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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been introduced
to control and monitor industrial processes and our daily critical infrastructures
such as electric power generation, water distribution and waste water collection
systems. This introduction improves the process and the safety of personnel. In
addition, the operation costs are significantly reduced [Boyer, 2009]. However, any
disruption to SCADA systems can result in financial consequences or may lead to
loss of life in a worst case scenario. Responding to potential risks, in the past,
SCADA systems were secure by virtue of their obscurity where only proprietary
hardware and software were used. Moreover, they were totally isolated from the
public network (e.g. the Internet). Due to this isolation, malicious intrusions and
attacks, that are expected to come from the outside world, were not a big concern.
However, there was a strong possibility of such threats occurring on the inside.
In recent years, the incorporation of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) prod-
ucts such as standard hardware and software platforms have begun to be used in
SCADA systems. This incorporation has allowed various products from different
vendors to be integrated with each other to build a SCADA system at low cost. In
addition, the integration of standard protocols (e.g. TCP/IP) into COTS products
has increased their connectivity, thereby increasing productivity and profitability.
However, this shift from proprietary and customized products to standard ones
exposes these systems to cyber threats [Oman et al., 2000].
An awareness of the potential threats to SCADA systems and the need to reduce
risk and mitigate vulnerabilities has recently become an interesting research topic
in the security area. A number of security measures have been extensively used in
traditional IT such as management, filtering, encryption and intrusion detection.
However, such measures cannot be applied directly to SCADA systems without con-
sidering their different nature and characteristics. Moreover, none of these security
measures can completely protect a system from the potential threats. However, the
full complement of these measures can create a robust security system.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the security measures that has
demonstrated promising results in detecting malicious activities in traditional IT
systems, and therefore it has been adapted in SCADA systems. The type of in-
formation source and detection methods are the salient components that play a
major role in developing IDS. The network traffic and events at system and ap-
plication levels are examples of information sources. The detection methods are
broadly categorized into two types in terms of detection: signature-based [Digi-
talbond, 2013] and anomaly-based [Linda et al., 2009; Kumar et al., 2007; Valdes
and Cheung, 2009; Yang et al., 2006; Ning et al., 2002; Gross et al., 2004]. The
former can detect only an attack whose signature is already known, while the latter
can detect unknown attacks by looking for activities that deviate from an expected
pattern (or behaviours). The differences between the nature and characteristics of
traditional IT and SCADA systems have motivated security researchers to develop
SCADA-specific IDSs. Recent researches on this topic found that the modelling
of measurement and control data that are called SCADA data is promising as a
means of detecting malicious attacks intended to jeopardize the targeted SCADA
system. However, the development of efficient and accurate detection models is still
an open research area.
Anomaly-based detection models can be built by using three modes, namely
supervised, semi-supervised or unsupervised. The class labels must be available for
the first mode; however, this type of learning is costly and time-consuming because
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domain experts are required to label hundreds of thousands of data observations.
The second mode is based on the assumption that the training data set represents
only one behaviour, either normal or abnormal. There are a number of issues
pertaining to this mode. The system has to operate for a long time under normal
conditions in order to obtain purely normal data that comprehensively represent
normal behaviours. However, there is no guarantee that any anomalous activity
will occur during the data collection period. On the another hand, it is challenging
to obtain a training data set that covers all possible anomalous behaviours that can
occur in the future. Alternatively, the unsupervised mode can be an appropriate
solution to address the aforementioned issues, where the anomaly detection models
can be built from unlabelled data without prior knowledge about normal/abnormal
behaviours. However, the low efficiency and accuracy are challenging issues of this
type of learning.
This thesis aims to develop an efficient and accurate unsupervised SCADA data-
driven IDS. Four research tasks are being addressed in this thesis. The first task
is related to the development of a framework for a SCADA security testbed that
is intended to be an evaluation and testing environment for SCADA security in
general, and for our proposed IDS in particular. While, the last three tasks are
focused on developing a set of solutions that can, together, achieve the aim of this
study.
Firstly, the establishment of a SCADA security testbed is a salient part of our
approach in order to evaluate and test the practicality and efficacy of any proposed
SCADA security solution. The evaluation and testing using actual SCADA systems
are infeasible since their availability and performance are most likely to be affected.
Moreover, the establishment of real SCADA testbeds would be costly and beyond
the reach of most researchers. Hence, we focus our efforts on the development of
a framework for a SCADA security testbed. In this framework, both the main
SCADA components and a controlled environment are modelled. The former part
includes essential services, a famous SCADA protocol (e.g. ModBus/TCP) and
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gateway through which the controlled environment is supervised and controlled. In
the latter part, we develop a server that acts as a surrogate for water distribution
systems. This server runs on the top of the dynamic link library (DLL) of EPANET,
the well-known modelling tool for simulating water movement and quality behaviour
within pressurized pipe networks.
Secondly, building anomaly detection models from unlabelled data is a challeng-
ing task since there is no prior knowledge about the normal/abnormal behaviours.
The k-nearest neighbour approach is believed to be one of the most interesting and
best techniques for data mining in general [Wu et al., 2008], and in particular, it
has demonstrated promising results in anomaly detection [Chandola et al., 2009b].
However, it is infeasible for use with large and high-dimensional data. In this
task, an efficient k-Nearest Neighbour approach based on Various-Widths Cluster-
ing is proposed, named kNNVWC, to efficiently address the aforementioned issues.
This approach is based on a novel various-width clustering algorithm and triangle
inequality. The performance of this approach is established over twelve data sets
which vary in domains, size and dimensionality. Results of experiments demonstrate
that the proposed approach performs well compared to four well-known algorithms.
Thirdly, it is impractical to develop SCADA data-driven anomaly detection
models that retain all the training data because a large memory capacity is re-
quired and high computational costs are incurred when operating such models in
the detection phase. Hence, we propose a novel SCADA Data-driven Anomaly
Detection approach, called SDAD, based on a clustering-based technique to ex-
tract proximity-based detection rules for each behaviour (normal and abnormal),
where the extracted proximity rules comprise a tiny portion compared to the train-
ing data, and meanwhile they maintain the representative nature of the original
data. Two main steps are performed in this approach: the separation between nor-
mal/abnormal behaviours. Then, a fixed-width clustering technique [Portnoy et al.,
2001] is adapted to partition the observations for each behaviour into micro-clusters.
The centroid of each micro-cluster is proposed as a new representative observation
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for the micro-cluster’s members. The experiments, conducted on real and simulated
data sets, have confirmed that the extracted proximity-based detection rules have
demonstrated promising results for detecting anomalies in SCADA data. Moreover,
the reliability of this approach has been tested against a well-known and existing
clustering-based intrusion detection algorithm.
Fourthly, and finally, the unsupervised anomaly learning method is a possible
means of learning anomaly detection models from unlabelled data. In fact, it is a
cost-efficient choice because experienced domain experts are not required for the la-
belling of a large amount of data. However, such learning suffers from low efficiency
and poor accuracy as it is based on assumptions to find the near-optimal anomaly
detection threshold, and therefore the accuracy of the anomaly detection models is
based on the validity of the assumptions. Thus, in this task, we propose a novel
approach called GATUD (Global Anomaly Threshold to Unsupervised Detection)
to address this issue. A most-representative and small data set for both normal
and abnormal behaviours is learned from unlabelled data. Then, a set of supervised
classifiers is used to create an ensemble-based decision-making model that is used
as an add-on component with any unsupervised anomaly detection technique in
order to find a global and efficient anomaly detection threshold. Experiments have
shown that the integration of GATUD into two unsupervised anomaly detection
approaches, has significantly improved their detection accuracy.
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Chapter1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the motivation for this research, highlights the existing
solutions and their limitations, and puts our work into context.
1.1 Motivation
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been integrated
to control and monitor industrial processes and our daily critical infrastructures
such as electric power generation, water distribution and waste water collection
systems. This integration adds valuable input to improve the safety of the process
and the personnel, and to reduce operation costs [Boyer, 2009]. However, any
disruption to SCADA systems can result in financial disasters or may lead to loss
of life in a worst case scenario. Therefore, in the past, such systems were secure
by virtue of their isolation and only proprietary hardware and software were used
to operate these systems. In other words, these systems were self-contained and
totally isolated from the public network (e.g. the Internet). This isolation created
the myth that malicious intrusions and attacks from the outside world were not a
big concern, and such attacks were expected to come from the inside. Therefore,
when developing SCADA protocols, the security of the information system was
given no consideration.
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In recent years, SCADA systems have begun to shift away from using propri-
etary and customized hardware and software to using Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) solutions. This shift has increased their connectivity to the public net-
works using standard protocols (e.g. TCP/IP). In addition, there is decreased
reliance on one vendor. Undoubtedly, this increases productivity and profitability
but will, however, expose these systems to cyber threats [Oman et al., 2000]. Ac-
cording to a survey published by the SANS Institute [Bird and Kim, 2012], only
14% of companies perform security reviews of COTS applications that are being
used. While, over 50% of other companies do not perform security assessments,
and rely only on vendor reputation or the legal liability agreements, or they have
no policies at all regarding the use of COTS solutions.
In fact, the adoption of COTS solutions is a time- and cost-efficient means of
building SCADA systems. In addition, COST-based devices are intended to oper-
ate on traditional Ethernet networks and the TCP/IP stack. This feature allows
devices from various vendors to communicate with each other, and also helps to
remotely supervise and control critical industrial systems from any place and at
any time using the Internet. Moreover, wireless technologies can efficiently be used
to provide mobility and local control for multi-vendor devices at a low cost for
installation and maintenance. However, the convergence of state-of-the-art com-
munication technologies exposes SCADA systems to all the inherent vulnerabilities
of these technologies. In the following, we discuss how the potential attacks against
the traditional IT can also be possible against SCADA systems.
• Denial of Services (DoS) attacks: This is a potential attack on any
Internet-connected device where a large number of spurious packets are sent
to a victim in order to consume excessive amounts of endpoint network band-
width. A packet flooding attack [Houle et al., 2001] is often used as another
term for a DoS attack. This type of attack delays or totally prevents the vic-
tim from receiving the legitimate packets [Householder et al., 2001]. SCADA
networking devices that are exposed to the Internet such as routers, gate-
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ways and firewalls are susceptible to this type of attack. [Long et al., 2005]
demonstrated two models of DoS attacks on a SCADA network using reli-
able simulation. The first model was directly launched to an endpoint (e.g.
controller or a customer-edge router connecting to the Internet), while the
second model is an indirect attack, where the DoS attack is launched on a
router (on the Internet) that is located in the path between the plant and
endpoint. In this study, it was found that DoS attacks that were launched di-
rectly (or indirectly) cause excessive packet losses. Consequently, a controller
that receives the measurement and control data late or not at all from the
devices deployed in the field will make a decision based on old data.
• Propagation of malicious codes: This type of attacks can occur in var-
ious forms such as viruses, Trojan horses and worms. They are potential
threats to SCADA systems that are directly (or indirectly) connected to the
Internet. Unlike worms, viruses and Trojans require a human action to be
initiated. However, all these threats are highly likely as long as the personnel
are connected to the Internet through the corporate network, which is directly
connected to the SCADA system, or if they are allowed to plug their personal
USBs into the corporate workstations. Therefore, a user can be deceived into
downloading a contaminated file containing a virus, or installing software that
appears to be useful. Shamoon [Bronk and Tikk-Ringas, 2013], Stuxnet [Fal-
liere et al., 2011], Duqu [Bencsa´th et al., 2012] and Flame [Munro, 2012]
are examples of such threats targeting SCADA systems and oil and energy
sectors.
• Inside threats: The employees who are disgruntled or intend to divulge
valuable information for malicious reasons, can pose real threats and risks that
should be taken seriously. This is because employees usually have unrestricted
access to the SCADA systems and also know the configuration settings of
these systems. For instance, the attack on the sewage treatment system in
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Maroochy Shire, south-east Queensland, Australia, 2001 [Slay and Miller,
2007] is an example of an attack that was launched by a disgruntled employee,
where the attacker took over the control devices of a SCADA system and
caused 800,000 litres of raw sewage to spill out into local parks and rivers.
• Unpatched vulnerabilities: The existence of vulnerabilities is highly ex-
pected in any system, and it is known that hackers always exploit unpatched
vulnerabilities to obtain access and to control the targeted system. Even
though the vendors immediately release the patches for the identified vulner-
abilities, it is challenging to install these patches on SCADA systems that
run twenty-four-by-seven. Therefore, such systems will remain vulnerable for
weeks or months. According to the independent and Open Source Vulnerabil-
ity DataBase(OSVDB)1 for the security community, vulnerabilities targeting
SCADA systems (as shown in Figure 1.1) have increased over the past three
years since 2011.
• Non-technical (social engineering) attacks: This type of attack can
bypass state-of-the-art security technologies that cost millions of dollars. In
general, the attackers initially try to obtain sensitive information such as
the design, operations, or security controls of the targeted SCADA system.
There are a number of ways to gather such information. If the network access
credentials of ex-employees are not immediately disabled, they can be revealed
to another party in order to profit from the information, or as a desire for
revenge. In another way, such critical information can be easily obtained
from the current employees as long as they are known by building a trust
relationship, or knowing some information about a naive employee who is
allowed to remotely control and monitor the systems via the Internet, all of
which can help the attacker to answer the expected questions when calling up
the central office to tell them that s/he forgot the network access credentials
and assistance is needed to connect to the field network.
1http://osvdb.org/
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Figure 1.1: SCADA vulnerabilities revealed since 2001 in OSVDB
The security concepts that have been extensively used in traditional IT, such as
management , filtering , encryption and intrusion detection , can be adapted
to mitigate the risk of the aforementioned potential threats against SCADA sys-
tems. However, these concepts cannot be directly applied without considering the
nature of SCADA systems. For instance, the resource constraints of SCADA de-
vices such as low bandwidth, processing power and memory, complicate the inte-
gration of complex cryptography, especially with legacy devices. All the SCADA
protocols were developed without any consideration given to information security
and, therefore, they lack authentication and integrity. Two solutions to secure the
SCADA communications are: placing the cryptographic technologies at each end of
the communication medium [American Gas Association (AGA), 2006; Tsang and
Smith, 2008], or directly integrating them into the protocol such as secure DNP3
that protects the communication between master stations and outstations such as
PLCs, RTUs and IEDs [Majdalawieh et al., 2006].
Apart from the efforts to authenticate and encrypt SCADA communication
links, it is still an open research challenge to secure the tens of SCADA protocols
that are being used, or to develop security modules to protect the communication
link between two parties. [American Gas Association (AGA), 2006] highlighted the
challenges in building security modules which can be broadly summarized into two
10 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
points: (i) the additional latency can be introduced by a secure protocol, and (ii)
the sophisticated key management system requires high bandwidth and additional
communication channels that SCADA communication links are lacking.
Similarly, the traffic filtering process between the SCADA network and the
corporate network using firewalls is a considerable countermeasure to mitigate the
potential threats. However, although modern firewalls are efficient for analysing tra-
ditional IT traffic, they are incapable of in-depth analysis of the SCADA protocols.
To develop firewalls tailored to SCADA systems, the UK governments National In-
frastructure Security Co-ordination Center (NISCC) published its guidelines for the
appropriate use of firewalls in SCADA networks [Byres et al., 2005]. It is proposed
that a micro-firewall to be embedded within each SCADA device to allow only the
traffic relevant to the host device. However, the computational power of SCADA
devices can be the challenging issue to support this type of firewall.
Firewalls can be configured using restrict-constrained rules to control traffic in
and out of the SCADA network; however, this will conflict with the feature al-
lowing remote maintenance and operation by vendors and operators. In addition,
the firewalls are assumed to be physically placed between the communication end-
points to examine each packet prior to passing it to the receiver. This may cause
a latency that is not acceptable in real-time networks. Since firewalls do not know
the “normal” operational behaviour of the targeted system, they cannot stop ma-
licious control messages, which may drive the targeted system from its expected
and normal behaviours, when they are sent from a compromised unit that is often
used to remotely control and monitor SCADA networks. Moreover, it is beyond
the ability of firewalls when the attacks are initiated internally using an already-
implanted malicious code, or directly by an employee. Stuxnet [Falliere et al., 2011],
Duqu [Bencsa´th et al., 2012] and Flame [Munro, 2012] are the recent cyber-attacks
that were initiated from inside the automation system. Therefore, the reliance only
on firewalls is not enough to mitigate the potential threats to SCADA systems.
Hence, an additional defense needs to be installed to monitor already predefined
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(or unexpected) patterns for either network traffic or system behaviours in order to
detect any intrusion attempt. This technique is known in the information security
area as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
There is no security countermeasure that can completely protect the target sys-
tem from potential threats, although a number of countermeasures can be used in
conjunction with each other in order to build a robust security system. An IDS (In-
trusion Detection System) is one of the security techniques that has demonstrated
promising results in detecting malicious activities in traditional IT systems. The
source of audit data and the detection methods are the main, salient parts in the
development of an IDS. The network traffic, system-level events and application-
level activities are the most usual sources of audit data. The detection methods
are categorized into two strategies: signature-based and anomaly-based. The
former searches for an attack whose signature is already known, while the latter
searches for activities that deviate from an expected pattern or from the predefined
normal behaviours.
Due to the differences between the nature and characteristics of traditional
IT and SCADA systems, there has been a need for the development of SCADA-
specific IDSs, and in recent years this has become an interesting research area. In
the literature, they vary in terms of the information source being used and in the
analysis strategy. Some of them use SCADA network traffic [Linda et al., 2009;
Cheung et al., 2007; Valdes and Cheung, 2009], system-level events [Yang et al.,
2006], or measurement and control data (values of sensors and actuators) [Rrushi
et al., 2009b; Fovino et al., 2010a; Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012] as the
information source to detect malicious, uncommon or inappropriate actions of the
monitored system using various analysis strategies which can be signature-based,
anomaly-based or a combination of both.
It is believed that the modelling of measurement and control data is a promising
means of detecting malicious attacks intended to jeopardise the targeted SCADA
system. For instance, the Stuxnet worm is a sophisticated attack that targets a
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control system, and initially cannot be detected by the antivirus software that was
installed in the victim [Falliere et al., 2011]. This is because it used zero-day
vulnerabilities and validated its drivers with trusted stolen certificates. Moreover,
it could hide its modifications using sophisticated PLC rootkits. However, the
final goal of this attack cannot be hidden since the manipulation of measurement
and control data will make the behaviour of the targeted system deviate from
previously seen ones. This motivates the design of SCADA-specific IDSs
using SCADA data (measurement and control data) which is an information
source to monitor the internal behaviour of the given system and protect it from
malicious actions that are intended to sabotage or disturb the proper functionality
of the targeted system.
As previously indicated, the analysis (or modelling) method, which will be used
to build the detection model using SCADA data, is the most second important
part after the selection of the information source when designing the IDS. It is
difficult to build the “normal” behaviours of a given system using observations
of the raw SCADA data because, firstly, it cannot be guaranteed that all obser-
vations represent one behaviour as either “normal” or “abnormal”, and therefore
domain experts are required for the labelling of each observation and this process is
prohibitively expensive; secondly, in order to obtain purely “normal” observations
that comprehensively represent “normal” behaviours, this requires a given system
to be run for a long period under normal conditions, and this not practical; and
finally, it is challenging to obtain observations that will cover all possible abnormal
behaviours that can occur in the future. Therefore, we strongly believe that the
development of a SCADA-specific IDS that uses SCADA data and operates in
unsupervised mode, where the labelled data is not available, has great potential
as a means of addressing the aforementioned issues. The unsupervised IDS can be
a time- and cost-efficient means of building detection models from unlabelled data;
however, this requires an efficient and accurate technique to differentiate between
the normal and abnormal observations without the involvement of experts, which
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is costly and prone to human error. Then, from observations of each behaviour,
either normal or abnormal, the detection models can be built.
1.2 Existing solutions
A layered defense could be the best security mechanism, where each layer in the
computer and network system is provided with a particular security countermea-
sure. For instance, organizations deploy firewalls between their private networks
and others to prevent unauthorized users from entering. However, firewalls can-
not address all risks and vulnerabilities. Therefore, an additional security layer
is required. The last component at the security level is the IDS that is used to
monitor intrusive activities [Pathan, 2014]. The concept of an IDS is based on the
assumption that the behaviours of intrusive activities are noticeably distinguishable
from the normal ones [Denning, 1987]. Since the last decade, compared to other
security countermeasures, the deployment of IDS technology has attracted great
interest from the traditional IT systems domain [Pathan, 2014]. The promising
functionalities of this technology have encouraged researchers concerned about the
security of SCADA systems to adopt this technology while taking into account the
nature and characteristics of SCADA systems.
To design an IDS, two main processes are often considered: first, the selection of
the information source (e.g. network-based, application-based) to be used, through
which anomalies can be detected; second, the building of the detection models using
the specified information source. SCADA-specific IDSs can be broadly grouped into
three categories in terms of the latter process: signature-based detection [Digital-
bond, 2013], anomaly detection [Linda et al., 2009; Kumar et al., 2007; Valdes and
Cheung, 2009; Yang et al., 2006; Ning et al., 2002; Gross et al., 2004], specification-
based detection [Cheung et al., 2007; Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2010a;
Fernandez et al., 2009]. Recently, several signature-based rules [Digitalbond, 2013]
have been designed to specifically detect particular attacks on SCADA protocols.
The rules can perfectly detect known attacks at SCADA network level. To detect
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unknown attacks at SCADA network level, a number of approaches have been pro-
posed. [Linda et al., 2009] suggested a window-based feature extraction technique
to extract important features of SCADA network traffic, and then used a feed-
forward neural network with the back propagation training algorithm for modelling
the boundaries of normal behaviours. However, this approach suffers from the great
amount of execution time required in the training phase, in addition to the need
for relearning the boundaries of normal behaviour upon receiving new behaviours.
The model-based detection approach proposed by [Valdes and Cheung, 2009]
learns about the communication patterns. This is based on the assumption that
the communication patterns of control systems are regular and predictable because
SCADA has specific services as well as interconnected and communicated devices
that are already predefined. This approach is useful in providing a border monitor-
ing of the requested services and devices. Similarly, [Gross et al., 2004] proposed
a collaborative approach, named “selecticast”, which uses a centralised server to
disperse among ID sensors any information about activities coming from suspicious
IP. [Ning et al., 2002] identifies causal relationships between alerts using prereq-
uisites and consequences. In essence, these approaches fail to detect high-level
control attacks, which are the most difficult threats to combat successfully [Wei
et al., 2011]. Furthermore, SCADA network level approaches are not concerned
with the operational meaning of the process parameters’ values, which are carried
by SCADA protocols, as long as they are not violating the specifications of the
protocol being used, or a broader picture of the monitored system.
Thus, analytical models based on the full system specifications have been pro-
posed in the literature. [Fovino et al., 2010a] proposed an analytical approach to
identify critical states for specific-correlated process parameters. Therefore, the
developed detection models are used to detect malicious actions ( such as high-
level control attacks) that try to drive the targeted system into a critical state. In
the same direction, [Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012] extended this idea
by identifying critical states for specific-correlated process parameters. Then, each
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critical state is represented by a multivariate vector, each vector being a reference
point to measure the degree of criticality of the current system. For example,
when the distance of the current system state is close to any critical state, it shows
that the system is approaching a critical state. However, the critical state-based
approaches require full specifications of all correlated process parameters in addi-
tion to their respective acceptable values. Moreover, the analytical identification
of critical states for a relatively large number of correlated process parameters, is
time-expensive and difficult. This is because the complexity of the interrelation-
ship among these parameters is proportional to their numbers. Furthermore, any
change in the system brought about by adding or removing process parameters will
require the same effort again. Obviously, human errors are highly expected in the
identification process of critical system states.
Due to the aforementioned issues relating to analytical models, SCADA data-
driven models have been proposed to capture the mechanistic behaviour of SCADA
systems without a knowledge of the physical behaviour of the systems. It was ex-
perimentally found by [Wenxian and Jiesheng, 2011] that operational SCADA data
for wind turbine systems are useful if they are properly analyzed to indicate the
condition of the system that is being supervised. A number of SCADA data-driven
methods for anomaly detection have appeared in the literature. [Jin et al., 2006]
extended the set of invariant models by a value range model to detect anomalous
values in the values for a particular process parameter. A pre-determined threshold
is proposed for each parameter, and any value exceeding this threshold is consid-
ered as anomalous. This approach can detect the anomalous values of an individual
process parameter. However, the value of an individual process parameter may not
be abnormal, but, in combination with other process parameters, may produce
abnormal observation, which very rarely occurs. These types of parameters are
called multivariate parameters, and are assumed to be directly (or indirectly) cor-
related. [Rrushi et al., 2009b] applied probabilistic models to estimate the normalcy
of the evolution of values of multivariate process parameters. Similarly, [Marton
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et al., 2013] proposed a data-driven approach to detect abnormal behaviours in
industrial equipment, where two multivariate analysis techniques, namely principal
component analysis (PCA) and partial least squares (PLS) are combined to build
the detection models. Neural network-based approaches have been proposed to
model the normal behaviours for various SCADA applications. For instance, [Gao
et al., 2010] proposed a neural-network-based intrusion detection system for water
tank control systems. In a different application, this technique has been adapted
by [Zaher et al., 2009] to build the normal behaviours for a wind turbine to identify
faults or unexpected behaviours (anomalies).
Although the results for the aforementioned SCADA data-driven approaches
are promising, they work only in supervised or semi-supervised modes. The former
mode is applicable when the labels for both normal/abnormal behaviours are avail-
able. Domain experts need to be involved in the labelling process but it is costly and
time-consuming to label hundreds of thousands of data observations (instances). In
addition, it is difficult to obtain abnormal observations that comprehensively rep-
resent anomalous behaviours. While in the latter mode, a one-class problem (either
normal or abnormal data) is required to train the model. Obtaining a normal train-
ing data set can be done by running a target system under normal conditions and
the collected data is assumed to be normal. To obtain purely normal data that
comprehensively represent normal behaviours, the system has to operate for a long
time under normal conditions. However, this cannot be guaranteed, and therefore
any anomalous activity occurring during this period will be learned as normal. On
the other hand, it is challenging to obtain a training data set that covers all possible
anomalous behaviours that can occur in the future.
Unlike supervised, semi-supervised and analytical solutions, in this thesis we
are interested in unsupervised anomaly detection models, where experts
are not required to prepare a labelled training data set or analytically define the
boundaries of normal/abnormal behaviours of a given system. In other words,
we are interested in developing a robust unsupervised intrusion detection
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system that automatically identifies, from unlabelled SCADA data, both normal
and abnormal behaviours, and then extracts the proximity-detection rules for each
behaviour.
1.3 Research questions
In recent years, many researchers have turned their attention to SCADA data in
order to build data-driven models that are able to learn the mechanistic behaviour
of SCADA systems without a knowledge of the physical behaviour of the systems.
Such models have shown a promising ability to detect anomalies, malfunctions or
faults in SCADA components. Nonetheless, it remains a relatively open research
area to develop unsupervised SCADA data-driven detection models that can be
time-and cost-efficient for learning detection models from unlabelled data. How-
ever, such models often have low detection accuracy. In this thesis, we focus on the
development of an efficient and accurate unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS.
Four main research questions are formulated in order to develop the proposed sys-
tem. Three of these pertain to the development of techniques that are used to build
a robust unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS. The fourth question relates to the
development of a framework for a SCADA security testbed that is intended to be
an evaluation and testing environment for SCADA security in general, and for our
proposed unsupervised IDS in particular.
A) How to develop a SCADA testbed which is a realistic alternative for
real SCADA systems so that it can be used for efficient SCADA
security evaluation and testing purposes? An evaluation of the security
solutions of SCADA systems is important. However, actual SCADA systems
cannot be used for such purposes because availability and performance, which
are the most important issues, are most likely to be affected when analysing
vulnerabilities, threats and the impact of attacks. To address this problem,
“real” SCADA testbeds have been set up for evaluation purposes, but they
are costly and beyond the reach of most researchers. Similarly, small real
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SCADA testbeds have also been set up; however, they are still proprietary and
location-constrained. Unfortunately, in Australia such labs are not available
for researchers concerned with SCADA security. Hence, it would be ideal to
develop a SCADA model-based testbed for that purpose. In this modelling,
we are concerned with two essential parts: SCADA system components and a
controlled environment. In the former, we consider both high-level and field-
level components, and the integration of a real SCADA protocol is devised
to realistically produce SCADA network traffic. While, in the latter, it is
important to model a controlled environment such as smart grid power or
water distribution systems so that we can produce realistic SCADA data.
B) How to efficiently find the k-NN in large and high dimensional data?
Due to the specific nature of the proposed unsupervised SCADA, an IDS
is developed to build the SCADA data-driven models from the unlabelled
SCADA data which, it is highly expected, will contain anomalous data; the
task is intended to give an anomaly score for each observation. The k-Nearest
Neighbour (k-NN) algorithm was found, from the extensive literature review,
to be one of top ten most interesting and best algorithm for data mining in
general [Wu et al., 2008], and in particular it has demonstrated promising
results in anomaly detection [Chandola et al., 2009b]. This is because the
anomalous observation is assumed to have a neighbourhood in which it will
stand out, while a normal observation will have a neighbourhood where all its
neighbours will be exactly like it. However, having to examine all observations
in a data set in order to find k-NN for an observation x, is the main drawback
of this technique, especially with a vast amount of high dimensional data. To
efficiently utilise this technique, the reduction of computation time in finding
k-NN is the aim of this research question that we endeavor to address.
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C) How to learn, from unlabelled SCADA data, clustering-based prox-
imity rules for SCADA anomaly detection? To build efficient SCADA
data-driven detection models, the efficient proposed k-NN algorithm in ques-
tion two is used to assign an anomaly score to each observation in the train-
ing data set. However, it is impractical to use all the training data in the
anomaly detection phase. This is because a large memory capacity is needed
to store all scored observations, and it is computationally infeasible to cal-
culate the similarity between these observations and each current new obser-
vation. Therefore, it would be ideal to efficiently separate the observations,
which are highly expected to be consistent (normal) and the inconsistent
(abnormal) ones. Then, a few proximity detection rules for each behaviour,
whether consistent or inconsistent, are automatically extracted from the ob-
servations that belong to that behaviour.
D) How to find a global and efficient anomaly threshold to unsuper-
vised detection? Anomaly-scoring-based and clustering-based approaches
are among the best-known techniques that are often used to identify the
anomalies in unlabelled data. With anomaly-scoring-based techniques [Es-
kin et al., 2002b; Angiulli and Pizzuti, 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2006], all
observations in a data set are given an anomaly score, and therefore actual
anomalies are assumed to have the highest scores. The key problem is how
to find the near-optimal cut-off threshold that minimizes the false positive
rate while maximizing the detection rate. On the one hand, clustering-based
techniques [Portnoy et al., 2001; Mahoney and Chan, 2003a; Portnoy et al.,
2001; Jianliang et al., 2009; Mu¨nz et al., 2007] group similar observations to-
gether into a number of clusters, and anomalies are identified by making use
of the fact that those anomalous observations will be considered as outliers,
and therefore will not be assigned to any cluster, or they will be grouped in
small clusters that have some characteristics which are different from those
of normal clusters. However, the detection of anomalies is controlled through
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several parameter choices within each used detection technique. For instance,
given the top 50% of the observations which have the highest anomaly scores,
these are assumed as anomalies. In this case, both detection and false posi-
tive rates will be much higher. Similarly, labelling a low percentage of largest
clusters as normal in clustering-based intrusion detection techniques will re-
sult in higher detection and false positive rates. Therefore, the effectiveness
of unsupervised intrusion approaches is sensitive to parameter choices, espe-
cially when the boundaries between normal and abnormal behaviours are not
clearly distinguishable. Thus, it would be interesting to identify the observa-
tions whose anomaly scores are extreme and significantly deviate from others,
and then such observations are assumed to be “abnormal”. On another hand,
the observations whose anomaly scores are significantly distant from “abnor-
mal” ones will be assumed as “normal”. Then, the ensemble-based supervised
learning is proposed to find a global and efficient anomaly threshold using the
information of both “normal”/“abnormal” behaviours.
1.4 Summary of the contributions
This section summarizes the main contributions of this thesis. The first contribution
is the development of a SCADA security testbed through which the practicality
and efficacy of SCADA security solutions are evaluated and tested. While, the
remaining three contributions focus on the development of a robust unsupervised
SCADA data-driven Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
1. The evaluation and testing of security solutions tailored to SCADA systems
are challenging issues facing researchers concerned about these systems. Sev-
eral reasons for this include: privacy, security, and legal constraints that
prevent organizations from publishing their respective SCADA data. In ad-
dition, it is infeasible to conduct experiments on actual live systems, as this
is highly likely to affect their availability and performance. Moreover, the
establishment of a real SCADA lab can be costly and place-constrained, and
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therefore unavailable to all researchers. In this thesis, a framework for a
SCADA security testbed is introduced to build a full SCADA system based
on a hybrid of emulation and simulation techniques. A real SCADA protocol
is implemented, and therefore realistic SCADA network traffic is generated.
Moreover, a key benefit of this framework is that it is a realistic alternative to
the real-world SCADA system and, in particular, it can be used to evaluate
the accuracy and efficiency of our proposed unsupervised SCADA data-driven
IDS.
2. The unsupervised learning for anomaly-detection models is time- and cost-
efficient since it can learn from unlabelled data. This is because human exper-
tise is not required to identify the behaviour (whether normal or abnormal)
for each observation in a large amount of training data set. The anomaly scor-
ing techniques are believed to be promising automatic methods for assigning
an anomaly degree to each observation [Chandola et al., 2009b]. The k-NN
approach is one of the most interesting and best techniques for calculating
the degree of anomaly based on neighbourhood density of a particular obser-
vation [Wu et al., 2008]. However, this technique requires high computational
cost, especially with large and high-dimensional data that we expect to have
in the development of an unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS. Therefore,
we propose an efficient k-nearest neighbour-based approach that utilizes a
novel various width clustering algorithm and triangle inequality.
3. It is infeasible to retain all the training data in SCADA data-driven anomaly
detection models especially when these models are built from a large training
data set. This is because such detection models will be used for on-line mon-
itoring, and therefore the more information retained in the detection models,
the larger the memory capacity required and the higher the computation cost
required. To address this issue, we propose a clustering-based technique to ex-
tract proximity-based detection rules, which are assumed to be a tiny portion
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compared to the training data, for each behaviour (normal and abnormal).
Each rule comprehensively represents a subset of observations that represent
only one behaviour.
4. The unsupervised learning for anomaly-detection models is based mainly on
assumptions to find the near-optimal anomaly detection threshold. There-
fore, the accuracy of the detection models is based on the validity of the
assumptions. However, we propose an efficient approach to firstly identify
observations whose anomaly scores significantly deviate from others to repre-
sent “abnormal” behaviour. On the other hand, a tiny portion of observations
whose anomaly scores are the smallest are considered to represent “normal”
behaviour. Then, we propose an ensemble-based decision-making model to
find a global and efficient anomaly threshold using the information of both
“normal”/“abnormal” behaviours.
1.5 Organisation of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an introduction
to SCADA systems and their architectures, and main components. This includes a
description of the relationship between the main components and three generations
of SCADA systems. The classification of a SCADA Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) based on its architecture and implementation is described.
In Chapter 3, we introduce SCADAVT, a framework for a SCADA security
testbed based on virtualization technology. This framework is used to create a
simulation of the main SCADA system components and a controlled environment.
The main SCADA components and real SCADA protocol (e.g. Modbus/TCP) are
integrated. In addition, a server, which acts as a surrogate for water distribution
systems, is introduced. This framework is used throughout the thesis to simulate a
realistic SCADA system for supervising and controlling a water distribution system.
This simulation is mentioned in the other chapters to evaluate and test anomaly
detection models for SCADA systems.
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Chapter 4 introduces an efficient approach called kNNVWC to find the k-nearest
neighbours in large and high dimensional data. In this approach, a new various-
widths clustering algorithm is introduced, where the data is partitioned into a
number of clusters using various widths. Triangle inequality is adapted to prune
unlikely clusters in the search process of k-nearest neighbours for an observation.
Experimental results demonstrate that kNNVWC performs well in finding k-nearest
neighbours compared to a number of k-nearest neighbour based algorithms, espe-
cially for a data set with high dimensions, various distributions and large size.
Chapter 5 introduces an approach called SDAD to extract proximity-based de-
tection rules, from unlabelled SCADA data, based on a clustering-based technique.
The evaluation of this technique is performed by using real and simulated data sets.
The extracted proximity-based detection rules show a significant detection accuracy
rate compared with an existing clustering-based intrusion detection algorithm.
In Chapter 6, we introduce an approach called GATUD to find a global and
efficient anomaly threshold. GATUD is proposed as an add-on component that can
be attached to any unsupervised anomaly detection technique in order to define the
near-optimal anomaly threshold. GATUD demonstrates significant and promising
results with two unsupervised anomaly detection techniques.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the contribution made by this
thesis to the extant body of research, and suggests possible directions for future
research.
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Background
This chapter provides the background necessary to understand the various elements
of this thesis. This includes an introduction to SCADA systems and their archi-
tectures, and main components. In addition, the description of the relationship
between the main components and three generations of SCADA systems are intro-
duced. The classification of a SCADA Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on
its architecture and implementation is described.
2.1 SCADA system
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is an important computer-
controlled industrial system that continuously monitor and control many different
sections of industrial infrastructures such as oil refineries, water treatment and dis-
tribution systems, and electric power generation plants, to name a few. A SCADA
system is responsible for supervising and monitoring industrial and infrastructure
processes by gathering measurements and control data from the deployed field de-
vices at the field-level. The collected data is then sent to a central site for further
process and analysis. The information and statuses about the supervised and mon-
itored processes can be displayed on a human-machine interface (HMI) at the home
station in a logical and organized fashion. If an abnormal event occurs, the opera-
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tors can analyse the gathered data, and put in place the necessary controls. Because
these industrial systems are large and distributed complexes, it is necessary to con-
tinuously and remotely monitor and control different sections of the plant to ensure
its proper operation by a central master unit.
2.1.1 The main SCADA components
SCADA provides the facility of continuously supervising and controlling the in-
dustrial plant or process equipment. The main components of a typical SCADA
system include the Master Terminal Unit (MTU), Programmable Logic Controller
(PLCs), Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Communication Media, and Human Ma-
chine Interface (HMI).
• MTU- MTU is the core of a SCADA system that gathers the information
from the distributed RTUs and analyzes this information for the control pro-
cess. The plant performance is evaluated through histogram generation, stan-
dard deviation calculation, plotting one parameter with respect to another
and so on. Based on the performance analysis, an operator may decide to
monitor any channel more frequently, change the limits, shut down the ter-
minal units, and so on. The software can be designed according to the ap-
plications and the type of analysis required. The human operator sometimes
cannot find the best operating policy for a plant which will minimize the op-
erating costs. Because of this deficiency caused by the enormous complexity
of a typical process plant, the master computer station with a high speed,
and the programmed intelligence of the digital computer, are used to analyze
the situation and find out the best policy. The MTU monitors, controls and
coordinate the activities of various RTUs and send the supervisory control
commands to the process plant.
• Field devices (RTUs, PLCs and IEDs)- These are computer-based com-
ponents, and they are deployed at a remote site to gather data from sensors
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and actuators. Each field device may be connected to one (or more) sen-
sors and actuators that are directly connected to physical equipments such as
pumps, valves, motors, etc. The main function of such devices is to convert
the electrical signals coming from sensors and actuator into digital values in
order to be sent to the MTU for further process and analysis using a commu-
nication protocol (e.g. Modbus). On the another hand, they can convert a
digital command message, which is received from the MTU, into an electrical
signal in order to control actuators that are being supervised and controlled.
Even though these field-level devices RTUs, PLCs and IEDs are intended to
be deployed at a remote site, they have different functionalities. RTUs collect
data from sensors and send it back to MTU, and then MTU takes a decision
based on the this data and sends command to actuators. In addition to the
same function of RTUs, PLCS can collect data from sensors and based on the
collected data, they can send commands to actuators. That is, PLCs can pro-
cesses the data locally and take the decision without contacting MTU. IEDs
are part of control systems such as transformers, circuit breakers, sensors, etc,
and they can be controlled via PLCs or RTUs
• HMI- An HMI provides an efficient human machine interface through which
the operator can monitor and control the end devices such as sensors and
actuators. That is, the information of the current state of the supervised and
controlled process are graphically displayed to the user, and therefore s/he
can be updated with alerts, warnings and urgent messages. In addition, HMI
allows the user to entirely interact with the system.
• Historian- It is a database that is used to store all data gathered from
the system such as measurement and control data, events, alarms, operator’s
activities, etc. This data is used for historical, auditing and analysis purposes.
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2.1.2 SCADA architecture
A SCADA network provides the communication infrastructure for different field
devices such as PLCs and RTUs on the plant. These field devices are remotely
monitored and controlled throughout the SCADA network. To make the network
communication more efficient and secure, many modern computing technologies
have evolved from a monolithic system to a distributed system and to a current
networked system.
The First Generation: Monolithic System
The monolithic SCADA system is considered to be the first-generation SCADA
system. At that time, the concept of networks were non-existent in general, and
therefore the SCADA system was deployed as a stand-alone system, and there was
no connectivity to other systems. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, a SCADA master
uses Wide Area Networks (WANs) to communicate with field devices using com-
munication protocols that were developed by vendors of field devices. In addition,
these protocols had limited functionality, and they only could do scanning and con-
trolling points within RTUs. The communications between the master and field
decices (e.g. RTUs) were performed at the bus level using a proprietary adapter.
To avoid the system failure two identically equipped mainframe systems are used,
one to be as a primary, while another as backup. The latter will take over when
the failure of the primary is detected. Figure 2.1 illustrates the typical architecture
of this generation.
The Second Generation: Distributed System
Figure 2.2 shows a typical second-generation SCADA architecture. With the de-
velopment of Local Area Networking (LAN) technologies, as shown in Figure 2.2
the second generation of SCADA systems distributes the processing to multiple
systems and assigns a specific function for each station. In addition, multiple sta-
tions could be connected to a LAN in order to share information with each other
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Figure 2.1: First Generation SCADA architecture
in real time. For instance, the communication server can be setup to communi-
cate with field devices such as PLCs and RTUs. Some stations are distributed as
MTU, Historian, and HMI servers. The distribution of system functionality across
network-connected systems increases processing power, reduces the redundancy and
improves reliability of the system as a whole. In this generation, the system failure
is addressed by keeping all stations on the LAN in an online state over the operation
time, and if one station, say HMI station, fails, another HMI station will take over.
The Third Generation: Networked System
Unlike the second generation, the third generation is based on an open system
architecture rather than vendor controlled, proprietary solutions. One of the ma-
jor difference is that the third generation can utilize open standard protocols and
products. Consequently, SCADA functionality can be distributed across a WAN
and not just a LAN. For instance most field devices such as PLCS and RTUS can
be connected directly to the MTU over an Ethernet connection. This open system
architecture allows various products from different vendors to be integrated with
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Figure 2.2: Second generation SCADA architecture
each other to build a SCADA system at low cost. In addition, a remote field device
can be supervised and controlled from any place and at any time using the Internet.
Figure 2.3 shows the architecture of a typical networked SCADA system.
2.1.3 SCADA Protocols
There are over 150 protocols utilized by SCADA systems [Igure et al., 2006], and
only a small group is widely used. Modbus [IDA, 2004] and DNP3 [Majdalawieh
et al., 2006] are examples of such well-known protocols. The communication proto-
col in SCADA is the main weakness regarding security and can be easily attacked
from there. Firstly, when the communication protocols were initially proposed for
the SCADA network, people were focusing more on their efficiency and effective-
ness without considering the potential security issues they might encounter in the
future. As the security concerns became critical, security researchers discovered
that it was not easy to address this issue. One reason is that the upgrade or re-
placement of a vital SCADA network in old industrial systems can stop production.
Secondly, most of the original SCADA systems were often separate from other cor-
porate networks. Hence, a large number of communication layers and protocols
were designed separately, including GE Fanuc, Siemens Sianut, Toshiba, Modbus
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RTU/ASCII, Allen Bradley DF1/DH, and other vendor protocols.
Recently, both Modbus and DNP3 have been integrated with TCP/IP [Knapp
and Langill, 2011]. The Modbus protocol offers a modified version called Mod-
bus/TCP that uses the TCP/IP as transport and network protocols. The DNP3
protocol can also cover TCP and UDP. Frames at the link layer are encapsulated
into TCP/IP packets, so that DNP3 can take full advantage of the internet tech-
nology.
2.2 SCADA-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an autonomous hardware or software or a
combination of these used to detect threats to SCADA systems from both internal
and external attacks, by monitoring and analyzing activities on a host computer or
a network. A threat can be considered as a malicious activity intended to destroy
the security of a SCADA system. Under the threat, the confidentiality, integrity,
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or availability of the host computer or network are compromised. In addition, IDS
can prevent potential threats to the SCADA system by detecting precursors to an
attack, the unauthorized access, and abnormal operations, etc. According to the
location and source of data collected, in traditional IT, IDSs can be categorized into
network-based and host-based IDSs [Denning, 1987], and this categorization could
be similar even to SCADA systems. However, due to the different nature of SCADA
systems in terms of architecture, functionalities, used devices, etc., SCADA IDSs,
within the scope of this thesis, are categorized based on only the source of data
collected: SCADA network-based and SCADA application-based.
2.2.1 SCADA network-based
A SCADA network-based IDS [Valdes and Cheung, 2009; Gross et al., 2004; Ning
et al., 2002; Linda et al., 2009] captures the data packets which are communicated
between devices such as points-to-points in RTU/PLC, between RTU/PLCs and
CTUs. The monitoring devices are always located throughout the network. The in-
formation in those captured data packets is evaluated to determine whether or not
it is a threat. If the packet is suspicious, security team members will be alarmed for
further investigation. The advantage of SCADA network-based IDSs is their lower
computation cost because only the information in the packet’s header is needed
for the investigation process, and therefore a SCADA network packet can be scru-
tinized on-the-fly. Consequently, large amounts of network can be inspected in a
satisfactory manner and within an acceptable time [Linda et al., 2009].
However, when there is high network traffic, a SCADA network-based IDS might
experience problems in monitoring all the packets and might miss an attack being
launched. The key weakness is that the operational meaning of the monitored
SCADA system can not be inferred from the information provided at the network
level such as IP address, TCP port, etc. Therefore, if the payload of the SCADA
network packet contains a malicious control message, which is crafted at the appli-
cation level, the SCADA network-based IDS cannot detect it if it is not violating
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the specifications of the protocol being used, or the communication pattern between
SCADA networked devices [Fovino et al., 2010a; Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al.,
2012].
2.2.2 SCADA application-based
SCADA applications typically log valuable information about supervised and con-
trolled processes, and this is stored in historian servers for maintenance, business,
historical and insight purposes. The SCADA data, that are the measurement and
control data generated by sensors and actuators, represent the majority of this
information, and in addition, they form the operational information for a given
SCADA system through which the internal presentation of monitored systems can
be inferred [Wenxian and Jiesheng, 2011; Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012;
Rrushi et al., 2009b; Zaher et al., 2009]. In contrast to the SCADA network-based
IDSs that inspect only network level information, a SCADA application-based IDS
can inspect the high level data such as SCADA data to detect the presence of
unusual behaviour. For example, high-level control attacks which are the most dif-
ficult threats to be detected by a SCADA network-based IDS [Wei et al., 2011], can
be detected by monitoring the evolution of SCADA data [Rrushi et al., 2009b].
Since the information source of SCADA application-based IDSs can be gathered
from different and remote field devices such as PLC and RTU, there are various
ways to deploy a SCADA application-based IDS, as follows. (i) It can be deployed in
the historian server, as this server is periodically updated by the MTU server which
acquires, through field devices, such as PLC and RTU, the information and status of
the monitored system for each time period. However, this type of deployment raises
a security issue, since the real information and statuses in the MTU server can be
different from the ones that are sent to the historian server. This could occur when
the MTU server is compromised [Jared Verba, 2008]. (ii) It can be deployed in an
independent server providing that it will not be compromised, and the server from
time to time acquires information and statuses from all field devices [Fovino et al.,
33 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2010a]. Similarly, the large requests from this server each time will increase the
network overhead. Consequently, a performance issue may arise. (iii) Each adjacent
field device can be connected with a server running SCADA application-based IDS,
which are similar to the works in [Alcaraz and Lopez, 2014a;b]. However, the
key issue is that SCADA data are directly (or indirectly) correlated, and therefore
sometimes there is an abnormality in a parameter not because of itself, but due
to a certain value in another parameter [Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012].
Therefore, it would be appropriate to assign an individual SCADA application-
based IDS for each of the correlated parameters.
2.3 The different types of IDS approaches
The concept of IDS is based on the assumption that the behaviours of intrusive ac-
tivities are noticeably distinguishable from the normal ones [Denning, 1987]. Many
types of SCADA IDSs have been proposed in the literature, and these fall into two
broad categories in terms of the detection strategy: signature-based detection [Digi-
talbond, 2013] and anomaly-based detection [Linda et al., 2009; Kumar et al., 2007;
Valdes and Cheung, 2009; Yang et al., 2006; Ning et al., 2002; Gross et al., 2004].
2.3.1 Signature-based
A SCADA signature-based IDS detects malicious activities in SCADA network
traffic or application events by matching the signatures of known attacks that are
stored in a specific database. The false positive rate in this type of IDSs is very low
and can approach zero. Moreover, the detection time can be fast because it is based
only on a matching process in the detection phase. Despite the aforementioned
advantages of a signature-based IDS, it will fail to detect an unknown attack whose
signature is not known, or which does not exist in its database. Therefore, the
database must constantly be updated with patterns of new attacks.
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2.3.2 Anomaly-based
A SCADA anomaly-based IDS is based on the assumption that the behaviour of
intrusive activities mathematically or statistically differs from normal behaviours.
That is, they are based on advanced mathematical or statistical techniques used to
detect the abnormal behavior. For example, normal SCADA network traffic can be
obtained over a period of “normal” operations, and then a modelling technique is
applied to build the normal SCADA network profiles. In the detection phase, the
deviation degree between the current network flow and the created normal network
profiles is calculated. If the deviation degree exceeds the predefined threshold, the
current network flow will be flagged as an intrusive activity. The primary advantage
of anomaly-based compared to signature-based detection is that novel (unknown)
attacks can be detected, although it suffers from a high false positive rate.
A number of factors have a significant impact on the performance of SCADA
anomaly-based IDS in distinguishing between the normal and abnormal behaviour,
including the type of modelling technique, the type of building process of the de-
tection models and the definition of an anomaly threshold. Three learning pro-
cesses are usually used to build the detection models, namely supervised, semi-
supervised and unsupervised. In the supervised learning, anomaly-based IDS
requires class labels for both normal and abnormal behaviours in order to build nor-
mal/abnormal profiles. However, this type of learning is costly and time-expensive
when identifying the class labels for a large amount of data. Hence, semi-supervised
learning is proposed as an alternative, where an anomaly-based IDS builds only
normal profiles from the normal data that is collected over a period of “normal”
operations. However, the main drawback of this learning is that comprehensive
and “purely” normal data is not easy to obtain. This is because the collection of
normal data requires that a given system operate under normal conditions for a
long time, and intrusive activities may occur during this period of the data collec-
tion process. On the another hand, the reliance only on abnormal data for building
abnormal profiles is infeasible since the possible abnormal behaviours that may oc-
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cur in the future cannot be known in advance. Alternatively, an anomaly-based
IDS uses the unsupervised learning to build normal/abnormal profiles from unla-
belled data, where prior knowledge about normal/abnormal data is not known. In
fact, it is a cost-efficient method, although it suffers from low efficiency and poor
accuracy [Pietro and Mancini, 2008].
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Security Testbed
SCADA systems monitor and supervise our daily infrastructure systems and in-
dustrial processes. Hence, the security of such systems cannot be overstated. A
number of industrial systems are still using legacy devices, and meanwhile they are
directly (or indirectly) connected to the public network (Internet). This is because
the sharing of real-time information with the business operations has become a
necessity for improving efficiency, minimizing costs, and maximizing profits. This,
however, exposes SCADA systems to various types of exploitation. Therefore, it
is important to identify common attacks and develop security solutions tailored to
SCADA systems. However, to do so, it is impractical to evaluate security solutions
on actual live systems. This chapter introduces a framework for a SCADA security
testbed based on virtualization technology, in addition to a server which is used as
a surrogate for water distribution systems. Moreover, this chapter presents a case
study to demonstrate how the testbed can be effective in monitoring and controlling
automated processes, and a case study of two well-known malicious attacks to show
how such attacks can be launched on supervised processes. This testbed is used
throughout the thesis to evaluate the security models proposed in other chapters.
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3.1 Introduction
SCADA labs are safe for the evaluation of security solutions, the execution of pene-
tration tests, and the analysis of vulnerabilities and threats. This is because actual
SCADA systems are most likely to be affected. Therefore, real SCADA testbeds
such as [Christiansson and Luiijf, 2010; Sandia National Laboratories, 2012] have
been set up for evaluation purposes, but they are costly and beyond the reach
of most researchers. Similarly, small real SCADA testbeds [Fovino et al., 2010b;
Morris et al., 2011] have also been set up; however, they are still proprietary- and
location-constrained. Hence, a number of model-based SCADA testbeds have been
proposed [Queiroz et al., 2011; Kush et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2006; Reaves and
Morris, 2012; Giani et al., 2008]. However, these testbeds use several modelling
tools to build the essential main components of a SCADA system, and the way in
which these are linked makes it a complex process to use each testbed. Therefore,
such testbeds are unlikely to attract SCADA security experts.
This chapter provides details of the proposed SCADAVT, a framework for a
SCADA security testbed that is intended for security experts. Both the essential
SCADA components and the controlled environment (e.g. water distribution sys-
tems) are developed. The former is built on top of the CORE emulator [Ahrenholz,
2010], while the latter is modelled through the use of the dynamic link library
(DLL) of EPANET, the well-known modelling tool for simulating water movement
and quality behaviour within pressurized pipe networks [Lewis, 1999].
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents guidelines for estab-
lishing a SCADA security testbed. In Section 3.3, the guidelines are implemented
to achieve the proposed SCADAVT, a framework for the SCADA security testbed.
Section 3.4 presents a scenario application of SCADAVT. Section 3.5 describes two
types of well-known malicious attacks and demonstrates their effects on supervised
processes. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 6.6.
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3.2 The Establishment Guidelines of SCADA Security Testbed
The security of SCADA systems has become a topic of interest in recent years, and
therefore the number of security solutions has increased. However, the evaluation of
their practicality and efficacy is a challenging issue for researchers. This is because
the evaluation of actual SCADA systems is infeasible because their availability
and performance are most likely to be affected. Moreover, the establishment of
actual SCADA security labs is costly, and therefore not affordable for the research
community. To address this issue, a SCADA security testbed, consisting of model-
based simulations and emulations, can be a realistic alternative to a real-world
SCADA system. In this section, we provide a set of guidelines for building a
SCADA security testbed.
The development of a simulation of a full SCADA system that realistically
mimics a real-world SCADA system consists of two main parts which must be
considered: the controlled environment (e.g. water distribution system) and the
computer-based SCADA components that are responsible for supervising and con-
trolling this environment. The following guidelines are suggested for the develop-
ment of a simulation that includes these two parts.
G1. Select the communication infrastructure. As previously discussed in the
Background Section 2.1.1, the main computer-based SCADA components pro-
vide the facility of continuously supervising and controlling the process plant
or equipment in industries. Clearly, the communication infrastructure is the
first requirement to interconnect these components with each other. To the
best of our knowledge, no open-source SCADA network simulator or emu-
lator has been developed from scratch to meet the requirements of SCADA
systems. This contrasts with the traditional IT network, where a number
of traditional network simulators such as NS2/NS3 [NS3 Maintainers, 2012],
OMNET++ [Varga and Hornig, 2008], QualNet [Developers, 2012], and em-
ulators such as CORE emulator [Ahrenholz, 2010], PlanetLab [Chun et al.,
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2003], NetBed [Hibler et al., 2008] and NEMAN [Puzˇar and Plagemann, 2005]
are free and publicly available. Since the architectures of networks, hardware
and software of the main SCADA components, are computer-based, tradi-
tional network simulators and emulators can be adapted and modified to meet
SCADA network requirements. Due to the different functionalities of SCADA
systems, three features must be available in any candidate traditional network
simulator (or emulator): (i) the communication with the external world and
the capability of (ii) integrating (ii) new protocols and (iii) services (applica-
tions).
G2. Develop the main computer-based SCADA components. The main
SCADA components are categorised into two levels: high level and field level.
The former encompasses SCADA servers that are called Master Terminal
Units (MTU)), Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and a historian database;
the latter includes field devices such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), Pro-
grammable Logic Control (PLC), and an Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)
which are deployed in the controlled environment to control and collect mea-
surements and control data from sensors and actuators. Since these compo-
nents are not supported in the traditional network simulators (or emulators),
their implementation is important. Hence, an independent simulator for each
component needs to be developed. However, several considerations have to
be take into account in the development of each component: the expected
functionalities and characteristics; whether the physical location is to be in-
tegrated inside the candidate tradition network simulator (or emulator) or
placed in the external world; and finally, whether communication methods
will use internal or external components.
G3. Implement SCADA protocols. In contrast to the traditional IT, over 150
protocols are utilized by SCADA systems [Igure et al., 2006]. However,
only a small group is well-known and widely-used. Modbus [IDA, 2004] and
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DNP3 [Majdalawieh et al., 2006] are examples of such protocols. Therefore,
the integration of SCADA protocols in the internal world of the traditional
candidate network simulator (or emulator) will make it possible to realisti-
cally produce SCADA network traffic. In addition, a real SCADA device can
communicate with any SCADA component in the simulated (or emulated)
network, if its communication protocol is supported and the communication
between the internal and external world is enabled.
G4. Link the internal SCADA components with the external world. The
physical distribution and the functionalities of the computer-based SCADA
components must be considered when developing a simulation (or emulation)
of a full SCADA system. For instance, field devices such as PLCs and RTUs
are computer-based, and they are distributed in the controlled environment
for controlling and collecting measurements and control data from sensors
and actuators. The physical location of these devices is supposed to be in the
internal-simulated (or emulated) world because they are networked devices
(see Figure 3.1). However, it is infeasible to integrate the massive simulated
controlled environment (e.g water distribution system) into the internal world.
Therefore, it is practical to implement the controlled environment in the ex-
ternal world, and periodically exchange the measurement and control data
between it and the field devices. Moreover, the integration of the HMI client,
which is one of the main SCADA components, into the internal world may be
not practical. This is because this component is responsible for showing the
effects of the user’s manipulation in a graphical interface for human opera-
tors, and therefore the graphical feature may be not supported in the internal
world. Finally, the capability of connecting an external SCADA component
(whether real or simulated) with the internal world would be a flexible feature.
G5. Simulate a realistic controlled environment. SCADA systems are em-
ployed in a number of applications (controlled environments) such as petroleum
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refining, nuclear power generation, water purification and distribution sys-
tems, etc. To fully mimic a SCADA system, this part, which is the controlled
environment, must be implemented in order to be supervised and controlled
by the computer-based SCADA components. For instance, the PowerWorld
simulator [Simulator, 2013], which is not free, simulates the power grid with
a feature-rich power flow solver, and the process of supervisory control and
data acquisition can be performed on this simulator via a TCP-based proto-
col. Instead, it is time- and cost-efficient to use free and available modelling
tools such as the simulations of wind turbine blades [TU Berlin, 2013] or water
distribution systems [Lewis, 1999] for simulating the controlled environment.
3.3 All Details about SCADAVT
Based on the aforementioned guidelines for developing a SCADA Security Testbed,
we propose SCADAVT, a framework for a SCADA security testbed. According to
these guidelines, we first select the appropriate communication infrastructure for
the main computer-based SCADA components that will be developed in the second
step. In the third step, the well-known and widely-used SCADA Modbus/TCP
protocol [IDA, 2004] is integrated into the CORE. In the next step, we develop a
generic gateway that links the internal world (emulated network) with the external
world. Finally, we develop a server that acts as a surrogate for water distribution
systems, and this will represent the controlled environment.
3.3.1 The communication infrastructure
We have conducted a thorough investigation of a number of traditional network
simulators such as NS2/NS3 [NS3 Maintainers, 2012], OMNET++ [Varga and
Hornig, 2008], OPNET [OPNET Technologies, 2012], QualNet [Developers, 2012],
and emulators such as CORE [Ahrenholz, 2010], PlanetLab [Chun et al., 2003],
NetBed [Hibler et al., 2008] and NEMAN [Puzˇar and Plagemann, 2005]. The CORE
was chosen as the communication infrastructure for the computer-based SCADA
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components in SCADAVT. In the following, we discuss the CORE architecture,
followed by the selection features that we considered important when choosing the
CORE as the appropriate communication infrastructure for our testbed.
The CORE architecture
The CORE (Common Open Research Emulator) is a tool for emulating entire tra-
ditional networks on one or more machines [Ahrenholz, 2010]. Two mechanisms
are used in the CORE: an emulation technique to emulate the routers, PCs and
other hosts, and a simulation technique to simulate the network links between the
emulated components. The CORE was derived from the open source Integrated
Multi-protocol Emulator Simulator (IMUNES) project from the University of Za-
greb [Mikuc et al., 2014]. However, the CORE uses FreeBSD and Linux virtualiza-
tion, as opposed to IMUNES, where only FreeBSD virtualization is used. Figure 3.1
shows the main components of the CORE, which are circled by a green dashed-line.
To date, the CORE runs only on Linux and FreeBSD systems. In Linux distribu-
tions such as Fedora and Ubuntu, the CORE uses Linux network namespaces as the
primary virtualization technique to create a namespace that has its own process and
private network stack. Afterwards, the CORE combines the created namespaces
with Linux Ethernet bridging to form networks. As shown in Figure 3.1, Python
modules can be used by a cored daemon (backend), or directly imported by Python
scripts to manage the emulation sessions. A user can interact with the emulated
network only via those components that are colored green. It can also be seen that
Python modules contain a Service module. This module is provided to integrate a
new service such as a protocol and application into the CORE. The added service
will be a part of the CORE and it can be customized for one (or more) virtual
nodes. Refer to the CORE documentation for more details [Ahrenholz, 2014].
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Figure 3.1: SCADAVT Architecture.
The selection features
In this section, we highlight the features of the CORE that make it the appropriate
candidature network emulator for our proposed SCADA testbed. In addition to the
following features, we emphasize that the CORE has the three necessary features
that were previously discussed in the guidelines (see G1, Section 3.2).
• Self-continued networks lab: All components such as nodes, routers, pro-
tocols, etc. that are essential for building an emulated network are available
in a friendly development environment that can be used to create any network
topology and set up its configuration without the need to write any code.
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• Efficient and scalable: Tens of nodes can be created using a standard
laptop computer. This is because the CORE virtualizes some parts of the
operating system. That is, only the processes and network stacks are made
virtual. Thus, each created node is lighter than a full virtual machine.
• Distributed with multiple COREs: This feature increases efficiency and
scalability, enabling a number of servers to co-operate in order to run a mas-
sive emulated network consisting of thousands of nodes.
• Highly customizable: Services such as protocols and applications can be
easily customized for each node. That is, the processes or scripts, which run
on a node when it is started, can be selected based on the functions required
of each node. A number of services are introduced, but if a service which is
not available is needed, a new service can be integrated. In fact, this feature
can help to integrate the essential SCADA components into the internal world
(the emulated network).
• Connected to live physical networks: The emulated network of the CORE
runs in real time. Therefore, it can be connected to live physical networks.
This is true for any real network device that has an interface; it will be able
to communicate with any CORE node. This can be an advantage when con-
necting any actual SCADA device with the CORE’s nodes for the purpose
of security testing, provided that the protocol which the real SCADA device
can communicate is implemented and added to the CORE as a service.
• Wireless networks are supported: The CORE provides two modes of
wireless network emulation: on-off mode, where two nodes are linked with
each other based on the distance between them, and advanced mode where
the complex effects of communicating wirelessly are emulated. This is per-
formed by the integration of an Extendable Mobile Ad-hoc Network Emulator
(EMANE) and CORE [Ahrenholz et al., 2011].
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• It is based on virtualization technology: The CORE is based on vir-
tualization technology and because of this, the generated network behaviour
and data will be similar (as found in [Reaves and Morris, 2012]) to the ones
generated by real systems.
3.3.2 The main computer-based SCADA components
This section discusses the development and integration of the four essential computer-
based SCADA components. Three of them are high-level components: HMI Client,
MTU and HMI servers; the fourth is a field-level component that can be one of the
following: PLC, RTU or IED. In recent time, these field-level devices have nearly
the same responsibilities and functionalities. Therefore, PLC is preferred for this
testbed, and is sometimes called the slave-device. This is because it is only listen-
ing for requests from the master. Since, at this stage, only SCADA Modbus/TCP
protocol [IDA, 2004] is implemented, all the components are Modbus/TCP-based.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the physical location of each component. A component is
considered to be in the internal world only when it is integrated into the CORE and
is a part of it; otherwise, it is in the external world. Three SCADA components
are integrated into the internal world. For example, Modbus/TCP Slave Simula-
tor, Modbus/TCP Master Simulator and Modbus/TCP HMI Server Simulator that
represent a field-level device (e.g. PLC), MTU and HMI servers respectively. It
can also be seen in Figure 3.1 that I/O Modules Simulator is integrated into the
internal world. This component is developed to act as the real I/O Modules for
a field device. In the real world, each field device has I/O Modules that are used
to interface sensors and actuators in the controlled environment. Therefore, I/O
Modules Simulator can be used with any simulated field device to synchronize the
measurement and control data of the controlled environment that is located in the
external world, with the simulated field device in the internal world.
The CORE architecture has a Pycore component that contains a number of
Python modules. The service module is one of these, whereby a new service (e.g.
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application, process or protocol) can be integrated into the CORE using Python
scripts. Therefore, we implement all the components of the internal world using
Python Programming Language, and integrated as services.
On the another hand, two SCADA components (e.g. Modbus/TCP Historian
and Modbus/TCP HMI Client) are proposed to be in the external world (see the jus-
tifications in Section 3.2, G4). In this testbed, similar to the HMI client component,
we use publicly-available Modbus/TCP HMI client [Software Development Team,
2014]. As shown in Figure 3.1, SCADA Modbus/TCP-based components in the ex-
ternal world can directly connect with others in the internal world. This is because
all SCADA components in the internal world support the SCADA Modbus/TCP
protocol. In the following, we discuss the implementation of each component.
Modbus/TCP Simulators of Master/Slave
For clarity, Modbus/TCP Master Simulator and Modbus/TCP Slave Simulator rep-
resent the MTU server and field device (e.g. PLC) respectively. The modern
SCADA systems adapted a master-slave model which is similar to the client-server
approach, where the role of the slave model is to listen to any request from the
master model. The latter sends control messages to a number of slaves to which a
required slave responds according to the control instructions received. Since SCA-
DAVT in this stage supports only the Modbus/TCP protocol, these components
are Modbus/TCP-based (see Figure 3.1).
To implement these two SCADA components, we develop Python-based mas-
ter/slave simulators. The publicly-available library of Modbus/TCP protocol [Team,
2014], which is Python-based, is imported in each simulator so that any Modbus/TCP-
based component, whether real or virtual, can communicate with it. The integra-
tion of the library of Modbus/TCP protocol is discussed in the following step which
concerns the implementation of SCADA protocols.
Similar to any actual Modbus-field device (e.g. PLC or RTU), Modbus/TCP
Slave simulator will require mapping its registers prior to being run for the purpose
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of controlling and monitoring. Therefore, we provided a registers map procedure
for mapping the registers as follows:
pro_1 = [’ProcessID1’,’C’,1,’i’];
pro_2 = [’ProcessID2’,’C’,2,’i’];
...
...
pro_9 = [’ProcessID9’,’C’,10,’o’];
Registers.add([pro_1,pro_2,..,pro_9]);
Pro 1 is a Python list variable that contains the tag of a supervised process param-
eter and its block type and position in the RAM in its associated slave simulator
and parameter type (e.g, input/output). Four symbols, namely H, C, D and A are
used to represent the following register types, HOLDING, COILS, DISCRETE and
ANALOG registers respectively. It can be seen from the above that the types of
registers are COIL. The last line is the function that adds the mapped registers. All
IDs of processes have to be unique. This is because the gateway reads and writes
measurement data from and to the registers in each Modbus/TCP Slave Simulator
through the ID process (see Section 3.3.4).
The Execute function, that is provided by Modbus/TCP library [Team, 2014],
is used in Modbus/TCP Master Simulator for pushing and pulling the measurement
and control data to and from Modbus/TCP Slave Simulator.
Modbus/TCP Simulator of HMI Server
The HMI server is an intermediate component between the MTU and HMI client
where the HMI client sends the user’s manipulation to the HMI server in order to
be read and executed by the MTU. In the opposite direction, the MTU sends to
the HMI server the collected data from a field device after the user’s manipulation
so that the HMI client can request it in order to show the effects of the user’s
manipulation in a graphical interface for human operators. As can be seen in
Figure 3.1, the HMI client is an external component in the proposed SCADAVT
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because the HMI client with a graphical interface cannot be supported in the CORE.
Therefore, we implement a Python-based simulator of the Modbus/TCP HMI server
that runs two independent instances: the first instance listens to the request from
the MTU via the internal IP of virtual node in the emulated environment; the
second instance listens to the request from the HMI client via the backchannel which
is assigned to each emulated node. Therefore, the HMI client can connect with the
Modbus/TCP HMI server in two ways: via a backchannel or directly if the HMI
client has an independent physical interface and also supports the Modbus/TCP
protocol.
I/O modules Simulator
Modbus/TCP slave simulator, which will be running in the virtual node, is required
to monitor and control the simulated supervised process such as the simulations of
power generation and water distribution systems that are outside the emulated en-
vironment. Therefore, the Python-based IOModules simulator is implemented and
integrated into the CORE, where it acts as a server which receives input data from
the external environment and sends output data when requested. This is performed
through the backchannel for each virtual node using a simple and intuitive custom
TCP-based protocol called IOModules that will be elaborated on in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.3 The implementation of SCADA protocols
Over 150 protocols are utilized by SCADA systems [Igure et al., 2006], and there-
fore, it is challenging to implement them all. However, there are several well-known
and widely-used protocols such as Modbus [IDA, 2004], DNP3 [Majdalawieh et al.,
2006] and Zigbee [Cunha et al., 2007]. At this stage, only the Modbus protocol is
supported. This protocol used to work only on Modicon programmable controllers.
However, it has become widely used in recent SCADA control devices. Modbus
devices adapted a client-server approach, where the Modbus slave device repre-
sents the server side; while the Modbus master device represents the client side of
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the communication model. Only the master (Client) initiates the communication,
while the slave (Server) listens to the request from the master in order to supply
the requested data or execute the requested action.
Thanks to open and free software, the Python-based library of the Modbus/TCP
protocol, that is available under GNU (General Public Licence) [Team, 2014], is
used. This library is distributed as Python modules, and it needs to be installed
on the platform hosting the CORE. To use this library from the CORE, a Python-
based script that imports this library needs to be created and added as a new
service to the CORE. For example, the Modbus/TCP SCADA components such
as Modbus/TCP Master Simulator and Modbus/TCP Slave Simulator, that are
discussed in Section 3.3.2, import this library.
3.3.4 Linking internal/external world components
As previously discussed in Section 3.2, G4, the physical location of several computer-
based SCADA components such as field devices are proposed to be integrated into
the internal world since they are networked devices. However, they are required to
control and collect measurement and control data from sensors and actuators that
are distributed in the controlled environment in the external world. Thus, we need
to link the two. In this section, we implement a generic gateway, Python-based
class, called IOModuleGate. IOModules protocol, which will be discussed later, is
implemented to periodically exchange the measurement data between Modbus/TCP
slave simulator and the respective supervised process parameters through I/O Mod-
ules Simulator running in each virtual node. Two configuration files are invoked to
IOModuleGate, where each file is formatted as shown in Table 3.1. For example,
in the first file, PLC1 represents the ID for Modbus/TCP Slave Simulator whose
backchannel IP and port are 172.16.0.1 and 9161 respectively. While, in the sec-
ond file, the process parameters P1 and P2 are supervised by this Modbus/TCP
slave simulator (PLC1). The parameter type is indicated by either “o” or “i”
(e.g, input/output). For pulling and pushing the measurement data to and from
50 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 3. SCADAVT−A FRAMEWORK FOR SCADA SECURITY TESTBED
the emulated environment, two public writing and reading methods are provided
by IOModuleGate. These methods take and return a Python dictionary variable
which is a key-value pair. The key is the identity ID of the process parameter (e.g
P1) and its I/O data, where each process parameter in a supervised process must
have a unique ID.
Table 3.1: The configuration of IOModuleGate
1st configuration file 2nd configuration file
[PLC1]
ip:172.16.0.1
port:9161
[PLC2]
ip:172.16.0.2
port:9161
[P1]
controller : PLC1
paraType : i
[P2]
controller : PLC1
paraType : o
The IOModules protocol
A simple custom TCP-based protocol is implemented in I/O modules simulator
and IOModuleGate in order to exchange measurement and control data. Figure 3.2
shows four fields that comprise the message structure: (1) TransactionNo: a unique
number for each reading and writing operation. Both reading and writing opera-
tions have independent sequential numbering and initially start with one. In the
response message, this field contains the same number of request messages to indi-
cate that output data is available and correctly read. However, if it contains zero,
this indicates that the output data is not ready to be read, and therefore it needs to
wait a while before requesting again. The amount of waiting time can be specified
in the initialization time of the IOModuleGate class. (2) Function Code: this takes
three values, 1, 2 and 0, to indicate reading, writing and termination operations
respectively. (3) ProcessID : each process parameter in a supervised process must
have a unique ID. (4) Data: it contains the process parameter’s value. This field is
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set to zero in the request message of the reading operation.
DataFunction Code
1 Byte 10 Byte 4 Bytes
Protocol Data Unit
TransactionNO
4 Bytes
ProcessID
Figure 3.2: IOModules protocol message structure.
3.3.5 The simulation of a controlled environment
Real-world SCADA systems are intended to supervise and control industrial pro-
cesses and utilities (e.g. petroleum refining, water distribution systems, etc.). In
Section 3.2, G5, the simulation of a controlled environment is identified as the sec-
ond important part of the development of a full SCADA solution. In this section,
we introduce a server that simulates water distribution systems using a dynamic
link library (DLL) of the well-known modelling tool, which is called EPANET,
for simulating water movement and quality behaviour within pressurized pipe net-
works [Lewis, 1999]. This server is designed using Visual Basic 6 language. Three
items are required: (i) the description file, that can be designed and exported by
the visual interface of EPANET tool, which describes the topology and properties
of all components for the simulated water distribution system; (ii) the port num-
ber on which the server is listening; and (iii) the time interval to recompute new
simulated data.
The server is provided with a custom TCP-based protocol in order to manipulate
the simulated data using a SCADA system. For instance, a client can acquire and
control pump status in the simulation through this protocol. Figure 3.3 shows the
message structure of this protocol. (1) processID contains the ID of the process
parameter, which needs to be manipulated. (2) Function code defines only two
operation types: acquisition and control. (3) Parameter Type defines only two
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component types, Node and link. (4) Data Type specifies the data type that needs
to be manipulated. For example, the link component such as pump has a number
of data types that can be manipulated (e.g. speed, pumping energy and status).
(5) Data contains the process parameter’s value. This field is set to zero in the
request message for the reading operation.
Parameter Type DataFunction Code
1 Byte 1 Byte 4 Bytes
Protocol Data Unit
ProcessID
10 Bytes 1 Byte
Data Type
Figure 3.3: The protocol message structure of the WaterSystem Server.
3.4 A SCADAVT Application
This section presents the details of a real-life application of SCADAVT. In this
scenario, four steps are performed. Firstly, the important steps to set up SCA-
DAVT are presented in bullet points. Secondly, the properties, equipment, expected
services, etc. of the water distribution system, that comprise the controlled envi-
ronment in this scenario, are defined. In the remaining steps, the characteristics,
configurations, topology, etc. of the SCADA system responsible for supervising and
controlling the aforementioned controlled environment, are described.
3.4.1 The setup of SCADAVT
To set up SCADAVT, a number of dependencies are required to be installed as
follows:
• CORE is the core part of SCADAVT. For installation details, please refer
to [Ahrenholz, 2010].
• The Modbus library is a library provided by a third party and is publicly
available [Team, 2014]
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• Python interpreter is a prerequisite for the CORE, the Modbus library and
our integration scripts.
• the hpin3 utility is a security assignment tool that is used to assemble/analyze
TCP/IP packets [Sanfilippo, 2012]. This tool supports many protocols such
as TCP, UDP and ICMP. Moreover, this tool can be used to launch a number
of attacks such as Denial of Service and spoofing attacks.
• The integration scripts are our Python-based scripts developed in order to
integrate the essential SCADA components into the CORE as services. To
automatically add these services, a user needs to move these scripts to the
myservices directory which is found in the CORE directory path prior to
starting up the CORE.
3.4.2 The setup of water distribution system
In this scenario, we designed a Water Distribution System (WDS) for a small town
as shown in Figure 3.4 using the graphical interface of the EPANET tool. Figure 3.4
shows that the water network is divided into six areas, namely A, B, C, D, E and
F. Each area has an elevated tank to supply the area with water at a satisfactory
pressure level. There are two water treatment systems to supply water to all areas.
The first supplies areas A, B and C; the second supplies areas D, E and F. In
addition, area C can be supplied from the second system through area F and this
is subjected to some considerations of water demands in both areas C and F. The
supplied water is pumped out by three pumps from the first water treatment system
into Tank1. The water is also delivered to Tank2 by two pumps. Tank3 is supplied
through gravity because the elevation of Tank2 is higher than Tank3. Tank1 is
twice the size of Tank2 and Tank3 because it is the main water source for areas
B and C. Similarly, four pumps are used to pump out the supplied water from
the second water treatment system. The first two pumps deliver the water to
Tank4, while the other two pumps deliver the water to Tank6. Tank5 is supplied
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with water from Tank4 using two pumps. Each area consists of a number of sub-
areas, which are represented by a house symbol. A number of houses (households)
are located in each sub-area, and the number of people who live in each sub-area is
randomly selected, provided that the expected demands of the people do not exceed
the capacity that the system can deliver. In fact, people are not always at home
for the whole time; therefore, every hour, we randomly assign a small fraction of
the number of people in each sub-area as people who are away. This fraction does
not exceed 10%. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of people throughout the areas.
Table 3.2: The distribution of people throughout the areas
Area sub-area People Area sub-area People Area sub-area People
A1 4500 C1 3600 E1 3560
A2 5200 C2 4999 E2 4500
A3 5000 C3 2560 E3 3690
A4 3500 C4 3256
B1 6000 D1 6800 F1 3600
B2 3500 D2 4600 F2 4300
B3 6500 D3 3600 F3 3600
A C
B D
E
F
The water consumption in the water network model is one of the factors that
reflects the behaviour of simulated data. Therefore, a realistic model of water
consumption behaviour is required in order to obtain more realistic simulated data.
Therefore, we fed the consumption module, in the EPANET model, with a specific
model based on [Melbourne Water, 2009] (i.e. the 2009-2010 Melbourne water
consumption). Table 3.3 illustrates Melbournians’ average water usage per day
over one week. To roughly estimate the average water usage by one person per
day, we calculate the local mean µ and standard deviation σ for each sequential n
week. Then, we generate a random number, which represents the consumption of
water per person per day, from the normal distribution with mean µ and standard
deviation σ. Let X be a vector of average water usage per day over n weeks, where
X = {x1, x2, ....xn}. The mean µ and the standard deviation σ of X are obtained
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Figure 3.4: The simulation of water distribution system
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with the following equations:
µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
X(i) (3.1)
σ =
1
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(X(i)− µ)2 (3.2)
For instance, let the current week in the simulation be 23− 01− 2009, and n be
five weeks which are the current week and two weeks before and after. We assumed
that five weeks can represent seasonal variations in generating daily consumptions.
The average consumption per day for a person over this week and two weeks before
(09 − 01 − 2009, 16 − 01 − 2009) and after (30 − 01 − 2009, 06 − 02 − 2009) are
X = {143, 172, 188, 207, 241}. To calculate µ and σ of X Equations 5.8 and 3.2 are
used respectively. The consumption per day for a person in this week is randomly
generated from a normal distribution with mean 190.2 and standard deviation 36.83.
The hourly water consumption is determined by dividing the period of 24 hours
into four classes as follows:
1. {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} : this class consumes 10 %, the consumption for each hour
in this class is equal, that is, each hourly consumption is 0.0166 %
2. {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11} : this class consumes 35 %, the consumption for each
hour in this class is different, and is as follows: 0.10%, 0.10%,0.05%, 0.033%,
0.033%,0.033% respectively.
3. {12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17} : this class consumes 20 %, the consumption for each
hour in this group is equal to 0.033% for each.
4. {18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23} : this class consumes 35 %, the consumption for each
hour in this class is different, and is as follows: 0.10%, 0.10%,0.05%, 0.033%,
0.033%,0.033% respectively.
These classes are based on our assumptions about routine daily usage that would
be typical for each time period of the day.
57 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 3. SCADAVT−A FRAMEWORK FOR SCADA SECURITY TESTBED
Table 3.3: Melburnians’ average water usage per day over week
Date Avg-C Date Avg-C Date Avg-C Date Avg-C
9/01/2009 143 29/05/2009 142 23/10/2009 146 12/03/2010 133
16/01/2009 172 5/06/2009 134 30/10/2009 157 19/03/2010 155
23/01/2009 188 12/06/2009 129 6/11/2009 150 26/03/2010 152
30/01/2009 207 19/06/2009 136 13/11/2009 204 2/04/2010 144
6/02/2009 241 26/06/2009 136 20/11/2009 200 9/04/2010 141
13/02/2009 202 3/07/2009 130 27/11/2009 166 16/04/2010 138
20/02/2009 195 17/07/2009 136 4/12/2009 145 23/04/2010 154
27/02/2009 186 24/07/2009 143 11/12/2009 153 30/04/2010 135
6/03/2009 181 31/07/2009 141 18/12/2009 165 7/05/2010 139
13/03/2009 149 7/08/2009 139 25/12/2009 165 14/05/2010 136
20/03/2009 134 14/08/2009 138 1/01/2010 138 21/05/2010 136
27/03/2009 152 21/08/2009 141 8/01/2010 138 28/05/2010 135
3/04/2009 155 28/08/2009 138 15/01/2010 187 4/06/2010 133
10/04/2009 143 4/09/2009 141 22/01/2010 150 11/06/2010 129
17/04/2009 135 11/09/2009 139 29/01/2010 157 18/06/2010 126
24/04/2009 151 18/09/2009 150 5/02/2010 189 25/06/2010 131
1/05/2009 133 25/09/2009 137 12/02/2010 170 2/07/2010 127
8/05/2009 138 2/10/2009 132 19/02/2010 141 9/07/2010 129
15/05/2009 135 9/10/2009 138 26/02/2010 174 16/07/2010 135
22/05/2009 140 16/10/2009 144 5/03/2010 164 23/07/2010 132
1 Avg-C: Average water usage per day over week
3.4.3 The setup of SCADA system for WDS
This section shows how the SCADA devices are used to monitor and control the
previously-discussed water distribution system. This process is performed by drag-
ging and dropping the components of the CORE such as virtual node, link and
router. The integrated SCADA components (e.g. Modbus/TCP slave simulator)
are automatically added to the services that can be assigned to any virtual node
with one click. Figure 3.5 shows the SCADA network topology for this scenario.
Thirty-three PLCs are deployed throughout fourteen field areas (see Table 3.4) and
each PLC is connected with a field router to communicate with the Master Ter-
minal Unit (MTU) over the Internet, which is represented (in this scenario) by a
number of connected routers. Each PLC is assigned to specific functions in this
scenario. Table 3.5 shows end devices (sensors or actuators) that are supervised
and controlled by each PLC. All these PLCs are managed by the MTU which is
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Internet
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Field C Router 
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Field E Router 
Corporate Router
MTU/HMI Server
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Tank1 Tank2
Simulation of 
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Field A  Router 
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Figure 3.5: SCADA network topology for controlling the scenario of the water
distribution network
Table 3.4: The deployment of PLCs over field areas
Field Controllers Field Controllers
A PLC2 H PLC27, PLC28
B PLC3, PLC4 I PLC21, PLC25
C PLC5, PLC8, PLC9, PLC10 J PLC18, PLC19, PLC20
D PLC1 K PLC22, PLC23, PLC24
E PLC11, PLC12, PLC13 L PLC33, PLC29
F PLC6, PLC7 M PLC30, PLC31, PLC32
G PLC14, PLC15, PLC16, PLC17 N PLC26
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represented by a virtual node that required the service of the Modbus/TCP Master
Simulator. Through the MTU, in this scenario, a number of functions can be re-
motely performed either manually (via the HMI) or automatically (via the MTU).
In the following, Table 3.6 summarizes all these instructions that the MTU can
perform via each PLC:
Table 3.5: Field devices and their respective supervised devices
Field device Supervised devices
PLC1 Water level sensor of tank (T2) and actuators of valves (V1a and V1b)
PLC2 Actuators of pumps (P1, P2, P3)
PLC3 Water level sensor of tank (T1) and actuators of valves (V3a and V3b)
PLC4 Actuators of pumps ( P4, P5)
PLC5 Actuator of valve (V5) and flow meter (M5)
PLC6 Actuator of valve (V1)
PLC7 Water level sensor of tank (T3)
PLC8 Actuator of valve (V8) and flow meter (M8)
PLC9 Actuator of valve (V9) and flow meter (M9)
PLC10 Actuator of valve (V10) and flow meter (M10)
PLC11 Actuator of valve (V11) and flow meter (M11)
PLC12 Actuator of valve (V12) and flow meter (M12)
PLC13 Actuator of valve (V13) and flow meter (M13)
PLC14 Actuator of valve (V14) and flow meter (M14)
PLC15 Actuator of valve (V15) and flow meter (M15)
PLC16 Actuator of valve (V16) and flow meter (M16)
PLC17 Actuator of valve (V17) and flow meter (M17)
PLC18 Actuator of valve (V18) and flow meter (M18)
PLC19 Actuator of valve (V19) and flow meter (M19)
PLC20 Actuator of valve (V20) and flow meter (M20)
PLC21 Water level sensor of tank (T4) and actuators of valves (V21a and V21b)
PLC22 Actuator of valve (V22) and flow meter (M22)
PLC23 Actuator of valve (V23) and flow meter (M23)
PLC24 Actuator of valve (V24) and flow meter (M24)
PLC25 Actuators of pumps ( P10, P11)
PLC26 Water level sensor of tank (T5) and actuators of valves (V26a and V26b)
PLC27 Actuators of pumps ( P6, P7)
PLC28 Actuators of pumps ( P8, P9)
PLC29 Actuator of pump ( P12)
PLC30 Actuator of valve (V30) and flow meter (M30)
PLC31 Actuator of valve (V31) and flow meter (M31)
PLC32 Actuator of valve (V32) and flow meter (M32)
PLC33 Water level sensor of tank (T6) and actuator of valves (V33)
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Table 3.6: The control and monitoring instructions that MTU performs through
each PLC
Field
device
Instructions
PLC1 Reads the water level in tank T2 and controls the valves V35a, V35b
PLC2 Reads status, speed and energy of the pumps P1, P2, P2 and controls their statuses and speeds
PLC3 Reads the water level in tank T1 and controls the valves V3a, V3b
PLC4 Reads status, speed and energy of the pumps P1, P2 and controls their statuses and speeds
PLC5 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area A1 using flow meter M5 and the presuure sensor attached in V5,
and controls the presuure using V5
PLC6 Intelligently adjusts the flow valve V1 , which is between tank T2 and tank T3, with an appropriate setting.
This is done using Algorithm
PLC7 Reads the water level in tank T3 and controls the valves V7
PLC8 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area A2 using flow meter M8 and the presuure sensor attached in V8,
and controls the presuure using V8
PLC9 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area A3 using flow meter M9 and the presuure sensor attached in V9,
and controls the presuure using V9
PLC10 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area A4 using flow meter M10 and the presuure sensor attached in
V10, and controls the presuure using V10
PLC11 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area B3 using flow meter M11 and the presuure sensor attached in
V11, and controls the presuure using V11
PLC12 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area B2 using flow meter M12 and the presuure sensor attached in
V12, and controls the presuure using V12
PLC13 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area B1 using flow meter M13 and the presuure sensor attached in
V13, and controls the presuure using V13
PLC14 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area C1 using flow meter M14 and the presuure sensor attached in
V14, and controls the presuure using V14
PLC15 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area C2 using flow meter M15 and the presuure sensor attached in
V15, and controls the presuure using V15
PLC16 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area C3 using flow meter M16 and the presuure sensor attached in
V16, and controls the presuure using V16
PLC17 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area C4 using flow meter M17 and the presuure sensor attached in
V17, and controls the presuure using V17
PLC18 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area D1 using flow meter M18 and the presuure sensor attached in
V18, and controls the presuure using V18
PLC19 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area D2 using flow meter M19 and the presuure sensor attached in
V19, and controls the presuure using V19
PLC20 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area D3 using flow meter M20 and the presuure sensor attached in
V20, and controls the presuure using V20
PLC21 Reads the water level in tank T4 and controls the valves V21a, V21b
PLC22 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area E1 using flow meter M22 and the presuure sensor attached in
V22, and controls the presuure using V22
PLC23 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area E2 using flow meter M23 and the presuure sensor attached in
V23, and controls the presuure using V23
PLC24 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area E3 using flow meter M24 and the presuure sensor attached in
V24, and controls the presuure using V24
PLC25 Reads status, speed and energy of the pumps P10, P11 and controls their statuses and speeds
PLC26 Reads the water level in tank T5 and controls the valves V26a, V26b
PLC27 Reads status, speed and energy of the pumps P6, P7 and controls their statuses and speeds
PLC28 Reads status, speed and energy of the pumps P8, P9 and controls their statuses and speeds
PLC29 Reads status, speed and energy of the pump P12 and controls its status and speed
PLC30 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area F3 using flow meter M30 and the presuure sensor attached in
V30, and controls the presuure using V30
PLC31 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area F2 using flow meter M31 and the presuure sensor attached in
V31, and controls the presuure using V31
PLC32 Reads water flow and presuure at sub-area F1 using flow meter M32 and the presuure sensor attached in
V32, and controls the presuure using V32
PLC33 Reads the water level in tank T6 and controls the valves V33a, V33b
Note : status of a pump either OFF or ON
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Algorithm 1 is implemented to maintain sufficient water in both Tank2 and
Tank3. This problem is illustrated in Figure 3.6 where the water level of Tank2
reached the critical level seven times, during which area C was not efficiently sup-
plied with water. This is because the flow valve V1 has a fixed setting, which is
1300 Litres Per Minute (LPM) in this example, and the water flow from Tank2 to
Tank3 is constant even though the water level in Tank2 is low. This problem is
addressed by considering the following parameters: the water level in Tank2 and
Tank3, the current water demands in areas C and B and the water flow pumped in
to Tank2. These parameters are used by the MTU to intelligently adjust the flow
valve V1. Figure 3.7 shows the water level of Tank2 and Tank3 after applying this
algorithm. Thanks to SCADA systems, there is an increase in the performance of
daily services using less equipment.
Algorithm 1: A smart control algorithm controlling water flow from Tank2
to Tank3
1 b⇐ Water demand in area B
2 c⇐ Water demand in area C
3 t2 ⇐ Water level in tank2
4 t3 ⇐ Water level in tank3
5 f ⇐ Water flow to tank2
6 if t2 > t3 then
7 flow = b + (f − c)
8 Adjust V1 to flow
9 else
10 flow = b − c
11 Adjust V1 to flow
12 end
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Figure 3.6: The water levels over a period of time for Tank2 and Tank3 without
control system
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Figure 3.7: The water levels over a period of time for Tank2 and Tank3 with
control system
3.4.4 Configuration steps
To control and monitor processes using SCADAVT, a number of configuration steps
are required similar to any actual SCADA system. Both I/O modules and Mod-
bus/TCP slave simulator services are enabled for each virtual node in order to
represent a PLC. Then, the IP address and port are assigned. Since the PLC
is used to read and control end devices (sensors and actuators), the map of the
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registers of the PLC with its associated end devices needs to be configured. Ta-
bles 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 in Appendix 3.8.1 have mapping of Modbus registers for
all PLCS used in the implemented scenario. For example, Table 3.7 shows that the
first resister of ANALOG registers in the field device PLC1 is assigned to t2 level
(the water level sensor of tank2). Therefore, through the IOModuleGate the data
of t2 level can be sent to the first ANALOG register in the PLC1. In this case,
the MTU device can read this register using the execute function provided by the
Modbus library [Team, 2014]being used.
To exchange the management and control data between the emulated SCADA
system and the supervised environment, IOModuleGate class is extended. However,
two configuration files need to be given when the IOModuleGate class is initialized.
The first file contains a list of backchannel IP addresses and ports for all PLCs.
Notably, the IP addresses are not the IPs that are used within the emulated control
system, but are the IPs that are automatically assigned by the CORE emulator for
each emulated device as a backchannel to allow communication with the external
world. Therefore, this feature is used by the I/O modules service to exchange the
measurement data between supervised processes and the emulated SCADA system
through the IOModuleGate. The second file contains a list of process parameters
and the IDs of their associated field devices. Tables 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14
in Appendix 3.8.2 show the configuration files for the implemented scenario. For
example, in the first file, PLC1 represents the ID for a field device whose backchannel
IP and port are 172.16.0.1 and 9161 respectively. In the second file, the process
parameter t2 level (the water level sensor of tank2 ) is supervised by the field device
PLC1 and the data type dataType of t2 level is input, where input indicates that
the end device can be read only by a PLC, while output indicates that a PLC can
change the data of the end device.
To realistically mimic SCADA systems, the HMI client needs to be integrated
to allow an operator to monitor and manually control the process. Therefore, we
developed an HMI server that supports the Modbus protocol as an integrated service
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in the proposed SCADAVT. For example, in Figure 3.5 this service was added to
the MTU device, and it is set up to listen on backchannel of the MTU. Therefore,
any HMI client that supports the Modbus protocol can directly connect to the
HMI server. In this scenario, we used the publicly-available HMI client [Software
Development Team, 2014].
To start exchanging measurement data between the control system and the
IOModuleGate, we use writing/reading methods provided by the IOModuleGate.
These methods take and return a Python dictionary variable which is a key-value
pair. The key is the identity ID of the process parameter (e.g t2 level) and its
I/O data. In this scenario, we establish a connection to the server of the WDS
simulation, and require the simulated data through its TCP-custom-protocol (see
Section 3.3.5). Afterwards, we construct a Python dictionary variable with input
data and push it by writing methods to respective field devices (PLCs). Similarly,
we pull the output data from the field devices using the reading method, and then
push them to their respective process parameters. The period of time for pulling
and pushing the data to and from a control system and supervised infrastructure
is determined by the implementer of the IOModuleGate class.
As is clear from the detailed discussion above, the functioning of the emula-
tion requires several different configuration steps and this in turn requires specific
knowledge of SCADA systems. Therefore, the user of SCADAVT who performs
the simulation has to be a person who is well-versed in the specifics of SCADA
systems.
3.5 Attack Scenarios
The evaluation of SCADAVT is carried out through two common attack scenarios:
a denial of service and an integrity attack. This section also shows how these
malicious attacks can affect the performance of WDS.
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3.5.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
In this type of attack, attackers launch flood attacks against a target to prevent it
from receiving a legitimate request. As previously discussed, the MTU periodically
adjusts the flow valve V1, which is controlled by PLC6, using Algorithm 1. In fact,
if the MTU cannot establish a connection with PLC6 to send a control message, the
flow valve V1 will not be properly adjusted. Hence, the water volume in Tank2 and
Tank3 will not be balanced, so the critical level may be reached. In this scenario, we
demonstrate a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) where ten virtual nodes
are attached to the Internet, which is represented in this scenario by a set of routers
linked with each others. This is easily done with a few clicks. The open source
hping3 utility [Sanfilippo, 2012] is used to launch flood attacks on the field device
PLC6. Three times PLC6 was flooded with TCP SYN packets. The first attack
started at time= 15h and ended at 20h. The second attack started at time= 55h
and ended at 57h. The last attack started at time= 100h and ended at 105h. During
these attack times, the MTU sometimes failed to establish a connection with PLC6
and sometimes it took a long time to successfully connect with it. Figure 3.8 shows
the unsuccessful and successful connections between MTU and PLC6. It can be
seen that the unsuccessful connections and the connection establishing time at the
period time of DDoS are significantly different from the normal behaviour. That is,
the MTU failed a number of times and waited a long time to establish connection
compared to attack-free time. Hence, because the MTU failed to intelligently adjust
the flow valve V1, the water volumes of both Tank2 and Tank3 have been affected.
Figure 3.9 clearly shows that the water volumes of Tank2 and Tank3 fell below the
critical level twice and once respectively. Consequently, areas C and B were not
sufficiently supplied with water twice and once respectively.
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Figure 3.8: The unsuccessful and successful connections and their elapsed times
between MTU and PLC6
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Figure 3.9: The effect of DDoS, which targets PLC6, on the water volume of
Tank2 and Tank3.
3.5.2 Integrity Attacks
This type of attack occurs as a result of the manipulation of command messages; it
is termed a high-level control attack [Queiroz et al., 2011] [Wei et al., 2011] [Giani
et al., 2013]. To launch such an attack, an attacker requires prior knowledge of the
target system. This can be obtained by the specifications, or by a correlation analy-
sis of the network traffic of that system. Taking over the control center and sending
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undesired control messages, or intercepting (e.g, man-in-middle attack) the com-
mand messages between the control center and field devices, are a common means
of launching such attacks. In fact, such an attack is difficult to detect because the
false message is still legitimate in terms of the Modbus/TCP protocol specifications.
To demonstrate this type of attack, we intercept and modify the control message
between the MTU and field device PLC4, which controls the operation of Pump4
and Pump5. To perform this attack, we establish a proxy between these devices.
As previously discussed, the MTU sends a control message to PLC4 to turn its
associated pumps ON/OFF. We modified the intercepted control message sent to
PLC4 three times. The starting and ending times of each integrity attack are de-
picted in Figure 3.10. In each attack, we modified the intercepted control message
with a control data whereby Pump4 and Pump5 are turned off. Figure 3.10 shows
the water volumes of Tank2 and Tank3 after the integrity attack, and it can be seen
that the critical level was reached several times, and that the effect of attacks has
not occurred at the same times as the attacks. This depends on the functionality
being attacked in the target system.
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Figure 3.10: The effect of integrity attack, which targets PLC4, on the water
volume of Tank2 and Tank3.
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3.6 Correctness Argument
The proposed SCADAVT is intended to realistically simulate the SCADA systems,
and therefore, it should satisfy the following requirements.
• The ability to directly communicate with the external (or internal)
Modbus/TCP-based components: We have developed four essential computer-
based SCADA components; three are high-level such as HMI Client, MTU
and HMI servers, while the fourth is a field-level that can be one or more
of the following: PLC, RTU or IED. All these components at this stage are
Modbus/TCP based, and therefore there are assumed to directly commu-
nicate with any Modbus/TCP-based device (or simulator). To ensure the
correctness of this requirement, we have used a third-party Modbus/TCP-
based HMI client [Software Development Team, 2014] called AdvancedHMI,
to graphically display the water level of tanks (e.g. Tank1 and Tank2), and
the status and speed of pumps 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. This is performed by con-
necting AdvancedHMI to the HMI server using its backchannel, and then
we mapped the graphical components in AdvancedHMI with the Modbus
registers that are assigned to the aforementioned process parameters. As
expected, SCADAVT has demonstrated its appropriateness to communicate
with a third-party Modbus/TCP-based component without writing any code.
• Produce realistic SCADA network traffic: The Modbus/TCP protocol
has been integrated into SCADAVT. Therefore, the produced SCADA net-
work traffic is assumed to be realistic. Prior to checking whether this require-
ment is satisfactory, we briefly discuss the structure of the Modbus/TCP
protocol. Figure 3.11 is the structure of the ModBus message over a se-
rial line, while Figure 3.12 shows the structure when the message is carried
over the TCP. As can be seen, four fields comprise the general ModBus
frame. Error check provides a method to validate the integrity of the mes-
sage contents. Function Code tells the server which kind of action to per-
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Data Error checkFunction Code
1 Byte 252 Bytes 2 Bytes
Protocol Data Unit
Device Address
1 Byte
Figure 3.11: General ModBus frame.
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1 Byte 252 Bytes
Protocol Data Unit
MBAP Header
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Protocol
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Transaction
Identifier
2 Bytes 2 Bytes 2 Bytes 1 Byte
Figure 3.12: ModBus request/response over TCP/IP.
form. Data has the registers, which need to be acquired (or changed), and
their corresponding data. Device Address represents a valid slave device ad-
dress. However, as shown in Figure 3.12, Error check is not needed when
the massage is carried over the TCP because the standard Ethernet TCP/IP
link layer checksum methods are used to validate the integrity of the message
contents. A Modbus Application Protocol (MBAP) header is created to rep-
resent several fields. Device Address is included within the MBAP header as
Unit ID. Length is a byte count of the following fields: Unit ID, Function Code
and Data. Protocol Identifier is always “0” for Modbus services. Transaction
Identifier is a unique ID for each ModBus Request/Response transaction.
We have used tcpdump to capture all SCADA network traffic produced by
SCADAVT. Since the ModBus/TCP application protocol is completely em-
bedded in the data field of a standard TCP frame, the payload for each packet
is extracted and a python-based parser [Team, 2014] for the ModBus message
is used to ensure that traffic is realistic in terms of ModBus/TCP specifica-
tions. In this investigation, all the captured traffic was parsed and found to
satisfy the specifications.
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• The synchronization between the emulated SCADA system and the sup-
ervised environment should complies to the configuration files: Ac-
cording to the guideline G4 in Section 3.2, any developed SCADA testbed
should have a feature enabling it to connect with the external world. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.4, a generic gateway called IOModuleGate is developed to
periodically exchange the measurement data between the Modbus/TCP slave
simulator and the respective supervised process parameters using IOModules
protocol. To ensure that IOModuleGate correctly performs this synchroniza-
tion as described in the two configuration files, we have written python-based
script that extends the python-based parser [Team, 2014]. This script auto-
matically validates each extracted packet by matching the address, registers
and their values in each packet with configuration settings in IOModuleGate.
• The activities of system should deviate from an expected pattern
(or behaviours) under attacks: To ensure that SCADAVT satisfies this
requirement, the behaviours of the SCADA system and the supervised process
must be different from the expected behaviours under attacks. In Section 3.5,
two attack scenarios have been conducted. Figure 3.8 shows how the commu-
nication behaviours under attack for some SCADA devices were significantly
different from the normal behaviours. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3.9,
the normal behaviours of the supervised process have been affected as well.
• Produce realistic SCADA data: SCADA data are the measurement and
control data generated by sensors and actuators deployed on the supervised
process. The Water Distribution System (WDS) for a small town is presented
as the supervised environment in SCADAVT (see Section 3.4). To ensure
that SCADAVT produces nearly realistic SCADA data, we have compared
the probability density of the simulated and real SCADA data sets, RealData
and SimData1 respectively. In this comparison, the distance-based k-nearest
neighbour approach is used to compute the density score for each observation
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in a data set. Figure 3.13 demonstrates that the produced simulated data
is nearly similar to the real one in terms of the k-nearest neighbour density
approach.
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Figure 3.13: Standard probability density distribution for each observation in
RealData and SimData1 are approximately normal and skewed to right.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented SCADAVT, a framework for a SCADA security testbed
based on virtualization technology. SCADAVT is a novel solution to create a full
SCADA system based on emulation and simulation techniques. In addition, it
realistically mimics the real SCADA testbed, and also has a feature that allows
an actual SCADA device to be connected for the purpose of realistic evaluation.
Furthermore, a server, which acts as a surrogate for water distribution systems,
is introduced. A scenario application of SCADAVT is presented to demonstrate
how the testbed can easily be used to create a realistic simulation of a full SCADA
system. DDoS and integrity attacks have been described to illustrate how malicious
attacks can be launched on supervised processes.
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3.8 Appendix for this Chapter
3.8.1 Modbus registers mapping
Table 3.7: Mapping of Modbus registers to the process parameters of the imple-
mented scenario
Field de-
vice
Registers mapping
PLC1
var1 = [’t2_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’m35_flow’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v35a_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v35a_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
var5 = [’v35b_settings_i’,’A’,4,’i’];var6 = [’v35b_settings_o’,’A’,5,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5,var6]);
PLC2
var1 = [’p1_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p1_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p1_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p1_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p1_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];var6 = [’p2_status_i’,’D’,2,’i’];
var7 = [’p2_status_o’,’D’,3,’o’];var8 = [’p2_speed_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var9 = [’p2_speed_o’,’A’,4,’o’];var10 = [’p2_ energy _i’,’A’,5,’i’];
var11 = [’p3_status_i’,’D’,3,’i’];var12 = [’p3_status_o’,’D’,4,’o’];
var13 = [’p3_speed_i’,’A’,6,’i’];var14 = [’p3_speed_o’,’A’,7,’o’];
var15 = [’p3_ energy _i’,’A’,8,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,...,var15]);
PLC3
var1 = [’t1_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v3a_settings_i’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v3a_settings_o’,’A’,2,’o’];var4 = [’v3b_settings_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var5 = [’v3b_settings_o’,’A’,4,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5]);
PLC4
var1 = [’p4_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p4_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p4_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p4_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p4_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];var6 = [’p5_status_i’,’D’,2,’i’];
var7 = [’p5_status_o’,’D’,3,’o’];var8 = [’p5_speed_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var9 = [’p5_speed_o’,’A’,4,’o’];var10 = [’p5_ energy _i’,’A’,5,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,...,var10]);
PLC5
var1 = [’m5_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v5_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v5_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v5_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC6
var1 = [’v1_settings_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v1_settings_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2]);
PLC7
var1 = [’t3_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v7_settings_i’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v7_settings_o’,’A’,2,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3]);
PLC8
var1 = [’m8_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v8_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v8_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v8_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
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Table 3.8: Mapping of Modbus registers to the process parameters of the imple-
mented scenario
Field de-
vice
Registers mapping
PLC9
var1 = [’m9_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v9_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v9_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v9_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC10
var1 = [’m10_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v10_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v10_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v10_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC11
var1 = [’m11_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v11_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v11_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v11_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC12
var1 = [’m12_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v12_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v12_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v12_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC13
var1 = [’m13_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v13_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v13_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v13_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC14
var1 = [’m14_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v14_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v14_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v14_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC15
var1 = [’m15_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v15_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v15_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v15_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC16
var1 = [’m16_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v16_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v16_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v16_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC17
var1 = [’m17_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v17_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v17_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v17_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC18
var1 = [’m18_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v18_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v18_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v18_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
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Table 3.9: Mapping of Modbus registers to the process parameters of the imple-
mented scenario
Field de-
vice
Registers mapping
PLC19
var1 = [’m19_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v19_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v19_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v19_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC20
var1 = [’m20_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v20_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v20_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v20_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC21
var1 = [’t4_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v21a_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];
var3 = [’v21a_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];var4 = [’v21b_settings_i’,’A’,4,’i’];
var5 = [’v21b_settings_o’,’A’,5,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5]);
PLC22
var1 = [’m22_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v22_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v22_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v22_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC23
var1 = [’m23_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v23_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v23_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v23_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC24
var1 = [’m24_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v24_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v24_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v24_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC25
var1 = [’p10_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p10_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p10_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p10_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p10_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];var6 = [’p11_status_i’,’D’,2,’i’];
var7 = [’p11_status_o’,’D’,3,’o’];var8 = [’p11_speed_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var9 = [’p11_speed_o’,’A’,4,’o’];var10 = [’p11_ energy _i’,’A’,5,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,...,var10]);
PLC26
var1 = [’t5_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v26a_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];
var3 = [’v26a_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];var4 = [’v26b_settings_i’,’A’,4,’i’];
var5 = [’v26b_settings_o’,’A’,5,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5]);
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Table 3.10: Mapping of Modbus registers to the process parameters of the imple-
mented scenario
Field de-
vice
Registers mapping
PLC27
var1 = [’p6_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p6_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p6_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p6_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p6_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];var6 = [’P7_status_i’,’D’,2,’i’];
var7 = [’p7_status_o’,’D’,3,’o’];var8 = [’p7_speed_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var9 = [’p7_speed_o’,’A’,4,’o’];var10 = [’p7_ energy _i’,’A’,5,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,...,var10]);
PLC28
var1 = [’p8_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p8_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p8_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p8_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p8_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];var6 = [’p9_status_i’,’D’,2,’i’];
var7 = [’p9_status_o’,’D’,3,’o’];var8 = [’p9_speed_i’,’A’,3,’i’];
var9 = [’p9_speed_o’,’A’,4,’o’];var10 = [’p9_ energy _i’,’A’,5,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,...,var10]);
PLC29
var1 = [’p12_status_i’,’D’,0,’i’];var2 = [’p12_status_o’,’D’,1,’o’];
var3 = [’p12_speed_i’,’A’,0,’i’];var4 = [’p12_speed_o’,’A’,1,’o’];
var5 = [’p12_ energy _i’,’A’,2,’i’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5]);
PLC30
var1 = [’m30_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v30_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v30_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v30_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC31
var1 = [’m31_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v31_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v31_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v31_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC32
var1 = [’m32_flow’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v32_ pressure’,’A’,1,’i’];
var3 = [’v32_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];var4 = [’v32_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4]);
PLC33
var1 = [’t6_level’,’A’,0,’i’];var2 = [’v33a_settings_i’,’A’,2,’i’];
var3 = [’v33a_settings_o’,’A’,3,’o’];var4 = [’v33b_settings_i’,’A’,4,’i’];
var5 = [’v33b_settings_o’,’A’,5,’o’];
regMap.add([var1,var2,var3,var4,var5]);
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3.8.2 The configuration of IOModuleGate
Table 3.11: The configuration of IOModuleGate of the implemented scenario
1st configuration file
[PLC1]
ip:172.16.0.1
port:9161
[PLC2]
ip:172.16.0.2
port:9161
[PLC3]
ip:172.16.0.3
port:9161
[PLC4]
ip:172.16.0.4
port:9161
[PLC5]
ip:172.16.0.5
port:9161
[PLC6]
ip:172.16.0.6
port:9161
[PLC7]
ip:172.16.0.7
port:9161
[PLC8]
ip:172.16.0.8
port:9161
[PLC9]
ip:172.16.0.9
port:9161
[PLC10]
ip:172.16.0.10
port:9161
[PLC11]
ip:172.16.0.11
port:9161
[PLC12]
ip:172.16.0.12
port:9161
[PLC13]
ip:172.16.0.13
port:9161
[PLC14]
ip:172.16.0.14
port:9161
[PLC15]
ip:172.16.0.14
port:9161
[PLC16]
ip:172.16.0.16
port:9161
[PLC17]
ip:172.16.0.17
port:9161
[PLC18]
ip:172.16.0.18
port:9161
[PLC19]
ip:172.16.0.19
port:9161
[PLC20]
ip:172.16.0.20
port:9161
[PLC21]
ip:172.16.0.21
port:9161
[PLC22]
ip:172.16.0.22
port:9161
[PLC23]
ip:172.16.0.23
port:9161
[PLC24]
ip:172.16.0.24
port:9161
[PLC25]
ip:172.16.0.25
port:9161
[PLC26]
ip:172.16.0.26
port:9161
[PLC27]
ip:172.16.0.27
port:9161
[PLC28]
ip:172.16.0.28
port:9161
[PLC29]
ip:172.16.0.29
port:9161
[PLC30]
ip:172.16.0.30
port:9161
[PLC31]
ip:172.16.0.31
port:9161
[PLC32]
ip:172.16.0.32
port:9161
[PLC33]
ip:172.16.0.33
port:9161
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Table 3.12: The configuration of IOModuleGate of the implemented scenario
2nd configuration file
[t2_level]
controller : PLC1
dataType : i
[m35_flow]
controller : PLC1
dataType : i
[v35a_settings_i]
controller : PLC1
dataType : i
[v35a_settings_o]
controller : PLC1
dataType : o
[v35b_settings_i]
controller : PLC1
dataType : i
[v35b_settings_o]
controller : PLC1
dataType : o
[p1_status_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p1_status_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p1_speed_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p1_speed_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p1_ energy _i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p2_status_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p2_status_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p2_speed_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p2_speed_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p2_ energy _i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p3_status_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p3_status_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p3_speed_i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[p3_speed_o]
controller : PLC2
dataType : o
[p3_ energy _i]
controller : PLC2
dataType : i
[t1_level]
controller : PLC3
dataType : i
[v3a_settings_i]
controller : PLC3
dataType : i
[v3a_settings_o]
controller : PLC3
dataType : o
[v3b_settings_i]
controller : PLC3
dataType : i
[v3b_settings_o]
controller : PLC3
dataType : o
[p4_status_i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[p4_status_o]
controller : PLC4
dataType : o
[p4_speed_i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[p4_speed_o]
controller : PLC4
dataType : o
[p4_ energy _i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[p5_status_i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[p5_status_o]
controller : PLC4
dataType : o
[p5_speed_i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[p5_speed_o]
controller : PLC4
dataType : o
[p5_ energy _i]
controller : PLC4
dataType : i
[m5_flow]
controller : PLC5
dataType : i
[v5_ pressure]
controller : PLC5
dataType : i
[v5_settings_i]
controller : PLC5
dataType : i
[v5_settings_o]
controller : PLC5
dataType : o
[v1_settings_i]
controller : PLC6
dataType : i
[v1_settings_o]
controller : PLC6
dataType : o
[t3_level]
controller : PLC7
dataType : i
[v7_settings_i]
controller : PLC7
dataType : i
[v7_settings_o]
controller : PLC7
dataType : o
[m8_flow]
controller : PLC8
dataType : i
[8_ pressure]
controller : PLC8
dataType : i
[v8_settings_i]
controller : PLC8
dataType : i
[v8_settings_o]
controller : PLC8
dataType : o
[m9_flow]
controller : PLC9
dataType : i
[v9_ pressure]
controller : PLC9
dataType : i
[v9_settings_i]
controller : PLC9
dataType : i
[v9_settings_o]
controller : PLC9
dataType : o
[m10_flow]
controller : PLC10
dataType : i
[v10_ pressure]
controller : PLC10
dataType : i
[v10_settings_i]
controller : PLC10
dataType : i
[v10_settings_o]
controller : PLC10
dataType : o
[m11_flow]
controller : PLC11
dataType : i
[v11_ pressure]
controller : PLC11
dataType : i
[v11_settings_i]
controller : PLC11
dataType : i
[v11_settings_o]
controller : PLC11
dataType : o
[m12_flow]
controller : PLC12
dataType : i
[v12_ pressure]
controller : PLC12
dataType : i
[v12_settings_i]
controller : PLC12
dataType : i
[v12_settings_o]
controller : PLC12
dataType : o
[m13_flow]
controller : PLC13
dataType : i
[v13_ pressure]
controller : PLC13
dataType : i
[v13_settings_i]
controller : PLC13
dataType : i
[v13_settings_o]
controller : PLC13
dataType : o
[m14_flow]
controller : PLC14
dataType : i
[v14_ pressure]
controller : PLC14
dataType : i
[v14_settings_i]
controller : PLC14
dataType : i
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[v14_settings_o]
controller : PLC14
dataType : o
[m15_flow]
controller : PLC15
dataType : i
[v15_ pressure]
controller : PLC15
dataType : i
[v15_settings_i]
controller : PLC15
dataType : i
[v15_settings_o]
controller : PLC15
dataType : o
[m16_flow]
controller : PLC16
dataType : i
[v16_ pressure]
controller : PLC16
dataType : i
[v16_settings_i]
controller : PLC16
dataType : i
[v16_settings_o]
controller : PLC16
dataType : o
[m17_flow]
controller : PLC17
dataType : i
[v17_ pressure]
controller : PLC17
dataType : i
[v17_settings_i]
controller : PLC17
dataType : i
[v17_settings_o]
controller : PLC17
dataType : o
[m18_flow]
controller : PLC18
dataType : i
[v18_ pressure]
controller : PLC18
dataType : i
[v18_settings_i]
controller : PLC18
dataType : i
[v18_settings_o]
controller : PLC18
dataType : o
[m19_flow]
controller : PLC19
dataType : i
[v19_ pressure]
controller : PLC19
dataType : i
[v19_settings_i]
controller : PLC19
dataType : i
[v19_settings_o]
controller : PLC19
dataType : o
[m20_flow]
controller : PLC20
dataType : i
[v20_ pressure]
controller : PLC20
dataType : i
[v20_settings_i]
controller : PLC20
dataType : i
[v20_settings_o]
controller : PLC20
dataType : o
[t4_level]
controller : PLC21
dataType : i
[v21a_settings_i]
controller : PLC21
dataType : i
[v21a_settings_o]
controller : PLC21
dataType : o
[v21b_settings_i]
controller : PLC21
dataType : i
[v21b_settings_o]
controller : PLC21
dataType : o
[m22_flow]
controller : PLC22
dataType : i
[v22_ pressure]
controller : PLC22
dataType : i
[v22_settings_i]
controller : PLC22
dataType : i
[v22_settings_o]
controller : PLC22
dataType : o
[m23_flow]
controller : PLC23
dataType : i
[v23_ pressure]
controller : PLC23
dataType : i
[v23_settings_i]
controller : PLC23
dataType : i
[v23_settings_o]
controller : PLC23
dataType : o
[m24_flow]
controller : PLC24
dataType : i
[v24_ pressure]
controller : PLC24
dataType : i
[v24_settings_i]
controller : PLC24
dataType : i
[v24_settings_o]
controller : PLC24
dataType : o
[p10_status_i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[p10_status_o]
controller : PLC25
dataType : o
[p10_speed_i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[p10_speed_o]
controller : PLC25
dataType : o
[p10_ energy _i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[p11_status_i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[p11_status_o]
controller : PLC25
dataType : o
[p11_speed_i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[p11_speed_o]
controller : PLC25
dataType : o
[p11_ energy _i]
controller : PLC25
dataType : i
[t5_level]
controller : PLC26
dataType : i
[v26a_settings_i]
controller : PLC26
dataType : i
[v26a_settings_o]
controller : PLC26
dataType : o
[v26b_settings_i]
controller : PLC26
dataType : i
[v26b_settings_o]
controller : PLC26
dataType : o
[p6_status_i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p6_status_o]
controller : PLC27
dataType : o
[p6_speed_i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p6_speed_o]
controller : PLC27
dataType : o
[p6_ energy _i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p7_status_i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p7_status_o]
controller : PLC27
dataType : o
[p7_speed_i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p7_speed_o]
controller : PLC27
dataType : o
[p7_ energy _i]
controller : PLC27
dataType : i
[p8_status_i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
[p8_status_o]
controller : PLC28
dataType : o
[p8_speed_i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
[p8_speed_o]
controller : PLC28
dataType : o
[p8_ energy _i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
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[p9_status_i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
[p9_status_o]
controller : PLC28
dataType : o
[p9_speed_i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
[p9_speed_o]
controller : PLC28
dataType : o
[p9_ energy _i]
controller : PLC28
dataType : i
[p12_status_i]
controller : PLC29
dataType : i
[p12_status_o]
controller : PLC29
dataType : o
[p12_speed_i]
controller : PLC29
dataType : i
[p12_speed_o]
controller : PLC29
dataType : o
[p12_ energy _i]
controller : PLC29
dataType : i
[m30_flow]
controller : PLC30
dataType : i
[v30_ pressure]
controller : PLC30
dataType : i
[v30_settings_i]
controller : PLC30
dataType : i
[v30_settings_o]
controller : PLC30
dataType : o
[m31_flow]
controller : PLC31
dataType : i
[v31_ pressure]
controller : PLC31
dataType : i
[v31_settings_i]
controller : PLC31
dataType : i
[v31_settings_o]
controller : PLC31
dataType : o
[m32_flow]
controller : PLC32
dataType : i
[v32_ pressure]
controller : PLC32
dataType : i
[v32_settings_i]
controller : PLC32
dataType : i
[v32_settings_o]
controller : PLC32
dataType : o
[t6_level]
controller : PLC33
dataType : i
[v33a_settings_i]
controller : PLC33
dataType : i
[v33a_settings_o]
controller : PLC33
dataType : o
[v33b_settings_i]
controller : PLC33
dataType : i
[v33b_settings_o]
controller : PLC33
dataType : o
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Chapter4
An Efficient k-Nearest Neighbour
Approach based on Various-Widths
Clustering (kNNVWC)
The proposed unsupervised SCADA intrusion detection system (IDS) operates with
unlabelled SCADA data, which is highly expected to contain abnormal data. The
separation between normal and abnormal data is the salient part of the train-
ing phase of the proposed system. The k-Nearest Neighbour (k-NN) approach is
found in the literature to be one of the most interesting and best approach for
data mining in general [Wu et al., 2008], and in particular it has demonstrated
promising results in anomaly detection [Chandola et al., 2009b]. This is because
an anomalous observation will have a neighbourhood in which it will stand out,
while a normal observation will have a neighbourhood wherein all its neighbours
will be exactly like it. However, the visit for all observations in a data set to find
the k-nearest neighbours for an observation x will result in a high computational
cost. This chapter introduces a novel approach called k-NN based on Various-
Widths Clustering (kNNVWC) to efficiently find the k-nearest neighbours for each
observation in a data set. A novel various-widths clustering technique is proposed
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and triangle inequality is adapted to prune unlikely clusters in order to accelerate
the search process of k-nearest neighbours for a given observation. Experimental
results demonstrate that kNNVWC performs well in finding k-nearest neighbours
compared to a number of k-NN search algorithms, especially for a data set with
high dimensions, various distributions and large size.
4.1 Introduction
The Exhaustive k-Nearest Neighbour (Ek-NN) [Cover and Hart, 1967] is a pow-
erful non-parametric algorithm that has been extensively used in many scientific
and engineering domains, and is one of the most interesting and best algorithms
for machine learning [Papadopoulos, 2006; Wu et al., 2008] and pattern recog-
nition [Shakhnarovich et al., 2008]. For instance, it achieves good accuracy in
unsupervised outlier detections [Angiulli and Fassetti, 2009; Angiulli et al., 2006;
Ghoting et al., 2008; Bay and Schwabacher, 2003]. In addition, it demonstrates high
classification accuracy in various applications [Shintemirov et al., 2009; Magnussen
et al., 2009; Govindarajan and Chandrasekaran, 2010]. However, this algorithm
requires the checking of all objects in a data set to find the k-NN for any query
object.
To reduce the computational time, a number of algorithms have been proposed,
in which the objects are structured in a way that can efficiently accelerate the
search for k-NN. For instance, tree-based spatial search algorithms are proposed
to structure objects that might have more than three dimensions [Fukunaga and
Narendra, 1975; Nene and Nayar, 1997; Liaw et al., 2010; McNames, 2001; Sproull,
1991; Friedman et al., 1975; Kim and Park, 1986; Beygelzimer et al., 2006]. These
algorithms demonstrated a promising improvement on Ek-NN. However, some of
them such as the KD-tree suffer from the problem of the dimensionality drawback
[Nene and Nayar, 1997]. Hence, a number of tree-based spatial search algorithms
such as Ball tree [Fukunaga and Narendra, 1975], Cover tree [Beygelzimer et al.,
2006], principal axis tree (PAT) [McNames, 2001] and orthogonal structure tree
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(OST) [Liaw et al., 2010] are proposed. Despite the enhanced performance offered
by these algorithms in accelerating the search of k-NN with high dimensional data,
there are still several outstanding issues that need to be resolved such as the con-
traction time of the tree as well as the traversal cost of the pre-created tree to
find the upper and lower search bounds. In addition, the search for “true” k-NN
within this area adds extra costs and can substantiality decrease the performance,
especially when the number of checked objects is relatively large.
Clustering-based approaches [Eskin et al., 2002a; Prerau and Eskin, 2000; Xueyi,
2011] are proposed as alternative choices for the tree-based spatial search algo-
rithms. Fixed-width clustering (FWC) [Eskin et al., 2002a; Prerau and Eskin,
2000] and k-means [Xueyi, 2011] algorithms are used for grouping the training data
set into similar clusters, and like tree-based algorithms, the elimination rules are
used to eliminate the clusters that cannot have the k-NN for a query object. Unlike
tree-based algorithms that often consist of a large number of nodes, especially when
a data set is large in size and dimensions, the clustering-based approaches directly
group a training data set into a relatively small number of clusters, and therefore
the cost of finding the upper and lower search bounds for a query object is low.
Despite the promising performance of clustering-based approaches, the char-
acteristics of the produced clusters such as size, shape and compactness can be
challenging issues in terms of benefitting from triangle inequality, which is used
for elimination, in minimizing the search area as much as possible. Therefore, a
training data set that has various distributions can be a challenging issue for both
k-means and FWC algorithms. This is because the former assigns sparse objects
to the closest cluster, and therefore the cluster can end up with a large radius
that overwhelmingly overlaps many clusters. Consequently, the triangle inequality
approach may not be adequately applied using the clusters’ centroids and radii. Al-
though the latter can set a fixed radius, it is challenging to determine the value that
suits all distributions in a data set. Since this algorithm is the extended version,
more details are given in Section 4.3.
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In this chapter, a novel k-NN approach based on Various-Widths Clustering
(kNNVWC) is proposed to efficiently search for k-NN in data has various distribu-
tions. kNNVWC is an extended version of FWC where a number of various widths
are used to cluster the training data set. In the clustering part, two processes are
looped sequentially until the criteria are met: Partitioning and Merging (see Sec-
tion 4.3). The former starts clustering with a global width (radius) which is learned
from data, and recursively clusters each produced cluster whose members exceed
the predefined threshold with their own local width. This process continues until
there is no cluster whose size exceeds the predefined threshold, while the latter is
called if some criteria are met. The triangle inequality is applied to efficiently accel-
erate the search for k-NN. The effectiveness of kNNVWC is evaluated in comparison
with FWC and well-known tree-based spacial algorithms such as KD-tree [Sproull,
1991], Ball tree [Fukunaga and Narendra, 1975] and Cover tree [Beygelzimer et al.,
2006]. In this evaluation, twelve data sets which vary in size, dimensionality and
domains, are used.
4.2 Related Work
It is an expensive process to scrutinize each object in a given data set to find the
k-NN for a query object, especially for a large data set. Therefore, one or more
elimination criteria are used to remove the necessity of checking each object. A
branch-and-bound strategy is used in tree-based algorithms to find the upper and
lower bounds of the potential search area that definitely has the “true” k-NN for
a query object. Fukunaga and Narendra [Fukunaga and Narendra, 1975] applied a
hierarchical clustering technique to divide a data set into a number of subsets, and
each subset is further recursively divided into a number of subsets. This process
continues until the criteria are met. Then, a binary tree is adapted to structure the
results of the decomposition process so that the branch-and-bound search algor-
ithm can be used to reduce the number of distance computations. This tree-based
approach is called Ball tree. This algorithm can accelerate the search of k-NN even
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with high dimensional data, although its performance is influenced by the cluster-
ing technique used in the decomposition phase. Hence, Omohundros [Omohundro,
1989] proposed five construction algorithms to address this issue. Beygelzimer et
al. proposed a method called Cover tree [Beygelzimer et al., 2006] that exploits
the intrinsic dimensionality of a data set, where the data set is assumed to exhibit
some restricted growth regardless of its actual number of dimensions. Thus, this
algorithm can perform well with a data set that complies with this assumption.
In a different approach, Friedman et al. [Friedman et al., 1977] introduced a
balanced k-dimensional tree called KD-tree to structure a data set in a balanced
binary-tree, where the data set is recursively split into two parts along one axis
(dimension), where hyperplane decomposition is used instead of the clustering
technique. An enhanced version of KD-tree was introduced by Sproull [Sproull,
1991]. However, because of the fast contraction time of the KD-tree and its ef-
ficiency in finding the k-NN, it is not appropriate for data that has more than
10 dimensions [Nene and Nayar, 1997]. Similarly, Kim and Park [Kim and Park,
1986] proposed an efficient method called the “ordered partition”, although it is
appropriate only for low dimensions.
To address the drawback of dimensionality, the Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) technique [Jolliffe, 2002] has been adapted by a number of approaches
[Liaw et al., 2010; McNames, 2001; Chen et al., 1995; PCA] to reduce the compu-
tational time, especially with high dimensional data where the first few principal
components are used to spin the training data set and query objects. Similar to
the algorithms discussed previously, the binary-tree technique is adapted in these
approaches; however, only projection values are used to construct the search tree.
Despite the performance improvement introduced by PCA-based approaches to
high dimensional data, the process of PCA adds extra cost to both construction
and search times. For instance, the Principal Axis search Tree (PAT) approach
in [McNames, 2001] requires a relatively long computation time for a large data set
or a search tree with great depth, while in the Orthogonal Structure Tree (OST)
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approach [Liaw et al., 2010], it is reduced. On the other hand, the preprocessing
time is less in PAT, while it is relatively large in OST, especially when dimension-
ality increases.
Clustering-based approaches with free tree structures are proposed [Eskin et al.,
2002a; Prerau and Eskin, 2000; Xueyi, 2011]. That is, the training data set is clus-
tered into subsets where each subset does not have to represent one of the actual
classes in the data set. Then, triangle inequality is used to eliminate the clusters
that cannot possibly have a k-NN. Unlike tree structures, the structure in these
approaches is flat, and therefore no extra cost is incurred by traversing the internal
nodes. However, the high dimensional data presents a potential problem for all opti-
mized k-NN algorithms in both the construction and search phases. Wang [Xueyi,
2011] proposed a free-tree-based structure approach as an alternative to spatial
searching algorithms, especially for high dimensional data. The author adapted
the k-means algorithm to directly cluster the data into a number of groups, and
then the triangle inequality method was applied in the search for a k-NN. However,
the author explicitly stated that the maximum benefit of triangle inequality relies
on the distribution of a data set.
Similarly, Eskin et al. [Eskin et al., 2002a] and Prerau and Eskin [Prerau and
Eskin, 2000] adapted fixed-width clustering to efficiently break down a data set
into subsets with less overlap in order to maximize the efficiency of the triangle
inequality method. Even though this technique requires one pass over the data set,
its efficiency is also reliant on the distribution of the data. For instance, data with
various densities can cause two problems. The use of a large width can produce
large clusters from the dense areas in n-dimensional space, while a small width can
produce a large number of clusters. Consequently, the search for k-NN in a flat
structure is expensive with a large number of clusters, while the search among few
clusters that are large in size is expensive as well. Moreover, the clustering time
gradually increases with the number of clusters. Therefore, the use of fixed-width
clustering for optimizing the search for k-NN with a data set with large size, high
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dimensions and various distributions is an open issue.
4.3 The kNNVWC Approach
The FWC algorithm and its inability to cluster a data set that has various dis-
tributions are discussed here. We introduce the two main parts of kNNVWC:
the various-widths clustering part and the exploitation of triangle inequality to effi-
ciently find k-NN for a query object at a reasonable cost throughout the partitioned
clusters.
4.3.1 FWC Algorithm and Its Limitations
The FWC algorithm is a simple and efficient technique for partitioning a data set
into a finite number of clusters with a fixed radius w. The procedure FixedWidth-
Clustering (Lines 50-76) in Algorithm 2 summarizes the steps of the extended
FWC algorithm, where one pass is required to partition a data set. Let X =
{X1, X2, . . . , Xn} be a set of objects in the data set D, and C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}
be the produced clusters from D using FWC. When an object Xi is pulled from D,
it is assigned to the closest cluster Ci providing that the distance between Xi and Ci
≤ w and |C| > 0. Otherwise, a new cluster is created Ci+1 and Xi is set as its cen-
troid. This will continue until all objects X in D have been scanned. The nature
of FWC constrains its use in outlier detection [Portnoy et al., 2001], [Oldmeadow
et al., 2004] and breaking down the data set into fixed-width clusters [Eskin et al.,
2002a] where these clusters, which are created based on fixed-radius, may not be
meaningful. Similar to our work, Eskin et al. [Eskin et al., 2002a] reduced the com-
putation time of the k-NN algorithm using the FWC as a means of breaking down
the data set into smaller and adjacent subsets in order to remove the necessity of
checking every object in a data set to efficiently find k-NN. However, the key issue
of using the FWC in breaking down the data set can be illustrated in the following
example.
Consider the example given in Figure 4.1. These are the two first principal
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Algorithm 2: Various-width clustering
1 Input: Data
2 Input: β
3 Output: Clusters
4 Clusters← φ; add(Clusters, [Data, zeros, 0]);
5 finished← 0;
6 while finished == 0 do
7 Partitioning(Clusters,β);
8 Merging(Clusters,β);
9 if |LargestCluster(Clusters)| ≤ β then
10 finished←− 1
11 end
12 end
13 return [Clusters];
14 Procedure Partitioning(Clusters,β)
15 U ← LargestCluster(Clusters);
16 while |U.objects| > β do
17 w ←− using eq 4.3;
18 if (w == 0) then
19 U.nonPartitioned(1);
20 update(Clusters, U);
21 continue ;
22 end
23 < tmpClusters >←− FixedWidthClustering(U,w);
24 if ClusterNum(tmpClusters)> 1 then
25 remove(Clusters, U);
26 add(Clusters, tmpClusters);
27 U ← LargestCluster(Clusters);
28 else
29 w ←− w − (w ∗ 0.1);
30 go to line 23
31 end
32 end
33 Procedure Merging(Clusters,β)
34 MergingList←− φ /* list of tuples < childClusterID, parentClusterID> */
35 foreach U in Clusters do
36 j ←− using eq 4.1 and eq 4.2;
/* ID of cluster contained U */
37 if j 6= 0 then
38 put < U.getID, j > in MergingList;
39 end
40 end
41 while MergingList 6= φ do
42 foreach tuple in MergingList do
43 < i, j >←− tuple;
44 if !isParent(MergingList, i) then
45 MergeClus(Clusters,i,j);
46 remove tuple from MergingList;
47 end
48 end
49 end
50 Procedure FixedWidthClustering(U,w)
51 tmpU ← ∅; tmpC ← ∅; tmpW ← ∅; /* A set of clusters and their centroids and widths */
52 q = 0; /* The number of created clusters */
53 Clusters← φ;
54 foreach object in U.objects do
55 if q==0 then
56 q+ = 1;
57 put object in tmpCq ;
58 put object in tmpUq ;
59 tmpWq ← 0;
60 else
61 < j, dis >←− ClosestCluster(object,tmpU);
62 if dis ≤ w then
63 put object in tmpUj ;
64 if tmpWq < dis then
65 tmpWq ← dis;
66 end
67 else
68 q+ = 1;
69 put object in tmpCq ; put object in tmpUq ; tmpWq ← 0;
70 end
71 end
72 end
73 for i← 1 to q do
74 add(Clusters, [tmpUi, tmpCi, tmpWi]);
75 end
76 return Clusters;
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(b) Clusters produced by the proposed
kNNVWC approach
Figure 4.1: Clustering of the two first principal components of a sample of the
original DARPA data set.
components of a sample of the original DARPA data set [Mahoney and Chan,
2003b]. This sample contains 52488 objects. 241 objects are labelled as attacks
while the rest are labelled as normal. To find the 5 nearest neighbours for an
object Xi, all the objects n -1 (52487 objects) must be checked although only 5
objects are required. Figure 4.1a shows the importance of using FWC to remove
the necessity of checking all objects. For instance, the 5-NN for an object Xi in in
the cluster C12 can be found in clusters C12, C9, C7, and C4. However, the efficiency
of this algorithm is decreased if some of the produced clusters are relatively large.
For instance, the clusters C3 and C2, which are adjacent, encompass more than 87%
of the data set. Hence, finding the 5-NN of any object in these clusters requires
checking more than 87% of the objects. Setting a fixed-width parameter with a
small value can prevent large clusters from being produced. However, this will
result in the following issues: (i) a large number of clusters can be created that
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increases the computation time of the FWC, which is O(nc) where n the number of
objects and c the number of clusters. This is mainly due to the sparsely distributed
objects in n-dimensional space, contributing to the creation of a large number of
clusters with very few members in each. This fact is highlighted in Figure 4.1a
where the data objects in clusters C8, C4 and C9 show a very sparse distribution.
(ii) The large number of created clusters also increases the computation time of the
search for k-NN (see Section 4.3.3). The two main elements of kNNVWC, namely
various-widths clustering and k-NN search, are elaborated in the following.
4.3.2 Various-Widths Clustering
In this section, the various-widths clustering part is presented, where a data set
is partitioned into a number of clusters whose sizes are constrained by the user-
defined threshold. Two processes are involved in this operation: partitioning and
merging and they are looped sequentially and executed until the criteria are met.
Algorithm 2 shows the steps of the mentioned processes and the variables, data
structures and functions employed by the algorithm are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Variables, data structures, and functions employed by kNNVWC
Algorithm 2: Various-widths clustering
Data A data set need to be partitioned
Clusters
A list of objects, each object consists of two numeric vari-
ables ( width and ID) and two arrays that contain members
(instances) and centroid of cluster respectively
β
The maximum cluster size, where any cluster exceeds this
threshold will be further partitioned
w
The predefined radius of cluster. The value of this parameter
learned from the data set in (Eq 4.3)
LargestCluster
This function returns the largest cluster among the set of
created clusters
finished
A variable that represents the status of various widths clus-
tering. 0 indicates either further partitioning or merging
process is required
Partitioning
A procedure that partitions a data set into a number of
clusters using various widths, where the size of each cluster
does not exceeds the predefined threshold β
Merging
A procedure that is responsible for merging the child clusters
with their parents
FixedWidthClustering
A procedure partitions a data set into a number of clusters
using fixed-width
ClosestCluster
This function computes the distance between the current
cluster and others and returns the ID of the closet cluster
isParent
This function is to check that the child cluster, which will
be merged into its parent, is not parent cluster for others
MergeClus
A function that associates the members of a cluster Ci with
another Cj and removes cluster Ci from the list of clusters
Clusters
Algorithm 3: Search for k-NN throughout partitioned clusters.
Clusters
A list of objects, each object consists of two numeric vari-
ables ( width and ID) and two arrays that contain members
(instances) and centroid of cluster respectively
k The number of nearest neighbours need to be looked for
N A list of IDs of objects and their distances to an object p
Z An array of IDs of candidate clusters for an object p
NNk
This function returns k-nearest neighbors of an object p in
data set d, where p 6∈ d
ClusAscOrder
This function returns a list of IDs of clusters and their dis-
tances to the current cluster. This list is sorted by the dis-
tances in ascending order
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Partitioning process
This process partitions a data set into a number of clusters using a large width
to resolve the issue of clustering the sparsely distributed objects in n-dimensional
space. However, large clusters from dense areas will be created such as clusters
C2 and C3 in Figure 4.1a. Therefore, each large cluster whose size exceeds a user-
defined threshold (maximum cluster size) will be divided into a number of clusters
using a width that suits the density of that cluster. This process continues until the
sizes of all clusters are less than or equal to the user-defined threshold. Figure 4.1b
illustrates the produced clusters using various-widths clustering, as can be seen in
Figure 4.1b, where large clusters are partitioned into a number of smaller clusters.
The main steps of this process are summarized in the procedure for Partitioning
in Algorithm 2. This procedure has two variables: Clusters and β. The former
is a list of class objects, where each object contains members and properties of a
cluster. In the initial step, the whole data set is considered as a cluster and its
centroid and width is set with zeros (Line 4). The latter variable is the threshold of
the maximum cluster’s size. The function LargestCluster returns the largest cluster
U , that is not assigned as non-partitionable, from Clusters (Line 15). If the size
of U is greater than (or equals) β, Equation 4.3 is used to calculate an appropriate
width w for partitioning U . If the value of w equals zero, U is assigned as non-
partitionable (Lines 16-21). This is because the objects in U have similarities in
terms of the distance function, and therefore they cannot be partitioned. Other-
wise, the procedure FixedWidthClustering in (Lines 50-76) is called to partition U
(Line 23). If the number of produced clusters is just one, the value of w is very
large and it should be minimized by 10% and used again (Line 29). Otherwise, the
new clusters produced from U are added to Clusters instead of U , and the largest
cluster again is pulled from Clusters (Lines 24-27). The steps (Lines 16-29) are
repeated until the partitionable largest cluster in Clusters is less β.
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Merging process
The partitioning process of a large cluster can lead to the creation of a cluster that
is totally contained in another cluster. Therefore, merging such clusters decreases
the number of clusters produced, thereby increasing the performance of the search
for k-NN because the distance computations between a query object and the clus-
ters’ centroids will be less when fewer clusters exist. Figure 4.1a shows that many
objects of the cluster C2 are located within the range of cluster C1, but they are
associated with the cluster C2 because it is the closest cluster. To partition the
cluster C2 (as it is large) into a number of clusters, the objects that are located
within the range of the cluster C1 might form a new cluster inside the cluster C1.
Therefore, the merging process is proposed to address this potential problem. Let
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} be the created clusters. The cluster Ci is contained by the
cluster Cj , if the following criteria are met. D(Ci, Cj) + wi ≤ wj Ci ⊂ Cj , i 6= jOtherwise Ci 6⊂ Cj (4.1)
where the D(Ci, Cj) is the distance function between the centroids of clusters i
and j, wi and wj are the radii of clusters i and j respectively. Ci might be contained
by a number of clusters C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cf}. Therefore, Ci is merged with the
closest Cj that is defined as follows.
Cj =
f
min
j=1
D(Ci, Cj) (4.2)
The final step of the merging process involves merging Ci with Cj while Ci is a
parent of Cj+1. This is undertaken quite simply by firstly merging the child clusters
(that are not parents of other clusters) with their parents. The procedure Merging
in Algorithm 2 summarizes the steps of the merging process. The list of all clusters
Clusters is iterated to obtain the IDs of child clusters and their respective parents
(Lines 33-38). In the next, all members (objects) of each child cluster are associated
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with its parent cluster, and the object of this child cluster is removed from the list
Clusters. To avoid removing any child cluster that might be a parent of other
clusters, bottom-up merging is used, where the child clusters that are not parents
of any clusters (like leaf nodes in tree structures) are merged first (Lines 41-46).
Parameters
Two parameters are required in the various-widths clustering, namely the cluster
width w and the maximum cluster size β. The selection of these parameters’ values
have an important impact on the performance of kNNVWC. Unlike FWC, cluster
width w in various-widths clustering is not sensitive due to the use of the new
parameter β, and it can be derived from the data being clustered. Let D be a data
set to be clustered, and NNk(Hi) be the function of k-nearest neighbours for the
object Hi, clsWidth be the function computing the width (radius) of NNk(Hi),
where the width is the distance between the object Hi and the farthest object
among its neighbours. The value of k is set to 50% × |D| to guarantee a large
cluster. To find the appropriate global width, we randomly draw a few objects
from D, H = {H1, H2, . . . ,Hr} where r  |D|, and for each randomly selected
object, the radius of its k-nearest neighbours is computed, and the average is used
as a global width for D as follows.
w =
1
r
r∑
i=1
clsWidth(NNk(Hi), Hi)) (4.3)
The user-defined threshold β is the second parameter that has an important
impact on the performance of kNNVWC because the small value of β will result
in a large number of clusters that can decelerate the clustering processing time, in
addition to the search for k-NN. Although a large value of β will result in large
clusters that can accelerate the clustering process, this will substantially decelerate
the search for k-NN. To obtain the near-optimal value of β the size of a data set
is considered. In Section 4.4.3, the influence of this parameter with respect to the
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size of a data set is investigated, and the suggestion for choosing the near-optimal
value is given.
4.3.3 The k-NN Search
This section shows how triangle inequality can be exploited to efficiently find k-NN
throughout the clusters that are produced by Algorithm 2. To eliminate clusters
that cannot possibly have k-NN for a query object q, the distance similarity between
each cluster and the query object q must be calculated. Prior to discussing the use
of triangle inequality for removing impossible clusters, two definitions are presented
first.
Definition 1 (k-nearest neighbors). The k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) of an object
p are objects whose distances from p are less than the remaining objects in the data
set. Let X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} be a set of n objects in the data set and D(Xi, Xj)
is the distance function between pairs of objects. Given B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bk} be a
set of k-nearest neighbors of the object p where B ⊂ X, p ∈ X and p /∈ B. B is
k-NN of p if
k
max
n=1
D(p,Bn) <
|Z|
min
n=1
D(p, Zn), Z = X\{B ∪ {p}} is held.
For example, Figure 4.2 shows two clusters C1 and C2. The 2-nearest neighbors
of object p1 are objects B = {p2, p5} even though p5 resides in different cluster.
This is because the object p5 holds the definition of the 2-nearest neighbors of
object p1.
2
max
n=1
D(p1, Bn) <
|Z|
min
n=1
D(p, Zn), Z = {p3, p4}
Definition 2. [Candidate cluster for an object p] Let C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} be the
set of clusters, and Bi = {Bi1, Bi2, . . . , Bik} be the k-NN for an object p in a cluster
Ci. The cluster Cj is considered as a candidate cluster for the object p, such that
i 6= j, if it holds: D(p, Cj) − wi < D(p,Biz), z = 1, 2 . . . , k, where wi is the radius
of the cluster Cj.
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Figure 4.2: An illustration of the use of the triangle inequality for searching
nearest neighbors
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This can be illustrated in Figure 4.2. The objects p2, p3 and p4 are the 3-NN of
the object p1 in the cluster C1. The cluster C2 is considered as a candidate cluster
for the object p1 because the distance between the object p1 and the cluster C2
minus the radius of this cluster is at least less than one of the distances between
the object p1 and its neighbors p2, p3 and p4. For example, D(p1, C2) − w2 =
(38.1 − 16.8) = 21.3 < D(p1, p3) = 30.3 and D(p1, p4) = 32. Hence, the candidate
cluster C2 might contain objects that are nearer than p3 and p4, which is, in this
example, the object p5, and therefore, the object p4 is replaced with it.
Algorithm 3 summarizes the steps involved in k-NN search. The variables, data
structures and functions employed by this algorithm are summarized in Table 4.1.
When a query object q is received, the function ClusAscOrder returns a list of
clusters’ IDs and their respective distances to q, the list is named clus. The returned
data is sorted by distances in ascending order (Line 6). A temporal cluster object
tmpU is created to represent the closest cluster to q. If the size of tmpU is less
than k, the objects of the second closest cluster are merged in tmpU . This process
continues until the size of tmpU becomes greater than (or equal to) k. Note that
all IDs of the joined clusters are removed from the list clus (Lines 7-13). In this
step, |tmpU | > k, and therefore, it is initially assumed to have k-NN for the object
q. The function NNk returns a list T of the IDs of the k-NN from tmpU alongside
their cross-posting distances to the object q (Line 16). In fact, the objects in T
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cannot be guaranteed as “true” k-NN for q. Thus, the candidate clusters, which
might contain objects that are nearer than the objects in T w.r.t the object q, have
to be defined from the clusters that have not been merged into tmpU . This can be
done with fast and simple calculations; no distance computation is required because
the distances from the object q to all the clusters and the objects in T have already
been computed (see Lines 6 and 16). Therefore, any cluster whose distance from
the object q is d, and the radius w of this cluster is subtracted from d = d−w, the
cluster is assigned as a candidate cluster when d is less than the distance between
the object q and any assumed k-NN objects in T (Lines 17-23).
To find the “true” k-NN for q, the similarity distance between each object in
the candidate clusters in Z and the object q is computed. All these objects, in
addition to the ones in T , are stored in the list N , and they are sorted by their
distances to q in ascending order. The final step is to return the top k objects from
N as the “true” k-NN for q (Lines 27-32).
4.4 Experiment Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed kNNVWC approach
on various data sets. Three aspects are considered in this evaluation: (i) the total
number of distance computations and (ii) the computational cost of the construction
process and (iii) the search for k-NN. Four algorithms are compared with kNNVWC.
The q-fold-cross validation is applied to each data set, by dividing it into q equal
size subsets. Each time, one of the subsets is used as testing queries, while the
remaining q - 1 subsets are used as a training data set. Then, the average value of
the results of all folds is used as an overall result. In this evaluation, q is set to 10 as
suggested by Kohavi [Kohavi, 1995] in order to reliably demonstrate the efficiency
of any proposed algorithm. All algorithms were implemented in Java, and executed
under Windows 7 enterprise with 3.4 GHz CPU and 8 GB memory.
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Algorithm 3: Search for k-NN for a query object throughout clusters
1 Input: clusters
2 Input: k
3 Input: q
/* The query object */
4 Output: N
5 clus← φ
/* list of tuples < clusterID, distance > sorted by distance in ascending
order */
6 clus← ClusAscOrder(clusters, q)
7 tmpU ← φ
8 foreach {clusterID, distance} in clus do
9 U ← get(clusters, clusterID)
10 tmpU ← tmpU ⋃U.objects
11 remove < clusterID, distance > from cluID
12 if |tmpU | > k then
13 break
14 end
15 end
16 T ← NNk(p, tmpU, k)
/* list of tuples < objectID, distance > */
17 N ← φ; Z ← φ
18 foreach {clusterID, cluDis} in clus do
19 U ← get(clusters, clusterID)
20 foreach {objID, objDis} in T do
21 if (cluDis− U.radius) < objDis then
22 put clusterID in Z
23 break
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 foreach clusterID in Z do
28 U ← get(clusters, clusterID)
29 put NNk(p, U.objects, k) in N
30 end
31 N = N ∪ T
32 return top k-nearest objects from N
4.4.1 The Data sets
Twelve data sets with high, medium and low-dimensional feature spaces are used
for evaluating the proposed approach. These data sets have been selected because
they come from various domains and are widely used for the evaluation of data
mining techniques. Ten of them were obtained from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a], while three come from different places.
Notably, these data sets are intended to be used for the purposes of classification
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and outlier detection; however, we use them only to evaluate the performance of
the proposed approach to searching k-nearest neighbours in various domains and
dimensions. The characteristics of these data sets are briefly described below:
• arcene: It contains mass-spectra obtained with the SELDI technique. This
data set has 900 objects, each being described by 1000 features that can
be used to separate the cancer patients from healthy patients [Frank and
Asuncion, 2013a].
• SimSCADA: This data set consists of 12000 objects, each being described
by 113 features. Each feature represents one sensor or actuator reading in
the water network systems, which is simulated using the proposed SCADA
testbed SCADAVT in Chapter 3.
• multiplefeaturs. This data set consists of 2000 patterns of handwritten numer-
als (“0”–“9”) extracted from a collection of Dutch utility maps,where each
pattern is represented by 649 numeric features [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• arrhythmia: This data set consists of 452 objects, each represented by 279
parameters (features) of ECG measurements. It is used to classify a patient
into one of the 16 classes of cardiac arrhythmia [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• gasSensors This data set contains 13,910 measurements that come from 16
chemical sensors, and each feature vector contains the 8 features extracted
from each particular sensor. This results in a 128-dimensional feature vec-
tor [Vergara et al., 2012][Rodriguez-Lujan et al., 2014]
• spambase This data set contains two classes: spam and non-spam e-mails.
It consists of 4601 objects (e-mails), each being described by 57 continuous
features denoting word frequencies [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• kddcup99 : set comes from the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation
Data [Mahoney and Chan, 2003b]
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• waveform: It consists of 5000 objects having 40 continuous features, and some
of which are noise [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• DUWWTP : It comes from the daily measures of sensors in an urban waste
water treatment plant, and it consists of 527 objects, each represented by 38
features [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• shuttle: This data set consists of 43500 objects, each represented by 9 nu-
merical features. It is used in the European StatLog project to compare the
performances of machine learning, statistical, and neural network algorithms
on data sets from real-world industrial areas [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• slices: This data set consists of 53500 computed tomography (CT) images
scanned from 74 different patients (43 male, 31 female). Each CT image
is described by two histograms in polar space from which 384 features are
extracted [Frank and Asuncion, 2013a].
• MORD : This data set consists of 4690 objects, each represented by 2 features
(e.g.Temperature and Humidity). It is collected from a real wireless sensor
network and used for outlier detection purpose [Suthaharan et al., 2010].
4.4.2 The Performance Metrics
The key problem of Ek-NN is that it requires a lengthy computation time because
each object in the data set must be checked to find the k-NN for a query object.
Therefore, the efficient search for k-NN might be the main aim of any optimized
algorithm. To measure this efficiency, the construction (if a preprocessing step is
required) and search times and the number of distance computations should be
considered in the evaluation step.
Reduction Rate of Distance Computations
This metric is platform-independent where the number of distance computations
is not affected by high/low platform resources, although it is data-dependent. To
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measure the reduction rate of distance computations (RD) for an algorithm Ω, the
Ek-NN is used as the baseline. The number of the distance computations for Ek-
NN is fixed for any k, which is q × n, where n is the number of objects in data
set and q is the number of query objects. Then, the performance of Ω for finding
k-nearest neighbours in m distance computations is calculated as follows:
RD = 1− m
q × n (4.4)
Reduction Rate of Computation Time
This metric is platform- and data-set-dependent. The reduction rate of computation
time (RC) for Ek-NN is the same for any k because all objects in the training data
set will be checked. Then, the RC for an algorithm Ω that takes the time t1 is
calculated as follows:
RC = 1− t1
t2
(4.5)
where the t2 is the time taken by Ek-NN.
4.4.3 The Impact of Cluster Size
In the proposed approach, the number of produced clusters is influenced by the
parameter β which is the maximum size of any produced cluster. Obviously, as
shown in Figure 4.3, this parameter can influence the performance of the proposed
approach. As a large value of β can result in a small number of large-sized clus-
ters, a large number of objects will be checked to find k-NN. This is illustrated in
Section 4.3.1. On the other hand, a small value can result in a large number of
small clusters, and this can minimize the search boundaries, especially when k is
small. However, the distances between each query object and all produced clus-
ters are required for each object, and this adds extra cost in addition to distance
computations within the minimized search boundaries.
Clearly, a near-optimal performance relies on the optimal value of β. In this
section, we demonstrate how a near-optimal value of β can be inferred from the
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Figure 4.3: An investigation of the impact of cluster size, which s influenced by
the value of the parameter β, on the performance of the proposed approach, where
s is the size of the training data set.
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size of a data set. Since the proposed approach inherits the nature of the FWC
algorithm, the exact number of produced clusters cannot be determined; therefore,
we tested various values of β to produce a number of clusters that ranges approx-
imately from 0.5
√
s to 8
√
s, where s is the size of the data set. In this investigation,
data sets varying in terms of domain, size and dimensionality are used.
As can also be seen in Figure 4.3, the performance of the proposed approach
is not very sensitive to the number of produced clusters within the range of
√
s
and 3
√
s. Moreover, it can be seen that the variance of the performance for each k
within this range is small. Therefore, we suggest using a value of the parameter β
that produces clusters within this range. However, there might be some data sets
that do not comply with this. Thus, a user can find out the near-optimal value of
β with few attempts.
4.4.4 The Baseline Methods
We compare kNNVWC with well-known methods that speed up a k-NN search,
including: KD-tree, Ball tree, Cover tree and FWC.
KD-tree
KD-tree is an algorithm used to structure objects in a binary tree in order to speed
up the query time of k-nearest neighbours [Sproull, 1991]. Because the objects
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at each node are recursively partitioned into two sets by splitting along one axis
(dimension), the contraction time of a k-d-Tree is very fast. However, the efficiency
of the query time decreases when the number of dimensions, m, increases, and it is
worthwhile when m ≤ 10 [Nene and Nayar, 1997].
Ball tree
Ball tree defines k-dimensional hyperspheres (balls) that cover the data objects and
structure them into a binary tree that consists of a finite number of nodes, where
each node represents a set of objects. The root node represents the whole objects.
There are two types of nodes: a leaf node and a non-leaf node. The leaf node
contains a list of objects represented by the node; a non-leaf node has two children
nodes whose centroids are assigned as follows. The centroid of the objects in the
parent node is calculated. Then, the farthest object from this centroid is assigned
as the centroid of the first child, while the farthest object from the centroid of the
first child is assigned as the centroid of the second child. Afterwards, each object is
assigned to the closet child node, and this recursively continues until all criteria are
met. This structure of the objects and the use of triangle inequality can accelerate
the search for k-nearest neighbours. Further technical and theoretical details about
this algorithm can be found in references [Fukunaga and Narendra, 1975; Liu et al.,
2006; Omohundro, 1989].
Cover tree
Cover tree is a state-of-the-art technique that efficiently finds the k-NN in high-
dimensional data. It is based on the assumption that a data set shows certain
restricted growth, regardless of its actual number of dimensions. However, it re-
quires a great deal of preprocessing time, especially when dimensionality increases.
In addition, the distribution of the data set plays a major role in its effective-
ness [Beygelzimer et al., 2006].
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FWC
FWC is a fixed-width clustering algorithm that is used to partition a data set into
small subsets using fixed width. See the previous Section 4.3.1. [Eskin et al., 2002a]
and [Eskin et al., 2002a] adapted this algorithm with the use of triangle inequality
to remove the necessity of checking each object in the data set in order to obtain
the k-nearest neighbours.
4.4.5 Distance Metric
To determine the search area which definitely has a k-NN, several calculations
are required for all baseline methods as well as kNNVWC. In tree-structure based
methods, some computation is required to traverse the tree to find the leaf nodes
that have objects within the search area; in flat-structure-based methods (e.g FWC
and kNNVWC), only distance computations between a query object and clusters’
centroids are required first. Due to the variation of these pre-calculations, we count
only the total number of distance computations between a query object and the
objects in the search area. That is, we use only the total number of visits for
objects to locate the k-nearest neighbours for n queries, where n is 10% of the
data set. Notably, we exclude the Cover tree algorithm in this comparison because
the library, which is the weka jar file [Hall et al., 2009], does not provide a public
method for obtaining the number of visited objects in this algorithm. However, in
the next Section 4.4.6, we will compare kNNVWC with the Cover tree algorithm
based on the computation and construction times that are the ultimate goals of the
end-users.
Various values of k 10, 50, 100 and 200 are tested in this experiment. These
value are chosen to compare the performance on small, medium and large k values.
As previously discussed, the distance computations for Ek-NN are fixed for all
values of k. Therefore, we compare all the results with Ek-NN, and demonstrate
the amount of deduction that each algorithm can achieve.
Table 4.2 shows the results of the comparison of five algorithms whose total
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distance calculations are compared with Ek-NN which represents the worst case
where all objects in a data set are visited to find the k-NN for a query object. As
previously discussed, the best algorithm according to this comparison is the one that
minimizes as much as possible the total number of distance calculations. From these
results, we can see that kNNVWC performed the best on the highest dimensional
data set arcene that has 10000 features, while FWC ranks second. However, the
large values of k could degrade their performance. This can be attributed to the
small size of the data set where all optimized algorithms will visit all objects when
the value of k is set equal to the data set size. On another hand, tree-structure-
based methods Ball tree and KD-tree did not show any improvement with this
data set. This is because the search boundaries for each query object overlapped
with most nodes in the pre-created tree. Hence, all objects in such nodes must
be checked. Similarly, kNNVWC competed against all baseline methods with high
dimensional data sets such as SimSCADA, multiplefeaturs, gasSensors and Slice,
except the data set arrhythmia with which all methods failed. The reason for this
is the small size of this data set. Thus, Ek-NN method is more appropriate for
any small data set. As for the medium-dimensional data sets spambase, waveform,
DUWWTP, and kddcup99, the overall performance of kNNVWC is still the best.
However, it can be seen that all methods are worse on the data set waveform even
though its size is relatively large. This is because this data set has a dense data
which might form one single condensed cluster, and therefore the range of the search
area for any query object overlaps with the majority of data in n-dimensional space.
In this case, a large number of objects must be checked for each query. Clearly,
all methods performed well on kddcup99. However, due to this, the data set has
several large clusters each of which contains objects that have identical similarities
in terms of the Euclidean distance, kNNVWC could not split these large clusters.
Thus, the search for k-NN for a query object that is close to one of these clusters
will be expensive. This is because all objects in such large clusters will be checked.
In fact, kNNVWC would certainly have shown a more significant result if these
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Table 4.2: The average reduction rate of distance calculations against Ek-NN
Data set K EkNN k-d Tree Ball tree FWC kNNVWC
arcene
10
7.29 ×104
0.00% 5.97% 53.71% 61.57%
50 0.00% 2.03% 41.54% 50.28%
100 0.00% 0.67% 31.95% 41.87%
200 0.00% 0.06% 12.72% 25.31%
SimSCADA
10
1.30 ×107
88.57% 93.45% 91.82% 97.86%
50 74.61% 92.46% 91.52% 97.56%
100 55.39% 90.65% 89.57% 96.45%
200 44.79% 87.22% 85.96% 94.63%
multiplefeaturs
10
3.60 ×105
0.00% 0.02% 55.27% 70.51%
50 0.00% 0.00% 47.54% 63.91%
100 0.00% 0.00% 41.73% 59.24%
200 0.00% 0.00% 38.93% 55.56%
arrhythmia
10
1.83 ×104
0.00% 0.00% 4.43% 6.56%
50 0.00% 0.00% 3.24% 5.94%
100 0.00% 0.00% 2.48% 5.86%
200 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 5.16%
gasSensors
10
1.74 ×107
90.47% 78.61% 91.59% 95.25%
50 76.91% 71.97% 88.18% 91.78%
100 68.46% 67.82% 85.69% 89.30%
200 59.71% 62.85% 82.56% 85.11%
spambase
10
1.90 ×106
57.80% 3.43% 82.39% 90.87%
50 40.73% 1.61% 80.24% 86.79%
100 35.16% 0.13% 78.63% 83.68%
200 28.81% 0.10% 76.03% 78.53%
waveform
10
2.25 ×106
0.00% 0.00% 2.47% 3.08%
50 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 1.39%
100 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.74%
200 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.43%
DUWWTP
10
2.51 ×105
0.14% 0.00% 5.86% 4.50%
50 0.00% 0.00% 2.98% 2.29%
100 0.00% 0.00% 2.02% 2.06%
200 0.00% 0.00% 1.20% 1.86%
shuttle
10
1.70 ×108
99.51% 98.20% 95.39% 95.71%
50 98.57% 97.55% 92.89% 92.30%
100 97.79% 97.07% 90.98% 89.79%
200 96.79% 96.37% 88.52% 86.33%
MORD
10
1.98 ×106
97.84% 94.15% 91.20% 94.76%
50 96.44% 93.18% 90.08% 93.56%
100 94.88% 90.50% 88.82% 92.06%
200 92.11% 88.02% 85.94% 89.78%
Slice
10
2.58 ×108
24.38% 47.81% 73.66% 89.23%
50 4.48% 21.07% 65.26% 83.22%
100 1.90% 15.88% 61.72% 80.73%
200 0.76% 12.31% 57.84% 78.23%
kddcup99
10
2.20 ×1010
78.38% 78.00% 73.91% 83.87%
50 78.32% 77.90% 73.83% 83.82%
100 78.27% 77.84% 73.79% 83.76%
200 78.19% 0.00% 73.73% 83.67%
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clusters had been removed.
For low-dimensional data sets shuttle and MORD, there is an interesting com-
petition among all methods. Even though interesting results are produced by all
methods, it is suggested that KD-tree be used when dimensions < 10.
4.4.6 The Complexity Metrics
In this comparison, we evaluate kNNVWC against the four baseline methods. Two
salient aspects of this evaluation are considered: construction time taken by each
method to build its own structure and the search time taken to find k-NN for a
number of query objects.
Search Time
This part provides an evaluation of the efficiency of each method against EkNN in
searching for k-NN. Note that the efficiency value τ is calculated as in Section 4.4.2
and this value is categorized into three statuses (Better, Similar and Worse) as
follows: 
0 < τ < 1 Better
τ = 0 Similar
τ < 0 Worse
(4.6)
That is, Ω method is better when it takes less time than EkNN to find k-NN, and
the similar status when its search time is exactly the same as the time consumed
by EkNN. Otherwise, the status is worse, and this happens when the search time
is longer than the time taken by EkNN. Therefore, any method producing a result
greater than zero can be an alternative for EkNN. However, the method with the
highest efficiency value is the best choice. On the other hand, EkNN is the best
when τ ≤ 0 because it does not require any preprocessing step and is simple to
implement.
In this evaluation, the same values of k that were used in Section 4.4.5 are
also used here. Figure 4.4 shows the efficiency of each method when searching
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Figure 4.4: The efficiency of the baseline methods and kNNVWC against EkNN
in searching for k-NN
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for the k-NN in various data sets. Overall, the tree-based methods KD-tree, Ball
tree and Cover tree demonstrate poor results over the high dimensional data sets
especially when k value is large, while Cover tree can be the best among them when
dimensionality increases. On the other hand, flat-structure-based methods, FWC
and kNNVWC demonstrate promising results except with the small size data set
arrhythmia and their efficiency is stable even with a large value of k. Nevertheless,
for high dimensional data, kNNVWC is the most efficient method compared with
all other methods.
With the medium-dimensional data sets, tree-based methods show good results
only for kddcup99, with a slightly lower efficiency when dimensionality increases.
The relatively large size of this data set is the possible reason for this improvement.
This is because EkNN, with which all results were compared, is very expensive with
this data set. On another hand, flat-structure methods demonstrate significant
and stable results with all k values except with waveform and DUWWTP. The
explanation for this was previously given in Section 4.4.5; the former is very dense
and relatively small, while the latter is very small. However, it is quite obvious
that the efficiency value of kNNVWC is greater than FWC’s one by approximately
10%. As shown, the overall efficiency of all methods with the low-dimensional data
sets is good except for Cover tree that appears to have low efficiency with large k
values.
Construction Time
All methods involve a preprocessing step prior to the k-NN search, and they all use
a clustering-based technique for the decomposition process except for the KD-tree
which uses hyperplane separation. This part provides an experimental evaluation
of the efficiency of each method in building its own structure.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the construction time for each of the methods on var-
ious data sets. It can be seen that the efficiency of Cover tree and Ball tree in
comparison with other methods is influenced by the number of dimensions and
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the distribution of a data set. For instance, Cover tree exhibits the worst con-
struction time on the high dimensional data arcene, while Ball tree is relatively
acceptable compared to others. The opposite is true for the high-dimensional data
SimSCADA. This fluctuation can be seen in other data sets. Therefore, this might
be a result not only of dimensionality, but of distribution. Clearly, FWC is the
worst method and is influenced by the size of the data set. Overall, kNNVWC and
KD-tree appear to be the most efficient and stable methods.
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Figure 4.5: The construction time of the baseline methods and kNNVWC for each
Data set
In general, comparing all methods, kNNVWC demonstrates an interesting ef-
ficiency in terms of construction and search times, especially with large and high-
dimensional data. In addition, it adds only a small extra cost in the worst case
scenario, when compared with EkNN.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel nearest-neighbour search approach based on various-widths
clustering is introduced. This approach is called kNNVWC and is able to partition
a data set using various widths, with each width suiting a particular distribu-
tion. Two features have been introduced which are compared with the use of fixed
width:(i) the balance between the number of produced clusters and their respective
sizes has maximized the efficiency of using triangle inequality to prune unlikely
clusters; (ii) clustering with a global width first produces relatively large clusters,
and each cluster is independently partitioned without considering other clusters,
thereby reducing the clustering time.
In the experiments, twelve data sets, which vary in domains, size and dimen-
sionality, have been used. The experimental results have shown that kNNVWC
outperformed four algorithms in both construction and search times. Moveover, the
new approach has shown promising results with high-dimensional data in searching
for the k-nearest-neighbours for a query object.
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Chapter5
SCADA Data-Driven Anomaly
Detection Approach (SDAD)
This chapter introduces a novel unsupervised SCADA Data-driven Anomaly De-
tection approach, called SDAD, generating from unlabeled SCADA data, proximity
anomaly-detection rules based on the clustering technique. SDAD is proposed to
monitor the inconsistent data behaviour of SCADA data points. Two techniques
are proposed here: (i) a separation between the consistent and inconsistent obser-
vations, which are generated by the data points of a given SCADA system, where
kNNVWC is used as the essential part of this process; and (ii) the clustering-
based proximity rules for each behaviour, whether consistent or inconsistent, are
automatically extracted from the observations pertaining to that behaviour. The
evaluation is provided to demonstrate the accuracy of both aforementioned tech-
niques. The proposed SCADA testbed SCADAVT in Chapter 3 is used to generate
simulated testing data sets that contain the data of tens of SCADA data points.
Moreover, real SCADA data sets are also used to evaluate SDAD. The experiment
results demonstrate the significantly better accuracy and efficiency of the proposed
SDAD approach in comparison with existing clustering-based intrusion detection
algorithms.
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5.1 Introduction
The evolution of SCADA data can reflect the system’s state: either consistent or
inconsistent, and therefore the monitoring of the evolution of SCADA data for a
given system has been proposed as an efficient tailored IDS for SCADA [Carcano
et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012; Rrushi et al., 2009b; Zaher et al., 2009; Alcaraz
and Lopez, 2014a;b]. Two attack scenarios from [Jared Verba, 2008] are used to
motivate the use of SCADA data to build anomaly detection models for monitoring
the behaviour of SCADA systems. Figure 5.1 illustrates that when an attacker
compromises the front end processor (FEP), three actions can be performed as
follows: (i) initialising connection with remote terminal unit (RTU1.1) and sending a
command without receiving a corresponding command from the application server,
(ii) dropping the command sent from the application server to RTU1.1, and frogging
feedback information, sent back to the application server, to meet his/her attack,
and (iii) frogging the command sent from the application server to RTU1.1, and also
frogging feedback information sent back from RTU1.1 to the application server. In
fact, all commands sent to RTU1.1 will be trusted because they are syntactically
valid and sent from the FEP.
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Figure 5.1: Compromised FEP sends undesired command and falsifies the feedback
information
In this scenario, two inconsistent data emerged: an inconsistent network traffic
pattern and inconsistent SCADA data. The inconsistent network traffic pattern can
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be identified as follows: (i) FEP is not an intelligent device that can make a decision
and send a command to RTU1.1 without receiving a corresponding command. (ii)
The dropped command at FEP will be shown up in the network stream from the
application server to the FEP but not in the network stream from the FEP to the
RTU1.1, while, the frogged commands between the application server and RTU1.1
can be identified by the inconsistent SCADA data. For example, the command in
the network stream from the application server to the FEP shows that the status
of pump1 is ON, while in the network stream, from the FEP to the RTU1.1 is
OFF. Clearly, watching for inconsistencies in commands in this scenario helps to
detect that the aforementioned MITM attacks are performed from FEP. However,
in the following, we demonstrate a scenario where monitoring of inconsistencies in
commands will fail to detect MITM attacks.
Figure 5.2 illustrates that when an attacker compromises the application server,
which is intelligent and can initiate independent actions, and also drop commands
sent from the operator, an unsafe condition could be created. In the same Fig-
ure 5.2, the attacker initialises the command from the application server to turn
of pump1, and it can be seen that the network traffic stream and SCADA data
between RUT2.1 and the application server are consistent for this command. How-
ever, the SCADA data such as the speed and status of pump1 could be inconsistent
with the sensory node of water level in RTU2.2, as they are set with values that
violate the specifications of the system from the operational perspective.
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Figure 5.2: Compromised application server sending false information
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As mentioned previously, the monitoring of the behaviour of SCADA sys-
tems through the evolution of SCADA data has attracted the attention of re-
searchers. [Jin et al., 2006] extended the set of invariant models with a value range
model to detect any inconsistent value for a particular data point. Similarly, [Al-
caraz and Lopez, 2014b;a] monitor each data point (sensory node) individually
using predefined threshold (e.g, min, max), and any reading that is not inside a
prescribed threshold is considered as an anomaly. These approaches are good for
monitoring one single data point. However, the value of an individual data point
may not be abnormal, but in combination with other data points, may produce
an abnormal observation, which very rarely occurs. To address this issue, analyt-
ical approaches in [Fovino et al., 2010a][Carcano et al., 2011][Fovino et al., 2012]
were proposed to identify the range of critical states for multivariate data points
whereby any inconsistent state of the analyzed data points can be monitored. Sim-
ilarly, [Rrushi et al., 2009b] applied probabilistic models to estimate the normalcy
of the evolution of multivariate data points. However, pure “normal” training data
is required for the probabilistic approach, and this requires the system to oper-
ate for a long time under normal conditions. However, this cannot be guaranteed,
and therefore any anomalous activity occurring during this period will be learned
as normal. Moreover, analytical approaches require expert involvement to anal-
yse and identify the inconsistent range of data points. This, however, results in
time-expensive processing and is prone to human errors.
This chapter proposes a novel SCADA unsupervised Data-driven Anomaly De-
tection approach, named SDAD, generating from unlabelled SCADA data, prox-
imity anomaly detection rules based on clustering technique. SDAD is intended to
monitor the inconsistent data behaviour of SCADA data points. SDAD efficiently
separates inconsistent from consistent observations in the learning data set for mul-
tivariate data points; in addition, the proximity detection rules for each behaviour,
whether consistent or inconsistent, are automatically extracted. Moreover, SDAD
works in an unsupervised mode where purely “normal” training data is not re-
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quired, and it does not require expert involvement to extract detection rules. This
will help to reduce time-expensive processing as well as eliminate human errors.
Seven different data sets are used to evaluate the effectiveness of SDAD; two are
generated by the proposed simulation of SCADA system in Chapter 3, while the
other five are real data sets that consist of both consistent/inconsistent observations
of data points.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a characterisation of
consistent/inconsistent observations for point data and the details of the proposed
approach. Section 5.3 presents the experimental set-up, followed by results and
analysis in Section 5.4. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 5.6.
5.2 The SDAD Approach
This section describes consistent/inconsistent observations for SCADA points and
the two techniques that contribute to the development of SDAD; (i) a technique that
separates inconsistent observations from consistent ones of multivariate SCADA
points, and (ii) a technique that extracts proximity-based detection rules, which
is used to detect inconsistent observations. Figure 5.3 shows the different steps
of SDAD. The SDAD approach is based on k-nearest neighbour approach for as-
sign inconsistency score for each observation produced by the multivariate SCADA
points over a period of time. The fast and efficient k-nearest neighbour approach
kNNVWC is used as an efficient algorithm to find the k-nearest neighbour obser-
vations for each current observation so that we can assign an inconsistency score
for that observation based on its neighbourhood density.
5.2.1 Observation State of SCADA Points
The data of SCADA points such as sensors’ measurement and actuator control
data, are data sources for the unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS. The data
consistency of SCADA points represent the normal current system state, while
inconsistency indicates malicious actions [Carcano et al., 2011; Fovino et al., 2012;
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Separation between  consistent and inconsistent observations
Extracted detection rules
Inconsistent observationsConsistent observations
Extract normal detection rules Extract anomaly detection rules
Training dataset 
Monitor a system state based on the extracted detection rules
Figure 5.3: The steps of the SDAD approach.
Rrushi et al., 2009b]. The consistency is defined by the specifications which describe
the valid (or acceptable) data in terms of the system’s operational perspective.
From the SCADA simulation presented in Chapter 3, Figure 5.4 shows the normal
operation producing consistent observations of the following SCADA points Pst1 ,
Pst2 , Pst3 , Psp1 , Psp2 , Psp3 and T1, where Psti and Pspi represent the status and the
speed of the Pumpi, respectively and Tj representing the water level in the Tankj .
Definition 3 (Observation of SCADA points). It is a combination of data produced
by SCADA points such as sensors and actuators at a certain period of time t. An
observation for n points can be represented by a vector p ∈ Rn .
Definition 4 (Inconsistent/consistent observation). An observation is considered
as inconsistent when the anomaly score for the observation based on its neigh-
bourhood density significantly deviates from the anomaly scores of all the learning
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Figure 5.4: The normal operation of the SCADA points Pst1, Pst2, Pst3, Psp1,
Psp2, Psp3
observations. Otherwise, it is considered as consistent.
5.2.2 Separation of Inconsistent Observations
The separation step as depicted in Figure 5.2 is the first phase. To perform this with
unlabelled data, two assumptions are held: the number of consistent observations
vastly outperforms the inconsistent observations, and the inconsistent observations
data must be statistically different from consistent observations. Therefore, the
proposed SDAD approach will be inappropriate for any situation that does not
meet these two assumptions. The preliminary investigations show that inconsistent
observations have a similar definition of outliers in n-dimensional space, and are
sparsely distributed in an informal way. That is, they could take various densities of
n-dimensional space. Two steps are involved in separating consistent/inconsistent
observations as follows.
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Inconsistency scoring
The proposed inconsistency scoring technique uses a hybrid of local and global
outlier detection approaches [Breunig et al., 2000][Breunig et al., 1999][Sˇaltenis
Vydunas, 2004][Arning et al., 1996]. In the local outlier detection approach [Bre-
unig et al., 2000][Breunig et al., 1999], only local outliers are detected. This works
well in a particular application domain whose normal behaviour forms a number of
clusters that have different densities. Comparatively, the global approach [Sˇaltenis
Vydunas, 2004][Arning et al., 1996] does not work well when the outliers are con-
tained in the reference points. Since the initial investigation revealed different
densities in inconsistent observations in the data space, neither local nor global
approaches are appropriate solutions for our problem. The choice of the best app-
roach should not be predominantly influenced by either local or global approaches.
Therefore, the proposed inconsistency scoring technique will need to rely on an
average of distances of the nearest neighbours and the number of neighbours k that
play a major role in the influence of local and global approaches. The larger the
value of k, the higher the influence of the global approach. For example, when k
equals the size of the data set DS, the inconsistency score for an observation si is
the average distance from si to all observations in DS. This is similar to the global
approaches proposed in [Sˇaltenis Vydunas, 2004][Arning et al., 1996].
Let Dpoints be a matrix of data points, where Dpoints = {d1, · · · , dn}. Let X
be a vector of values of di, X = {x1, x1, · · · , xm}. Let Si denotes an observation in
Dpoints, Si = {si,1, si,2, · · · , si,j}, i = 1, · · · ,m, j = 1, · · · , n where m the number
of observations, and n the number of data points. Any observation Si could be
either consistent or inconsistent. Therefore, in the identification phase, a set of
consistent observations, R = {r1, r2, · · · , rf}, and a set of inconsistent observations,
O = {of+1, of+2, · · · , om} are identified, where R ⊆ Dpoints, O ⊆ Dpoints, R ∪O =
Dpoints, R ∩O = φ.
To calculate the inconsistency score for each observation Si, let Ω be a function
of Euclidean distance between two observations s = (s1, ...., sd) and p = (p1, ...., pd),
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defined as follows:
Ω(s, p) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(si − pi)2 (5.1)
where n is the number of data points (attributes). Let k a positive parameter
such that 2 ≤ k ≤ |DS|, and Ψ and Υ be the functions of an inconsistency score
and the k-nearest neighbours for the observation si respectively. The inconsistency
score for an observation is defined as follows:
B = Υ(si, DS\si, k) (5.2)
where, B is the k-nearest neighbours of si.
Ψ(si, DS, k) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
Ω(si, Bj) (5.3)
For example, consider Figure 5.5, where a data set D of eleven observations of
R2 is shown. Let k =4. In this example, the inconsistency score for the observation
O1 based on the Euclidean distance is computed as follows:
We find the 4-nearest neighbours of O1 using the function Υ
Υ(O1, D\O1, 4) = {s3, s5, s6, s7}
Then, the inconsistency score for the observation O1 is computed as the average
distance from O1 to {s3, s5, s6, s7}.
Ψ(O1, D, 4) =
27.7 + 22.4 + 24.6 + 20.3
4
=
95
4
= 79.775
where, the numerators represent the Euclidean distances of the 4-nearest neighbours
of O1. Note, the approach kNNVWC that has been proposed in Chapter 4 is used
to efficiently find the k-nearest neighbours.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the k-nearest neighbours of the observation si. For exam-
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of an inconsistency scoring technique based on intra-
cluster cohesion factor
ple, the k-nearest neighbours of the observation 1, which is a consistent observation,
with respect to k = 5 are 2, · · · , 5. This represents a cluster c1 whose centre and
size are observations 1 and k respectively.
The inconsistency score of the observation 1 is measured by the average distance
of all observations 2, · · · , 5 in c1 to observation 1. It can be seen that the clusters
c1, c2 and c3 in Figure 5.5 have similar radii, and this suggests that their centroid
observations may have a similar inconsistency score. In fact, this is not always
true because the inconsistency score is computed by the inter-compactness of the
cluster, and not by reachability-distance [Ankerst et al., 1999]. Since the obser-
vations 2 and 5 are centroids of clusters whose radii are larger than c1, c2 and c3,
they will obtain higher inconsistency scores. The radii of the clusters c6 and c7
whose centroids are given by the inconsistent observations O1 and O2 respectively,
are clearly the largest radii, and are considered as the inconsistent observations be-
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cause they have relatively large radii that can significantly deviate from the mean of
the radii of other observations. Algorithm 4 summarises the steps used to calculate
the inconsistency scores for each observation si.
Algorithm 4: inconsistency scoring algorithm
1 Input: DS
/* A matrix of unlabelled SCADA data consisting of m observations and n
attributes */
2 Input: k
/* # of nearest neighbors */
3 Output: IncList
/* list of inconsistency scores */
4 IncList←− ∅;
5 for i← 1 to |DS| do
6 IncList[i] = Ψ(DS[i], DS, k);
7 end
8 return [IncList];
The Separation Threshold
Since all observations are assigned with inconsistency scores, an appropriate thresh-
old η to determine whether the observation is consistent or inconsistent is required.
In fact, the selection of the near-optimal threshold plays an important role in sup-
porting the robustness of the inconsistency scoring technique, while an inappropri-
ate threshold leads to bad results regardless of the criticality scoring technique. It
is obvious that labelling consistent observations as inconsistent observations will
result in a high false positive rate. Moreover, tuning the threshold to reduce the
false positive rate is a critical operation because a number of true inconsistent ob-
servations will be missed. In the anomaly detection techniques that are based on
anomaly-scoring, observations are sorted in descending order. An analyst might
choose to either analyze the top few outliers or use a cut-off threshold to select
the anomalies. Therefore, based on the assumption that anomalies constitute a
tiny portion of the data, the top small percentage ( say between 1% and 5%) of
the observations which have the highest anomaly scores, are assumed as anomalies.
Figure 5.6 shows the critical step in selecting the best threshold.
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Figure 5.6: (a) The behaviour of consistent/inconsistent observations of two pro-
cess parameters in 2-dimension space, (b) Inconsistency scores after applying in-
consistency scoring algorithm
It can be seen that the best threshold for the data set SIRD is the top 3% of
the observations which have the highest anomaly scores, while the best threshold
for the data set MORD is 0.01. However, under the aforementioned assumption,
and in addition to the empirical investigation of the used data sets, it is highly
possible to attempt a range of thresholds from 0.50% to 5% increased by 0.50%.
That is, the threshold parameter η can be increased (or decreased) by 0.50% until
good results are obtained.
5.2.3 Extracting Proximity-Detection Rules
The various constraints of SCADA systems (e.g. real-time nature, lack of memory
resources, limited computation power) require a tailored IDS that monitors a target
system in at least near real-time and operates in a constrained-resource environ-
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ment. In practice, feeding the IDS with the identified consistent and inconsistent
observations for monitoring is not a practical approach because: (i) a large memory
capacity is needed to store all training observations; and (ii) it is time-consuming to
calculate the similarity between the current observation and each learned observa-
tion in the monitoring phase. In this section, a detection rule extraction technique is
proposed to extract a few detection rules which fully represent the entire identified
observations.
As shown in Figure 5.3, the extraction of proximity-detection rules comes after
the separation phase. The set of consistent observations is denoted as
R = {r1, r2, · · · , rk} and the set of inconsistent observations is denoted as O =
{ok+1, ok+2, · · · , om}, where R ∩O = φ.
It is assumed that the consistent observations of data points will create dense
areas and will constitute a large portion of a training data set, while the inconsistent
observations will be sparsely distributed in the n-dimensional space and constitute
a tiny portion. Hence, R has one or more high-density clusters. As we are mainly
interested in a few extracting detection rules, which can represent the built detec-
tion models, we adapted the fixed-width clustering technique [Portnoy et al., 2001]
to cluster the consistent and inconsistent observations into micro-clusters with a
constant fixed width. However, choosing the appropriate fixed-width value is a
challenging task. This is because a large width will degrade the model accuracy,
while the small width will result in many rules that will need to be checked in the
detection phase. Since an inconsistency score for each observation is the average
area of the neighbourhood of that observation, the mean of inconsistency scores is
proposed as an appropriate value of the fixed-width parameter γ and this is defined
as follows:
Let X be a vector of inconsistency scores of the training data set Dpoints, X =
{x1, x2, ....xn} where n is the number of observations
γ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
X(i) (5.4)
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Figure 5.7 shows the proximity-detection rules for two data points (attributes),
which in this case are the two sensors for humidity and temperature, where the con-
sistent observations are clustered into micro-clusters using fixed-width clustering,
and the centroids of these produced micro-clusters are used as normal proximity-
detection rules for monitoring the current system. Also, the inconsistent observa-
tions are clustered into micro-clusters and their respective centroids are used as
abnormal proximity-detection rules.
Figure 5.7: The extracted proximity-detection rules for two data points (at-
tributes) in 2-dimension space and each rule is represented by a centroid of a micro-
cluster
 
 
Normal micro−clusters Abnormal  micro−clusters
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 5 summarises the steps that are followed to extract proximity-based
detection rules for both consistent/inconsistent behaviours.
5.2.4 Inconsistency Detection
The proximity-detection rules, whereby each rule is represented by a cluster’s cen-
troid, are used to monitor any observation for the target system to judge whether
the current observation is consistent or inconsistent. Therefore, a current observa-
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Algorithm 5: The extraction algorithm of proximity-based detection rules
1 Input: w
/* Width of a cluster as eq 5.4 */
2 Input: data
/* List of observations for one behaviour whether consistent or inconsistent
*/
3 Initialize the set of cluster ξ ←− ∅;
4 Initialize the number of clusters M ←− 0;
5 foreach Training sample ci ∈ Data do
6 if M == 0 then
7 Make a new cluster χ1 with centroid χ
8
1 from ci;
8 χ1 ← {ci}; χ81 ← ci;
9 ξ ← {χ1}; M ←M + 1;;
10 else
11 Find the closest cluster χn to ci;
12 n = mini∈k Ω(ci, χn) /* where k = 1 . . .M and Ω is the function of
Euclidean distance */
13 if The distance n < w then
14 Add ci to cluster χn and update cluster centroid χ
8
n;
15 χn ← χn ∪ {ci};
16 else
17 M ←M + 1;
18 Make a new cluster χM with centroid χ
8
M from ci;
19 χM ← {ci}; χ8M ← ci;
20 ξ ← ξ ∪ {χM};
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 return [All Clusters’ centroids χ8 ] /* The returned centroids will be used as
proximity detection rules */
25 ;
tion is labeled with the label of the closest cluster. Let sj be the current observation,
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} be the centroids of consistent clusters, and I = {i1, i2, . . . , in}
be the centroids of inconsistent clusters. The closest consistent and inconsistent
clusters to sj are determined by the following equations respectively:
cmin = min
c∈C
Ω(sj , c) (5.5)
imin = min
i∈I
Ω(sj , i) (5.6)
where, Ω is Equation 5.1 that compute the Euclidean distance between two
observations. In this case, the Euclidean distance between the current (testing)
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observation si and all micro-clusters, that represent the consistent behaviours, are
calculated. Then, the smallest distance is set to the variable cmin. Similarly, the
Euclidean distance between si and all micro-clusters, that represent the inconsistent
behaviours is calculated, and the smallest distance is set to the variable omin. After-
wards, as defined in the following, the status of the current observation si is judged
as consistent when the Euclidean distance in cmin is less than omin. Otherwise, it
is judged as inconsistent.
StateType(si) =
 cmin < omin ConsistentOtherwise Inconsistent (5.7)
5.3 Experimental Setup
This section focuses on the set-up of the experimental environment in order to
evaluate the robustness of the proposed approach. In what follows, we describe two
integrity attacks that target the simulation system. We also describe the data sets
used and the experimental parameters chosen for this evaluation.
5.3.1 The Data sets
To provide quantitative results for the proposed SDAD approach, we use seven
labeled data sets: five are publicly available [Suthaharan et al., 2010; Frank and
Asuncion, 2013b] and two are generated by the simulation system.
Simulated Data Sets
Since SDAD is mainly intended for SCADA systems using the values of data points
(process parameters), the Water Distribution System (WDS) that has been simu-
lated using the proposed SCADA testbed SCADAVT in Chapter 3 is used to gen-
erate data sets for evaluation. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, MTU server
plays a key role in sending command messages to the PLCs for controlling and
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monitoring purposes. To create the data sets, all communication messages between
MTU and all PLCs are collected under normal/abnormal conditions. All SCADA
data X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} that are observed at a period of time t are represented by
a vector vt = {x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xn,t}. The simulated data vectors V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm},
which are observed under normal condition, are labelled as normal. While, vectors
V = {vm+1, vm+2, . . . , vm+n}, which are observed under abnormal conditions, are
labelled as abnormal.
Under the abnormal conditions, we have opted to simulate man-in-the-middle
attacks. Since we had prior knowledge of the target system, we launched integrity
attacks that violated the specifications of the system. This was performed by com-
promising the MTU server and two malicious actions were performed as follows.
Firstly, we sent 100 successive command messages to PLC4 to turn off the pump2
and pump3, and randomly change the speed of the pump1 between 0.1 to 1. Sec-
ondly, we launched a similar malicious attack on PLC4 to turn off the pump2 and
randomly change the speed of pump1 and the pump2 between 0.1 to 1. These
types of attacks can be launched in a number of ways, and PLC4 will trust such
commands as they are sent from the MTU server.
Two simulated data sets are generated, each consisting of 113 data points (at-
tributes) and approximately more than 10000 instances. In addition, each data set
has 100 inconsistent observations, where each inconsistent observation in each data
set is generated by a different attack. The simulated data sets will be denoted as
SimData1 and SimData2 .
Real Data Sets
For more quantitative results, we also evaluated SDAD using five real data sets.
One of them comes from the daily measures of sensors in an urban waste water
treatment plant (referred to as DUWWTP), and it consists of 38 data points (at-
tributes ) [Frank and Asuncion, 2013b]. This data set consists of approximately
527 instances, while 14 instances are labelled as abnormal. The four other data sets
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are collected from a real wireless sensor network [Suthaharan et al., 2010], and each
consists of two attributes (temperature and humidity). Each data set has more
than 4000 instances, and a tiny portion of abnormal instances. For simplicity, we
refer to these data sets as: Multi-hop Outdoor Real Data, Multi-hop Indoor Real
Data, Single-hop Outdoor Real Data and Single-hop Indoor Real Data as MORD,
MIRD, SORD and SIRD.
5.3.2 Normalization
To improve the accuracy and efficiency of SDAD, the normalization technique is
applied to all testing data sets to scale features by a range 0.0 of 1.0. This will
prevent features with a large scale from outweighing features with a small scale.
As the actual minimum/maximum of features are already known, and also because
the identification process is performed in static mode, a min-max normalization
technique is used to map the values of features. A given feature A will have values
in [0.0, 1.0]. Let us denote by minA and maxA the minimum value and maximum
value of A respectively. Then, to produce the normalized value of v (v ∈ A) using
the min-max normalization method, which we denote as v´, the following formula is
used:
v´ =
v −minA
maxA −minA (5.8)
Two parameters are required for SDAD:
• The k-nearest neighbours parameter is the influencing factor for the anomaly
scoring technique. However, this value is insensitive and can be heuristically
determined based on the assumption that anomalies constitute a tiny portion
of the data. Therefore, the value of k-nearest is set to be 1% of the rep-
resentative data set, because this value is assumed to discriminate between
abnormal instances and normal ones in terms of the density-based distance.
• The cut-off threshold η to select the most relevant anomalies after applying
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the inconsistency scoring technique. In this experiment, ten values (from
0.50% to 5% increased by 0.50%) of η are tested and the best values are
conditioned by the high detection rate of inconsistent observations and the
low detection of false positive rate. Therefore, any value of η that yields a
detection rate more than or equal to 90% with a false positive rate less than
or equal to 1.50% is considered as a promising threshold to efficiently separate
inconsistent observations from consistent ones and, consequently, the robust
proximity-detection rules can be extracted from these.
5.4 Results and Analysis
The aim of this section is to evaluate the accuracy of SDAD. Two parts in this
approach are evaluated: the first part is the accuracy of the separation between
consistent and inconsistent observations as a first phase to extract detection rules,
while the second part is the detection accuracy of these extracted detection rules.
The performance of the second part is compared with k-means algorithm [Mac-
Queen et al., 1967] that is considered as one of the most useful and promising
techniques that can be adapted to build an unsupervised clustering-based intru-
sion detection model [Jianliang et al., 2009; Mu¨nz et al., 2007]. All observations in
the testing data sets, as discussed earlier, are used to demonstrate the accuracy of
the process that separates consistent from inconsistent observations in each data
set. To evaluate the robustness of the extracted detection rules in detecting in-
consistent observations, k-fold-cross validation is applied to each data set for each
experimental parameter. The k-fold-cross validation technique [Hastie et al., 2009]
is performed by dividing the data set into k equal size subsets. Each time, one of
the subsets is used as the validation data to test the model, while the remaining k -
1 subsets are used to train the model. In this evaluation, k is set to 10 as suggested
by Kohavi [Kohavi, 1995] in order to reliably demonstrate the appropriateness of
the proposed predictive model.
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5.4.1 Accuracy metrics
Several metrics have been used to evaluate anomaly detection approaches. In this
evaluation, the precision, recall (Detection rate), false positive rate and F-Measure
metrics are used to quantitatively measure the performance of the system. The first
phase of the proposed approach, which is responsible for separating inconsistent ob-
servations from consistent ones, is evaluated using Detection rate and false positive
rate metrics. This is because the separation of most “true” inconsistent observa-
tions from consistent ones with less false positive rate, will yield robust proximity-
detection rules for both inconsistent/consistent observations. While, F-Measure
metric is used to evaluate the efficiency of the extracted proximity-detection rules
as it is not dependent on the size of the training and testing data set. Further
details about these metrics are as follows:
Recall (Detection rate) =
TP
TP + FN
(5.9)
False positive rate =
FP
FP + TN
(5.10)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(5.11)
F −Measure = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(5.12)
where TP is the number of inconsistent observations that are correctly de-
tected, FN is the number of inconsistent observations that have occurred but have
not been detected, FP are the consistent observations that have been incorrectly
flagged as inconsistent, and TN is the number of consistent observations that have
been correctly classified. The recall (detection rate) is the proportion of correctly
detected inconsistent observations to the actual size of the inconsistent observations
in the testing data set, while false positive rate is the proportion of the incorrectly
classified consistent observations as inconsistent to the actual size of the consistent
observations in the testing data set. The precision metric is used to demonstrate
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the robustness of the IDS in minimizing the false positive rate. However, the system
can obtain a high precision score although a number of inconsistent observations
have been missed. Similarly, the system can obtain a high recall score although the
false positive rate is higher. Therefore, the F-Measure, which is the harmonic mean
of precision and recall, would be a more appropriate metric for demonstrating the
accuracy of IDS approaches.
5.4.2 Separation Accuracy of Inconsistent observations
As shown in Figure 5.3, the separation of inconsistent observations from the un-
labelled training data set should be performed prior to the extraction of these
proximity-detection rules. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the accuracy of
the separation process of the most “true” inconsistent observations. This is because
proximity detection rules for both normal and abnormal behaviours of the target
system are extracted from the consistent and inconsistent observations respectively.
From the intensive investigation, the best extracted proximity detection rules
that represent the normal behaviour of a system are the ones extracted from actual
normal (consistent) observations, and this is true with proximity detection rules
that represent the abnormal behaviour. Therefore, the performance of the separa-
tion phase is measured by two metrics: the high detection rate and false positive
rate. This is because the separation of the most “true” inconsistent observations
with a very small false positive rate produces the two most pure data sets of consis-
tent/inconsistent observations. It is important to determine the near-optimal value
of the separation threshold η. Since we assign an inconsistency score for each ob-
servation, the inconsistent ones are assumed to have the highest scores. Therefore,
we use a range of cut-off thresholds, where each threshold η represents the top per-
centage of the observations which have the highest inconsistency scores. Based on
the empirical results the near-optimal threshold η, which can separate inconsistent
observations from consistent ones to extract robust proximity-detection rules, is the
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one that can meet the following criteria: Detection rate ≥ 90%False positive rate ≤ 1.5% (5.13)
Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 show the separation accuracy of incon-
sistent observations in all testing data sets using a range of cut-off thresholds η. It
can be seen that the significant results, which meet the criterion in equation 6.5, are
shown in a bold font style. Clearly, the use of an inconsistency scoring technique,
that was introduced in Section 5.2.2, demonstrated significant results in separating
inconsistent observations from the unlabelled training data set. That is, the most
inconsistent observations can be separated from consistent ones. However, there is
no fixed threshold that can work with all data sets and this can be attributed to a
number of characteristics for each data set such as the distribution, the number of
inconsistent observations and the application domain for each data set.
Table 5.1: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on DUWWTP
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00%
1.00% 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63%
1.50% 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67%
2.00% 70.71% 0.02% 99.00% 82.50%
2.50% 79.29% 0.19% 92.50% 85.38%
3.00% 87.14% 0.39% 87.14% 87.14%
3.50% 92.86% 0.87% 76.47% 83.87%
4.00% 92.86% 1.30% 68.42% 78.79%
4.50% 94.29% 1.69% 62.86% 75.43%
5.00% 100.00% 2.17% 58.33% 73.68%
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending
order,
are assumed as inconsistent
135 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 5. SCADA DATA-DRIVEN ANOMALY DETECTION APPROACH
(SDAD)
Table 5.2: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on SimData1.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 40.78% 0.06% 88.51% 55.84%
1.00% 80.78% 0.13% 86.74% 83.65%
1.50% 98.04% 0.45% 70.42% 81.97%
2.00% 98.04% 0.95% 52.91% 68.73%
2.50% 98.04% 1.46% 42.19% 59.00%
3.00% 98.04% 1.97% 35.21% 51.81%
3.50% 98.04% 2.47% 30.21% 46.19%
4.00% 98.04% 2.97% 26.46% 41.67%
4.50% 98.04% 3.48% 23.47% 37.88%
5.00% 98.04% 3.99% 21.14% 34.78%
Table 5.3: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on SimData2.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 46.50% 0.01% 98.94% 63.27%
1.00% 81.50% 0.14% 85.79% 83.59%
1.50% 100.00% 0.45% 70.42% 82.64%
2.00% 100.00% 0.95% 52.91% 69.20%
2.50% 100.00% 1.46% 42.19% 59.35%
3.00% 100.00% 1.97% 35.21% 52.08%
3.50% 100.00% 2.47% 30.21% 46.40%
4.00% 100.00% 2.97% 26.46% 41.84%
4.50% 100.00% 3.48% 23.47% 38.02%
5.00% 100.00% 3.98% 21.14% 34.90%
Table 5.4: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on SIRD.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20%
1.00% 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96%
1.50% 51.28% 0.00% 100.00% 67.80%
2.00% 68.38% 0.00% 100.00% 81.22%
2.50% 85.47% 0.00% 100.00% 92.17%
3.00% 100.00% 0.08% 97.50% 98.73%
3.50% 100.00% 0.59% 83.57% 91.05%
4.00% 100.00% 1.09% 73.58% 84.78%
4.50% 100.00% 1.60% 65.36% 79.05%
5.00% 100.00% 2.12% 58.79% 74.05%
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Table 5.5: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on SORD.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64%
1.00% 90.94% 0.35% 64.67% 75.58%
1.50% 93.75% 0.84% 44.12% 60.00%
2.00% 93.75% 1.77% 27.27% 42.25%
2.50% 93.75% 2.00% 25.00% 39.47%
3.00% 96.88% 2.33% 22.79% 36.90%
3.50% 96.88% 2.84% 19.50% 32.46%
4.00% 96.88% 3.35% 17.03% 28.97%
4.50% 96.88% 3.84% 15.20% 26.27%
5.00% 96.88% 4.35% 13.66% 23.94%
Table 5.6: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on MORD.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
1.00% 72.41% 0.00% 100.00% 84.00%
1.50% 86.03% 0.31% 79.21% 82.48%
2.00% 86.21% 0.84% 58.82% 69.93%
2.50% 86.55% 1.34% 47.36% 61.22%
3.00% 87.41% 1.83% 39.92% 54.81%
3.50% 87.93% 2.33% 34.46% 49.51%
4.00% 87.93% 2.83% 30.18% 44.93%
4.50% 88.45% 3.33% 27.00% 41.37%
5.00% 89.31% 3.82% 24.55% 38.51%
Table 5.7: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations on MIRD.
η Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50% 21.00% 0.00% 100.00% 34.71%
1.00% 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15%
1.50% 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30%
2.00% 85.00% 0.00% 100.00% 91.89%
2.50% 100.00% 0.15% 94.34% 97.09%
3.00% 100.00% 0.65% 78.74% 88.11%
3.50% 100.00% 1.16% 67.57% 80.65%
4.00% 100.00% 1.67% 59.17% 74.35%
4.50% 100.00% 2.18% 52.63% 68.97%
5.00% 100.00% 2.71% 47.17% 64.10%
137 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 5. SCADA DATA-DRIVEN ANOMALY DETECTION APPROACH
(SDAD)
5.4.3 Detection Accuracy
The aim of this evaluation has been to demonstrate the detection accuracy of
the proposed SDAD approach and the k-means algorithm [MacQueen et al., 1967]
that is proposed as a useful and promising technique for building an unsupervised
clustering-based intrusion detection model [Jianliang et al., 2009; Mu¨nz et al., 2007].
Since the k-means algorithm that we have chosen as a basis for comparison is
inherently different in terms of the required parameters for building a clustering-
based intrusion detection model, we tested it separately from the proposed model.
The 10-fold validation technique is used to evaluate the generalization detection
accuracy of both SDAD and k-means. Each data set is divided equally into 10
subsets where, in each fold, a different subset is used as a testing data set, while
the remaining 9 subsets are used as a training data set.
In this evaluation, the optimal detection model is the one that can detect all in-
consistent observations and has a zero false positive rate. In some cases, a detection
model can have a zero false positive rate, but a number of inconsistent observations
are missed, while in another case, the detection model can have a high false positive
rate, but detects all inconsistent observations. Therefore, the F-Measure, which is
the harmonic mean of precision and recall (detection rate), would be a more appro-
priate metric to demonstrate the detection accuracy. We assumed that F-measure
results that are greater than or equal to 90 are significant and they appear in bold
font.
k-means algorithm
k-means [MacQueen et al., 1967] is a clustering algorithm which groups similar
data into a number of clusters based on a specified number of clusters k, where the
value of k is specified in advance. To build the detection model using the k-means
algorithm, the unlabelled training data set is clustered into a number of clusters,
and each produced cluster is labelled as either normal or abnormal. The labelling
technique is based on the percentage of the data in each cluster. For instance, if
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the members of a cluster represent the percentage θ of the overall training data, it
is labelled as an abnormal cluster; otherwise it is labelled as normal. A range of
numbers of clusters from 10 to 150 increased by 10 are tested in this evaluation, and
we have chosen only the best six values 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and with each value
we have tested five values of θ which are 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05. The selection
of the values of θ is based on the two assumptions about the assumed size and the
characteristics of anomalies in unlabelled data [Portnoy et al., 2001]. For instance,
given θ is set to 0.01, if any produced cluster whose members are less or equal to
0.01% of the overall members in the training data set, it is labelled as abnormal;
otherwise, it is labelled as normal. In the testing phase, the distance between the
centroids of the produced clusters and each observation in the testing data set is
calculated and it is given the label of its closest cluster.
Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14. show the accuracy results in
detecting inconsistent observations in all used data sets, and it can be seen that the
best numbers of clusters are relatively large. This is because the smaller the value
of the numbers of clusters, the higher is the expectation of outlying observations,
which are assumed to be inconsistent, to be grouped into the large normal clusters.
Clearly, the use of k-means to build the detection model for detecting inconsistent
observations demonstrated poor detection results. As can be seen, we can obtain
a high detection rate using k-means; however, it is obvious that the false positive
rate is very high and this can be a nuisance for a security administrator by warning
him with false positive alarms.
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Table 5.8: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on DUWWTP
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 62.86% 1.56% 84.57% 69.65%
2% 80.71% 14.22% 59.25% 59.98%
3% 87.14% 29.74% 45.76% 50.50%
4% 90.36% 42.57% 37.97% 44.22%
5% 92.29% 53.01% 32.90% 39.86%
60
1% 67.14% 6.24% 61.00% 62.36%
2% 83.57% 21.16% 44.96% 53.36%
3% 89.05% 39.70% 35.04% 44.37%
4% 91.79% 52.77% 29.53% 39.03%
5% 93.43% 61.62% 26.10% 35.62%
70
1% 70.00% 6.63% 58.82% 62.95%
2% 84.29% 28.86% 39.88% 48.73%
3% 89.52% 47.82% 31.18% 40.56%
4% 92.14% 59.45% 26.56% 36.05%
5% 93.71% 67.29% 23.68% 33.17%
80
1% 75.71% 12.10% 46.84% 57.08%
2% 87.86% 36.27% 32.71% 44.19%
3% 91.91% 54.20% 26.20% 37.23%
4% 93.93% 65.65% 22.65% 33.28%
5% 95.14% 72.52% 20.52% 30.91%
90
1% 88.57% 16.58% 45.11% 58.62%
2% 94.29% 45.73% 30.31% 42.73%
3% 96.19% 62.53% 24.36% 35.87%
4% 97.14% 71.90% 21.27% 32.26%
5% 97.71% 77.52% 19.42% 30.10%
100
1% 91.43% 22.99% 36.21% 51.52%
2% 95.71% 51.74% 25.46% 38.56%
3% 97.14% 66.91% 21.08% 33.01%
4% 97.86% 75.14% 18.82% 30.13%
5% 98.29% 80.11% 17.45% 28.39%
1 θ: The percentage of the data in a cluster to be assumed as malicious
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Table 5.9: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on SimData1
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 67.65% 3.63% 41.29% 50.56%
2% 60.98% 21.06% 23.73% 30.82%
3% 67.39% 38.04% 17.52% 23.74%
4% 70.64% 51.21% 14.18% 19.79%
5% 76.47% 60.34% 12.31% 17.67%
60
1% 68.63% 8.05% 25.59% 37.04%
2% 67.84% 29.08% 15.88% 24.17%
3% 73.14% 47.39% 12.14% 19.06%
4% 67.75% 59.33% 9.75% 15.51%
5% 74.20% 67.05% 8.75% 14.23%
70
1% 69.02% 14.36% 16.88% 26.97%
2% 76.28% 42.18% 11.20% 18.66%
3% 77.71% 58.84% 8.82% 15.02%
4% 80.88% 68.68% 7.69% 13.32%
5% 84.71% 74.94% 7.09% 12.44%
80
1% 97.26% 21.60% 18.24% 30.68%
2% 90.69% 50.17% 11.64% 20.10%
3% 91.44% 65.26% 9.28% 16.30%
4% 93.58% 73.40% 8.16% 14.51%
5% 94.86% 78.72% 7.46% 13.39%
90
1% 89.02% 25.62% 14.30% 24.61%
2% 94.51% 57.33% 9.77% 17.29%
3% 96.34% 71.55% 8.07% 14.50%
4% 92.40% 78.23% 7.01% 12.69%
5% 93.92% 82.58% 6.54% 11.94%
100
1% 98.63% 36.30% 11.85% 21.15%
2% 99.31% 64.75% 8.43% 15.34%
3% 99.54% 76.38% 7.18% 13.22%
4% 97.26% 81.90% 6.46% 11.96%
5% 97.80% 85.52% 6.10% 11.35%
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Table 5.10: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on SimData2
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 100.00% 3.39% 60.45% 74.79%
2% 100.00% 19.02% 36.41% 48.40%
3% 100.00% 36.54% 26.39% 36.25%
4% 100.00% 50.22% 21.05% 29.58%
5% 100.00% 59.38% 17.80% 25.49%
60
1% 100.00% 8.96% 35.90% 52.54%
2% 100.00% 31.06% 22.11% 33.94%
3% 100.00% 48.85% 16.54% 26.06%
4% 100.00% 61.23% 13.57% 21.77%
5% 100.00% 68.98% 11.78% 19.17%
70
1% 100.00% 12.49% 28.19% 43.87%
2% 100.00% 38.28% 17.60% 28.49%
3% 100.00% 56.73% 13.37% 22.10%
4% 100.00% 67.18% 11.19% 18.80%
5% 100.00% 73.75% 9.87% 16.80%
80
1% 100.00% 19.61% 19.93% 33.18%
2% 100.00% 49.31% 12.85% 22.04%
3% 100.00% 64.58% 10.17% 17.76%
4% 100.00% 73.07% 8.79% 15.55%
5% 100.00% 78.46% 7.95% 14.19%
90
1% 100.00% 28.81% 14.46% 25.24%
2% 100.00% 56.83% 9.92% 17.73%
3% 100.00% 70.25% 8.19% 14.83%
4% 100.00% 77.44% 7.30% 13.33%
5% 100.00% 81.96% 6.76% 12.42%
100
1% 100.00% 34.32% 12.39% 22.03%
2% 100.00% 62.78% 8.70% 15.79%
3% 100.00% 74.48% 7.36% 13.51%
4% 100.00% 80.86% 6.67% 12.33%
5% 100.00% 84.69% 6.25% 11.62%
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Table 5.11: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on SIRD
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 95.25% 5.88% 69.20% 80.09%
2% 97.12% 19.54% 49.40% 62.74%
3% 97.74% 32.45% 39.26% 52.44%
4% 98.18% 44.10% 33.14% 45.76%
5% 98.54% 52.82% 29.24% 41.40%
60
1% 96.95% 10.21% 56.97% 71.64%
2% 98.22% 29.33% 39.51% 53.86%
3% 98.48% 42.83% 31.79% 45.25%
4% 98.73% 54.88% 27.11% 39.72%
5% 98.98% 62.54% 24.26% 36.34%
70
1% 97.63% 14.21% 48.66% 64.89%
2% 98.31% 37.05% 33.63% 48.09%
3% 98.64% 52.35% 27.15% 40.33%
4% 98.98% 62.47% 23.59% 35.97%
5% 99.09% 69.07% 21.38% 33.23%
80
1% 98.81% 21.23% 39.63% 56.39%
2% 98.90% 42.42% 28.63% 43.16%
3% 99.15% 58.49% 23.47% 36.51%
4% 99.24% 67.72% 20.74% 32.95%
5% 99.39% 73.85% 19.04% 30.72%
90
1% 98.98% 27.56% 33.09% 49.58%
2% 99.49% 49.87% 24.55% 38.59%
3% 99.55% 63.57% 20.74% 33.45%
4% 99.66% 72.45% 18.59% 30.51%
5% 99.73% 77.66% 17.32% 28.77%
100
1% 99.66% 37.35% 26.92% 42.35%
2% 99.66% 57.57% 20.95% 34.20%
3% 99.77% 70.66% 18.11% 30.16%
4% 99.83% 77.99% 16.60% 28.01%
5% 99.86% 82.40% 15.69% 26.71%
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Table 5.12: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on SORD
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 84.38% 6.99% 28.61% 42.53%
2% 87.81% 21.17% 18.21% 28.45%
3% 90.00% 35.70% 13.64% 21.83%
4% 91.25% 48.44% 11.08% 18.01%
5% 92.63% 57.79% 9.50% 15.64%
60
1% 90.00% 10.12% 24.06% 37.43%
2% 92.19% 29.13% 15.01% 24.32%
3% 94.17% 46.41% 11.26% 18.62%
4% 95.16% 58.89% 9.23% 15.49%
5% 96.00% 66.57% 8.02% 13.62%
70
1% 93.13% 16.49% 15.62% 26.69%
2% 94.38% 39.01% 10.21% 17.91%
3% 95.42% 55.33% 7.95% 14.15%
4% 96.09% 65.31% 6.76% 12.16%
5% 96.75% 72.01% 6.03% 10.93%
80
1% 95.00% 23.98% 11.46% 20.41%
2% 95.94% 49.16% 7.73% 14.05%
3% 97.08% 63.45% 6.27% 11.52%
4% 97.34% 71.69% 5.49% 10.17%
5% 97.75% 77.13% 5.01% 9.34%
90
1% 96.25% 30.27% 9.34% 17.01%
2% 97.50% 55.19% 6.56% 12.15%
3% 98.13% 69.30% 5.43% 10.14%
4% 98.59% 76.98% 4.84% 9.11%
5% 98.88% 81.58% 4.49% 8.49%
100
1% 96.25% 38.15% 7.60% 14.07%
2% 98.13% 61.47% 5.62% 10.54%
3% 97.92% 72.74% 4.80% 9.07%
4% 98.44% 79.55% 4.37% 8.31%
5% 98.63% 83.57% 4.12% 7.84%
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Table 5.13: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on MORD
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 85.17% 3.13% 65.00% 72.61%
2% 87.76% 20.09% 39.26% 48.03%
3% 91.15% 37.06% 28.83% 36.94%
4% 93.28% 47.86% 23.44% 31.08%
5% 94.48% 56.93% 20.00% 27.23%
60
1% 84.83% 7.23% 43.03% 56.72%
2% 88.45% 28.80% 26.68% 37.64%
3% 92.30% 46.15% 20.20% 29.59%
4% 93.79% 57.57% 16.73% 25.16%
5% 95.03% 65.43% 14.60% 22.42%
70
1% 87.24% 13.21% 29.85% 44.26%
2% 91.03% 37.96% 19.27% 30.09%
3% 93.91% 54.34% 15.08% 24.24%
4% 95.35% 65.36% 12.80% 20.99%
5% 96.28% 72.05% 11.43% 19.04%
80
1% 91.03% 18.85% 23.33% 37.11%
2% 93.45% 46.92% 15.37% 25.44%
3% 95.63% 62.46% 12.34% 20.90%
4% 96.72% 71.22% 10.77% 18.52%
5% 97.38% 76.89% 9.80% 17.05%
90
1% 87.24% 26.02% 17.63% 29.29%
2% 91.90% 53.27% 12.32% 21.18%
3% 94.60% 67.52% 10.26% 17.97%
4% 95.95% 75.55% 9.17% 16.27%
5% 96.76% 80.30% 8.52% 15.26%
100
1% 89.66% 33.98% 14.22% 24.53%
2% 93.28% 58.75% 10.50% 18.61%
3% 95.52% 72.07% 8.99% 16.16%
4% 96.64% 78.95% 8.22% 14.91%
5% 97.31% 83.16% 7.76% 14.15%
145 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 5. SCADA DATA-DRIVEN ANOMALY DETECTION APPROACH
(SDAD)
Table 5.14: The detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting consis-
tent/inconsistent observations on MIRD
#Clusters θ Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
50
1% 99.60% 4.18% 73.02% 84.02%
2% 99.80% 19.54% 48.48% 61.31%
3% 99.87% 33.13% 37.43% 49.73%
4% 99.90% 45.79% 30.96% 42.47%
5% 99.92% 55.80% 26.81% 37.69%
60
1% 100.00% 7.28% 60.81% 75.38%
2% 100.00% 27.06% 39.92% 53.65%
3% 100.00% 43.83% 30.73% 43.10%
4% 100.00% 56.71% 25.62% 36.99%
5% 100.00% 65.23% 22.47% 33.19%
70
1% 100.00% 12.99% 46.75% 63.42%
2% 100.00% 38.03% 30.77% 44.59%
3% 100.00% 55.80% 24.08% 36.16%
4% 100.00% 66.20% 20.58% 31.70%
5% 100.00% 72.75% 18.45% 28.97%
80
1% 100.00% 19.48% 36.21% 53.07%
2% 100.00% 45.58% 24.74% 38.25%
3% 100.00% 61.67% 19.96% 31.78%
4% 100.00% 71.01% 17.45% 28.35%
5% 100.00% 76.81% 15.93% 26.25%
90
1% 99.80% 26.28% 29.64% 45.60%
2% 99.80% 52.94% 20.85% 33.55%
3% 99.80% 67.49% 17.28% 28.50%
4% 99.85% 75.62% 15.41% 25.84%
5% 99.88% 80.49% 14.29% 24.25%
100
1% 100.00% 36.25% 23.31% 37.75%
2% 100.00% 62.58% 17.12% 28.72%
3% 100.00% 74.56% 14.73% 25.19%
4% 100.00% 80.81% 13.51% 23.38%
5% 100.00% 84.65% 12.78% 22.28%
The proposed SDAD approach
In this section, we evaluate the detection accuracy of SDAD. As previously dis-
cussed, SDAD in the first phase separates the inconsistent observations from the
consistent ones in the unlabelled training data set, and a range of different separa-
tion thresholds η are used in this process. As a result, both sets of inconsistent and
consistent observations are expected to be different for each threshold η. Therefore,
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proximity-detection rules are independently extracted for each different threshold
η and evaluated in detecting inconsistent observations. Since the fixed-width clus-
tering algorithm is adapted to individually cluster the inconsistent and consistent
observations into micro-clusters with constant-width, the value of width parameter
w is required. However, the value of w can be obtained using the equation 5.4.
The micro-clusters created from the consistent observations are labelled as normal,
while the micro-clusters created from inconsistent observations are labelled as ab-
normal. Figure 5.7 illustrates how proximity-detection rules for two data points
(attributes) are extracted.
Tables 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 show the detection accuracy of
SDAD for all used data sets. Each table demonstrates the detection accuracy results
for a particular data set, where each row of the table represents detection accuracy
results of the extracted proximity-detection rules for a specific threshold η. For
instance, the first row in Table 5.15 indicates that the separation threshold η is set
to 0.50% and the cluster width parameter is set to 0.7506 to create micro-clusters
for both consistent/inconsistent observations. In this example, the identified con-
sistent and inconsistent observations are partitioned into 62 and 2 micro-clusters
respectively. The centroids of these micro-clusters are used as proximity-detection
rules for monitoring inconsistent observations for a given system.
As shown in Tables 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20 and 5.21, SDAD has achieved
significant results for all data sets except MORD, where its results are nearly sig-
nificant. However, the significant results for each data set are achieved by using
variant separation thresholds η. For instance, the significant results on the data
set DUWWTP, which is shown in Table 5.15, are achieved when η is set 3.50%
and 4.00%. While, on the data sets SimData1 and SimData2, which are shown
in Tables 5.15 and 5.15 respectively, are achieved when η is set to 1.50%, 2.00%
and 2.50%. Tables 5.18 and 5.21 show the results of the detection accuracy of the
data sets SIRD and MIRD respectively and it can be seen the significant results
are achieved when η is set to 3.00%, 3.50% and 4.00% for SIRD, while η is set to
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2.50%, 3.00% and 3.50% for MIRD. Interestingly, the significant results of the data
set SORD, which are shown in Table 5.18, are achieved with only small values of
η, 1.00%, and 1.50%.
Table 5.15: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on DUWWTP
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.7506
62 2 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00%
1.00% 59 5 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63%
1.50% 57 7 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67%
2.00% 54 10 70.71% 0.00% 100.00% 82.85%
2.50% 52 12 79.29% 0.00% 100.00% 88.45%
3.00% 51 14 87.14% 5.85% 80.26% 83.56%
3.50% 48 16 92.86% 0.78% 97.01% 94.89%
4.00% 46 18 92.86% 0.97% 96.30% 94.55%
4.50% 44 20 94.29% 9.75% 72.53% 81.99%
5.00% 41 23 100.00% 11.70% 70.00% 82.35%
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending order,
are assumed as inconsistent
2 w: The cluster width parameter
3 NC: The number of the produced normal clusters
4 AC: The number of the produced abnormal clusters
Table 5.16: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on SimData1
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.1456
316 39 40.78% 0.06% 98.58% 57.70%
1.00% 286 68 80.78% 0.13% 98.33% 88.70%
1.50% 265 92 98.04% 0.46% 95.42% 96.71%
2.00% 252 104 98.04% 1.11% 89.69% 93.68%
2.50% 242 116 98.04% 1.73% 84.75% 90.91%
3.00% 238 131 98.04% 2.49% 79.43% 87.76%
3.50% 234 138 98.04% 3.08% 75.76% 85.47%
4.00% 225 144 98.04% 3.64% 72.52% 83.37%
4.50% 219 151 98.04% 4.24% 69.40% 81.27%
5.00% 211 157 98.04% 4.75% 66.93% 79.55%
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Table 5.17: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on SimData2
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.1476
307 42 46.50% 0.01% 99.79% 63.44%
1.00% 279 71 70.00% 0.14% 97.90% 81.63%
1.50% 262 90 100.00% 0.51% 94.97% 97.42%
2.00% 255 102 100.00% 1.18% 89.05% 94.21%
2.50% 243 112 100.00% 1.72% 84.82% 91.79%
3.00% 239 120 100.00% 2.42% 79.87% 88.81%
3.50% 231 130 100.00% 3.05% 75.93% 86.32%
4.00% 228 139 100.00% 3.63% 72.57% 84.10%
4.50% 222 146 100.00% 4.19% 69.64% 82.10%
5.00% 216 147 100.00% 4.71% 67.11% 80.32%
Table 5.18: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on SIRD
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.0124
63 17 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20%
1.00% 45 35 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96%
1.50% 36 44 51.97% 0.00% 100.00% 68.39%
2.00% 31 49 67.61% 0.00% 100.00% 80.67%
2.50% 24 57 72.65% 0.00% 100.00% 84.16%
3.00% 17 63 100.00% 0.42% 98.48% 99.24%
3.50% 15 64 100.00% 0.77% 97.26% 98.61%
4.00% 15 64 100.00% 1.58% 94.51% 97.18%
4.50% 15 64 100.00% 6.98% 79.59% 88.64%
5.00% 15 65 100.00% 8.14% 76.97% 86.99%
Table 5.19: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on SORD
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.0152
73 20 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64%
1.00% 67 27 90.94% 0.28% 95.41% 93.12%
1.50% 64 32 93.75% 0.90% 86.96% 90.23%
2.00% 62 33 93.75% 1.32% 81.97% 87.46%
2.50% 61 35 93.75% 2.02% 74.81% 83.22%
3.00% 57 37 96.88% 2.38% 72.26% 82.78%
3.50% 55 41 96.88% 3.03% 67.10% 79.28%
4.00% 55 42 96.88% 3.83% 61.75% 75.43%
4.50% 54 41 96.88% 4.19% 59.62% 73.81%
5.00% 54 42 96.88% 4.59% 57.41% 72.09%
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Table 5.20: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on MORD
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.0093
74 14 36.21% 0.00% 100.00% 53.16%
1.00% 55 34 72.59% 0.00% 100.00% 84.12%
1.50% 53 38 77.59% 0.56% 94.54% 85.23%
2.00% 53 39 86.21% 1.10% 90.74% 88.42%
2.50% 52 39 86.55% 1.68% 86.55% 86.55%
3.00% 50 40 87.41% 2.20% 83.25% 85.28%
3.50% 49 41 87.93% 2.72% 80.19% 83.88%
4.00% 48 42 87.93% 3.00% 78.58% 82.99%
4.50% 48 43 88.45% 3.39% 76.57% 82.08%
5.00% 46 44 89.31% 3.99% 73.68% 80.75%
Table 5.21: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules on MIRD
η w NC AC Detection Rate False Positive Precision F-Measure
0.50%
0.0135
62 13 20.10% 0.00% 100.00% 33.47%
1.00% 44 31 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15%
1.50% 37 38 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30%
2.00% 26 49 70.00% 0.00% 100.00% 82.35%
2.50% 20 55 100.00% 0.20% 99.11% 99.55%
3.00% 18 57 100.00% 0.87% 96.15% 98.04%
3.50% 18 58 100.00% 1.29% 94.43% 97.13%
4.00% 18 59 100.00% 6.54% 76.92% 86.96%
4.50% 15 61 100.00% 7.63% 74.07% 85.11%
5.00% 16 65 100.00% 8.28% 72.46% 84.03%
5.5 SDAD Limitations
Although the proposed SDAD approach demonstrated significant results on most
data sets, there is no fixed separation threshold η that can work with all data
sets. Table 5.22 exhibits the interesting separation thresholds η, which were near-
optimal to separate inconsistent from consistent observations in the separation stage
of SDAD, for each data set.
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Table 5.22: The illustration of the acceptable thresholds η that produce significant
accuracy results of the separation of inconsistent observations on each data set
Data sets
η AgreeNO
DUWWTP SimData1 SimData2 MORD MIRD SORD SIRD
0.50% 0
1.00%
√
1
1.50%
√ √ √
3
2.00%
√ √
2
2.50%
√ √ √
3
3.00%
√ √
2
3.50%
√ √ √
3
4.00%
√ √
2
4.50% 0
5.00% 0
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending order,
are assumed as inconsistent
2 AgreeNO: The number of data sets that agree on each separation threshold η, where
the agreement is judged by the significant detection results
It can be seen that the maximum number of data sets that agree on one unique
threshold η is three. This is because the unsupervised mode, where the labelled data
is not available, relies mainly on assumptions (discussed earlier in Section 5.2.4) to
distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviours. Therefore, the effectiveness
of unsupervised anomaly-detection approaches is sensitive to parameter choices,
especially when the boundaries between normal and abnormal behaviours are not
clearly distinguishable. For instance, the anomaly-scoring based technique, which is
adapted in the first phase of the proposed approach and one of the famous unsuper-
vised anomaly detection techniques [Chandola et al., 2009a], assigns an anomaly-
score for each observation and actual abnormal observations are assumed to have
the highest scores. The key problem is how to find a near-optimal cut-off threshold
that minimizes the false positive rate while maximizing the detection rate.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed an innovative unsupervised SCADA Data-driven Anomaly
Detection approach called SDAD that generates, from unlabeled SCADA data,
proximity anomaly detection rules based on the clustering technique. The proposed
SDAD approach initially separates the inconsistent observations from consistent
ones in unlabelled SCADA data, and then the proximity detection rules for each
behaviour, whether consistent or inconsistent, are automatically extracted from the
observations that belong to that behaviour. The extracted proximity rules are used
to monitor the abnormal behaviour of SCADA systems by observing the evolution
of SCADA data that are produced by the target SCADA data points. Experimental
results of SDAD demonstrate its ability to separate inconsistent observations from
consistent ones. Moreover, the automatically-extracted, proximity-based detection
rules show a significant detection accuracy rate compared with existing clustering-
based, intrusion-detection algorithms.
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Chapter6
A Global Anomaly Threshold to
Unsupervised Detection (GATUD)
The effectiveness of unsupervised anomaly detection approaches is sensitive to pa-
rameter choices, especially when the boundaries between normal and abnormal
behaviours are not clearly distinguishable. Therefore, the proposed SDAD app-
roach in Chapter 5 is based on assumption by which anomalies are defined, where
this assumption are controlled by a parameter choice. This chapter proposes an
approach, called Global Anomaly Threshold to Unsupervised Detection (GATUD)
that can be used as an add-on component for any unsupervised anomaly detection
approach to mitigate the sensitivity of such parameters whereby the performance
of an unsupervised anomaly detection is improved. Experimental results confirm
that GATUD demonstrated a significant improvement in two unsupervised anomaly
detection algorithms.
6.1 Introduction
Two assumptions must be made in unsupervised anomaly detection approaches: (i)
the number of normal instances in data set vastly outperforms the abnormal in-
stances, and (ii) the abnormal instances must be statistically different from normal
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ones. Therefore, the performance of detection models relies mainly on assumptions
to distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviours. The reporting of anoma-
lies in the unsupervised mode can be done either by scoring-based or binary-based
techniques.
In the scoring-based anomaly detection models [Guttormsson et al., 1999], [Es-
kin et al., 2002c], all observations in a data set are given an anomaly score, and
therefore actual anomalies are assumed to have the highest scores. The key problem
is how to find the best cut-off threshold that minimizes the false positive rate while
maximizing the detection rate. On the one hand, binary-based techniques [Portnoy
et al., 2001], [Mahoney and Chan, 2003a] group similar observations together into
a number of clusters. Abnormal observations are identified by making use of the
fact that abnormal observations will be considered as outliers, and therefore will
not be assigned to any cluster, or they will be grouped into small clusters that have
some characteristics which are different from normal clusters. However, labelling an
observation as an outlier or a cluster as anomalous is controlled through some pa-
rameter choices within each detection technique. For instance, given the top 50% of
the observations which have the highest anomaly scores, these are assumed as out-
liers. In this case, both detection and false positive rates will be higher. Similarly,
labelling a low percentage of largest clusters as normal in clustering-based intrusion
detection techniques, will result in higher detection and false positive rates. There-
fore, the effectiveness of unsupervised intrusion approaches is sensitive to parameter
choices, especially when the boundaries between normal and abnormal behaviours
are not clearly distinguishable.
This chapter describes Global Anomaly Threshold to Unsupervised Detection
(GATUD) that can be used as an add-on component to allow unsupervised anomaly
scoring-based techniques to set the value of the cut-off threshold parameter at a
satisfactory level to guarantee a high detection rate, while minimizing the resulting
high false positive rate. In addition, GATUD can be used as a robust technique for
labelling clusters to improve the accuracy of clustering-based intrusion detection
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systems. Figure 6.1 shows that GATUD involves two steps: (i) establishing two
small-size most-representative data sets, where each data set represents one-class
problem (normal or abnormal) with high-confidence; and (ii) using the established
data sets to build an ensemble-based decision-making model using a set of super-
vised classifiers.
Unlabelled 
Data
Most-
representative 
labelled data 
sets
Classifier 1
Classifier  2
Classifier  3
Classifier  n
Decision-model 1
Decision-model 2
Decision-model 3
Decision-model n
Decision-making process
Unsupervised intrusion detection technique
Step 1 Step 2
Support Anomaly Score 
Calculation 
Labelling process
Figure 6.1: Overview of GATUD.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents an overview of related
work. Section 6.3 introduces GATUD. Section 6.4 presents the experimental set-
up, followed by results and discussion in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes the
chapter.
6.2 Related Work
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a main component in securing computer
systems and networks. In the case of SCADA systems, a number of tailored IDSs
have been proposed (refer to a survey paper [Zhu and Sastry, 2010]). There are
two categories of IDSs: signature-based and anomaly-based. The former detects
only known attacks because it monitors the system against specific attack patterns.
The latter attempts to build models from the normal behaviour of the systems,
and any deviation from this behaviour is assumed to be a malicious activity. Both
approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The former achieves good accuracy,
but fails to detect attacks that are new or the patterns of which are not learned.
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Although the latter is able to detect novel attacks, the overall detection accuracy
of this approach is low.
This chapter focuses on the anomaly detection techniques since they able to
address the problem of the zero-day attacks. Rrushi [Rrushi et al., 2009a] applied
statistics and probability theory to estimate the normality of the evolution of val-
ues of correlated process parameters. In the work of [Valdes and Cheung, 2009],
the authors assumed that communication patterns among SCADA components are
well-behaved, and combined the normal behavior of SCADA network traffic with
artificial intrusion instances to learn the boundaries of the normal behavior using
the neural network technique. There are two types of anomaly detection techniques:
supervised and unsupervised modes. In the former mode, training data are labelled,
while in the latter, data are not labelled. In contrast to conventional Information
Technology (IT), the unsupervised mode has not been used much in SCADA sys-
tems. This is because SCADA security research is relatively recent compared with
IT. In addition, the security requirements of such systems require a high detection
accuracy which this mode lacks.
Recently, machine learning techniques have been successfully applied in traffic
classification [Zhang et al., 2013a], [Zhang et al., 2013b] and unsupervised IDS [Port-
noy et al., 2001], [Mahoney and Chan, 2003a], [Guttormsson et al., 1999], [Eskin
et al., 2002c], [MacQueen et al., 1967] for traditional IT networks. The ensemble-
based clustering approaches enhance the performance of the unsupervised mode [Weng
et al., 2007], [Yamanishi and ichi Takeuchi, 2001] by combining classifiers to pro-
duce efficient and accurate Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [Kittler et al., 1998].
Similar to our work, Yamanishi et al. [Yamanishi and ichi Takeuchi, 2001] applied
an anomaly-scoring technique to unlabelled data, where the data that have the
highest anomaly scores are labelled as outliers, while the rest are labelled as nor-
mal. They randomly selected a subset of normal data and combined it with outliers
to create labelled data. Afterwards, a supervised technique was trained with the
labelled data to build an outlier filtering rule that differentiates outliers from nor-
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mal data. However, our approach differs in that we learn the labeled data from
data about which we have no prior knowledge, and a set of supervised classifiers
are used to build a robust decision-maker because each classifier can capture differ-
ent knowledge [Dietterich, 2000]. Finally, our approach is proposed as an add-on
component (not an independent technique) for unsupervised learning algorithms in
order to benefit from the inherent characteristics of each algorithm.
6.3 The Proposed GATUD Approach
We focus on improving the detection accuracy of unsupervised anomaly detection
approaches. This is because such approaches are able to detect (unknown) zero-
day attacks. However, they suffer from low accuracy. In this section, we present
GATUD that is intended to address this problem. We outline the various steps
below.
6.3.1 Learning of Most-Representative Data Sets
In this step, two small-size, most-representative data sets are established from
the unlabelled data, where the first and second data sets approximately repre-
sent the normal and abnormal behaviours respectively. In order to choose the
most-representative data sets, two steps are followed:
Step 1: Anomaly Scoring
Since we have no prior knowledge about the normal and abnormal data, the k-
nearest neighbour notion is adapted to assign an anomaly score to each observation.
The k-nearest neighbour notion is chosen because it has produced significant results
in anomaly scoring in the previous approaches [Guttormsson et al., 1999], [Eskin
et al., 2002c] in cases where normal data in n-dimension space form dense areas,
and the abnormal data are sparsely distributed. Unlike the previous approaches,
we are concerned with the most relevant normal and abnormal data rather than
with the detection of all anomalies. However, the k-nearest neighbour algorithm is
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computationally expensive and this issue has been addressed in Chapter 4. There-
fore, the kNNVWC approach is used to efficiently find k-nearest neighbours for
each observation in a data set. Let D be unlabelled data set of SCADA data with
a multi-dimensional space, m× n matrix , where m and n represent the number of
observations and attributes in D respectively. Each dimension represents a distinct
data point (e.g. temperature, motor speed or humidity ), while each observation
xi is represented by values of a set of attributes A = {a1, a2, a3, . . . , an}. Let d be
the Euclidian observation between two observations x1 = {x1,1, x1,2, . . . , x1,n} and
x2 = {x2,1, x2,2, . . . , x2,n},
d(x1, x2) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(x1,i − x2,i)2 (6.1)
where n is the number of the attributes. We compute the anomaly score for each
observation xi by taking the average of observations of its k-nearest neighbours.
Let k be a positive parameter such that 2 ≤ k ≤ |D| and xi be a observation in D.
Then the anomaly score of xi is computed as follows:
ρ(xi) =
1
k
k∑
i=0
D(xi, knni(xi)) (6.2)
where knn(xi) is the k-nearest neighbours of observation xi and the kNNVWC app-
roach proposed in Chapter 4 is used here. Algorithm 6 summarises the calculation
steps of anomaly scores for each observation xi.
Step 2: Selection of Candidate Sets
From the list of anomaly scores, which are produced by Algorithm 6, we estab-
lish two small-size, most-representative data sets, where each data set represents
normal or abnormal behaviours with high confidence. Based on the two previously-
mentioned assumptions of normal and abnormal behaviours in the unsupervised
mode, we group the list of anomaly scores into three categories as illustrated in
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Algorithm 6: Anomaly scoring calculation
1 Input: D
/* A matrix of unlabelled SCADA measurement data consisting of m observations
and n attributes */
2 Input: k
/* A positive integer that specifies the number of nearest neighbors */
3 Output: AnomalyScoresList
/* list of Anomaly Scores sorted by rank in descending order */
4 AnomalyScoresList←− ∅;
5 foreach instance in D do
6 Score←− AnomalyScore(instance);
/* Compute anomaly score as eq 6.2 */
7 put Score in AnomalyScoresList;
8 end
9 return [AnomalyScoresList];
Figure 6.2: confidence area of anomalies, uncertain area and confidence area of
normality. As shown in this figure, the extent of these areas is determined by
the confidence thresholds β, α and λ. For instance, the smaller threshold β of
the confidence area of anomalies, the greater is the confidence that the instances
falling into this area are abnormal. This is true for the confidence area of the
normality. Therefore, the thresholds (β and λ) should be kept at a distance from
the uncertain area because this area requires a best cut-off threshold in order to
judge that observation as either normal or abnormal, especially when some ac-
tual anomalous observations have anomaly scores that are close to some normal
ones. Therefore, the most-representative data sets for normal and abnormal be-
haviours are established from the following two categories: confidence area of nor-
mality and confidence area of anomalies respectively. The most-relevant anomalies,
AbnormalData are defined by selecting observations whose indices correspond to
the top n of AnomalyScoresList, where n = β × |AnomalyScoresList|. While,
the most relevant normal observations, MostNormal are defined by selecting ob-
servations whose indices correspond to the bottom n of AnomalyScoresList, where
n = λ × |AnomalyScoresList|. Again, if the two assumptions [Portnoy et al., 2001]
about the unlabelled data are met, the thresholds β and λ are not difficult to de-
termine. According to these assumptions, the anomalies are assumed to constitute
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Figure 6.2: The categorization of unlabelled data after applying the anomaly-
scoring technique
a small portion of the data, where this percentage is assumed to not exceed 5%.
Since we are not interested in finding all anomalies more than finding the fraction
of anomalies with high confidence, and also we are not supposed to approach the
uncertain area, the value of β will be set to a value that is smaller than 5%. As
opposed to anomalies, the normal data is assumed to constitute a large portion of
the data; therefore, setting λ to a small value will result in a small-size data set of
most-relevant normal observations. However, this data set might not approximately
represent the large portion of the normal data. To address this problem, we pro-
pose to set λ to a large value providing this value does overlap with the uncertain
area by, say, 80%. This will result in a large data set that is most-relevant normal.
However, the computation time in the ensemble-based decision-making model will
be substantially higher.
In order to resolve the previous problem, we extract a small-size set of repre-
sentative observations from the most relevant normal data set. In this step, we
group the similar observations together in terms of Euclidean distance, and take
their mean as a representative observation for each group. k-means clustering tech-
nique [MacQueen et al., 1967] is a candidate algorithm for this process because
of its simplicity, low computation time and fast convergence. Moreover, the main
disadvantages of k-means of determining the appropriate number of clusters and
forcing an outlier observation to be assigned to the closest cluster even if it is dis-
similar to its members, will not be problematic in this step. This is because we
are not interested in finding specific clusters more than chopping the data into a
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number of groups, and also the clustering data ( most-relevant normal data set )
is assumed to be outlier-free. Therefore, the number of clusters k will be set to a
small value, where k  |D|. Algorithm 7 summarises the steps involved in learning
a small-size representative data set of the most relevant normal observations.
Algorithm 7: learning small-size representative data set of most-relevant
normal observations.
1 Input: k
/* A positive integer that specifies the number of clusters */
2 Input: NormalData
/* The instances that fall into the confidence area of normality */
3 Output: RepNormalData
/* small-size data set that contains representative observations for
most-relevant normal observations */
4 Initialise the cluster centroids C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck} ;
5 AssignmentList←− ∅;
/* list of tuples < observation, Cluster ID > */
6 while termination criterion is not met do
7 foreach observation in NormalData do
8 ClusterID ←− ClosestCluster(observation, C);
/* Find the closest cluster to this observation */
9 put < observation,ClusterID > in AssignmentList;
10 end
11 C ←− UpdateCentroids(AssignmentList);
12 end
13 RepNormalData←− C;
/* the centroids of clusters are used as representative observations for
most-relevant normal observations */
14 return [RepNormalData]];
The two small-size data sets (the learned normal and anomalous data sets) are
combined in order to form a labelled compressed representation of the unlabelled
data. The concept of this compressed data set is slightly similar to the concept of
the set of support vectors built by a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [Schiilko¨pf
et al., 1995].
6.3.2 Decision-Making Model
This section introduces the Ensemble-based Decision-Making Model (EDMM) used
to calculate the support anomaly score for each testing observation. As shown in
Figure 6.1, EDMM is composed of a set of supervised classifiers whose individual
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decisions are combined to form an ensemble decision. This is because the combining
of classifiers promised to be effective [Kittler et al., 1998]. Each classifier ci is trained
with the labelled data set to build a decision model di. In GATUD, the number and
the type of involved supervised classifiers have been left open because the choice of
a specific algorithm is a critical step.
Let C = {ci|1 ≤ i ≥ n} be a set of candidate supervised classifiers that build a
set of decision models D = {di|1 ≤ i ≥ n}. Each decision model di assigns binary-
decision value (either “1” or “0”) to a testing observation xi, di(xi) : vi. When
the binary value vi is “1”, the observation xi is judged as anomalous, otherwise is
judged as normal. Then the calculation of the support anomaly score is defined as
follows:
support(xi) =
∑n
j=1 dj(xi)
n
(6.3)
where n is the number of decision models involved in the calculation of the sup-
port anomaly score. The observation type (class), whether abnormal or normal, is
defined by the following equation:
Class(xi) =
 support(xi) ≥ ρ Abnormal = 1Otherwise Normal = 0 (6.4)
where ρ is the percentage of the accepted vote of the decision-models to judge
a testing observation xi as anomalous. For instance, when the threshold ρ is set to
1, the testing observation will not be considered as anomalous unless all involved
decision models agree that the observation is an anomaly.
Illustrative Example
A simple example is given below to illustrate the process of the EDMM. Given five
supervised classifiers are selected, C = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, and trained with labelled
data sets that have been learned at Section 9, to build the decision models, D =
{d1, d2, d3, d4, d5}, and given a testing observation xi whose status predicted by
162 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 6. A GLOBAL ANOMALY THRESHOLD TO UNSUPERVISED
DETECTION (GATUD)
these in question models as shown in Table 6.1, then the support anomaly score is
computed as follows:
support(xi) =
1 + 1 + 0 + 1 + 1
5
=
4
5
= 0.80
Given the threshold ρ set to 0.6, where the observation xi is considered as
an anomaly, when at least three decision models have to assign it as anomalous.
Therefore, from this example, the observation xi will be considered anomalous.
Table 6.1: Prediction results for a set of decision models on a testing observation
xi
Decision model d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 Sum
Is observation xi anomalous? 1 1 0 1 1 4
6.4 The Experimental Setup
To provide quantitative results for GATUD, we use the seven labeled data sets,
which have been used in Chapter 5, and the normalization, which is explained in
Chapter 5, is applied to all these data sets to improve the accuracy and efficiency
of GATUD.
6.4.1 Choice of Parameters
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, four parameters are required in order to learn the
most representative labelled data sets.
• The k-nearest neighbours parameter is the influencing factor for the anomaly
scoring technique. However, this value is insensitive and can be heuristically
determined based on the assumption that anomalies constitute a tiny portion
of the data. Therefore, the value of k-nearest is set to be 1% of the representa-
tive data set, because this value is assumed to discriminate between abnormal
observations and normal ones in terms of the density-based distance.
163 (December 2, 2014)
CHAPTER 6. A GLOBAL ANOMALY THRESHOLD TO UNSUPERVISED
DETECTION (GATUD)
• There are three parameters used for learning the most-representative data
sets: (i) the extent of confidence area of normality λ; (ii) the extent of con-
fidence area of abnormity β. We set the parameters λ and β to 70% and
1% respectively. Even though the assumption was that the normal and ab-
normal data constitute larger percentages than the ones we have chosen, we
want to maintain some distance from the uncertain area; (iii) the number of
clusters k required for k-means in the candidate step. The purpose of this
parameter is to reduce the number of representative normal observations, not
to discover specific clusters. Experimentally, the value of k for several values
such as 0.01%, 0.02%, 0.03% and 0.04% demonstrated similar results, while
the larger the value of k, the more is the computation time in the anomaly
decision-making model of GATUD. Therefore, the value of this parameter is
set to be 0.01% of the representative data set.
6.4.2 The Candidate Classifiers
As previously discussed, the type and the number of the supervised classifiers that
are involved in EDMM in GATUD are left for the implementer. In this chapter, a
thorough investigation has been conducted of a number of classifiers. We concluded
with the most five efficient classifiers. Two are decision-tree based, best-first deci-
sion tree (BFTree) [Shi, 2007] and J48 [Quinlan, 1993]; another two are rule-based,
Non-Nested generalized exemplars (NNge) [Martin, 1995] and Projective Adaptive
Resonance Theory (PART) [Frank and Witten, 1998]; the fifth is a probabilistic
based, Naive Bayes [John and Langley, 1995]. When using classifiers, we kept the
default parameters of WEKA data mining software [Hall et al., 2009].
6.5 Results and Discussion
Clearly, GATUD is intended to improve the accuracy of unsupervised anomaly
detection systems in general and our proposed SDAD approach in particular. In this
evaluation, we demonstrate how GATUD can address the limitations that have been
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discussed in Chapter 5, where a global anomaly threshold is required to work with
all data sets, that vary in distribution, the number of inconsistent observations and
the application domain, when the scoring-based technique is adapted. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, GATUD can be used as an add-on component to help improve
the accuracy of the unsupervised anomaly detection approach. We demonstrate its
performance when it is used with k-means algorithm [MacQueen et al., 1967] that is
considered as one of the most useful and promising techniques that can be adapted
to build an unsupervised clustering-based anomaly detection technique [Jianliang
et al., 2009; Mu¨nz et al., 2007]. The accuracy metrics that have been discussed
and used in Chapter 5 are also used in this evaluation. Moreover, 10-fold cross-
validation is applied to each data set for each experimental parameter.
6.5.1 Integrating GATUD into SDAD
The separation of the most relevant inconsistent observations from consistent ones
in order to extract proximity detection rules for a given system, is the initial part
of SDAD in Chapter 5. However, a cut-off threshold parameter η is required to be
given, and in fact this parameter plays a major role in separating the most relevant
inconsistent observations. The demonstrated results were significant; however, var-
ious cut-off thresholds η for a number of data sets have been used, where some data
sets work with a small value of η, while other work with a large value. Therefore, we
evaluate how the integration of GATUD into SDAD can help to find a global and
efficient anomaly threshold η that can work with all data sets regardless of their
variant characteristics such as distribution, the number of inconsistent observations
and the application domain, and meanwhile produces significant results.
It is well-known that the larger the value of the cut-off threshold η, the higher
will be the detection rate and the higher will be the false positive rate as well.
This, however, will result in poor performance. The determination of an appropri-
ate cut-off threshold η that maximises and minimizes the detection rate and the
false positive rate respectively, is the challenging problem. GATUD addresses this
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problem by allowing the anomaly scoring technique to choose a large value of cut-off
thresholds η in order to ensure that the detection rate is higher, while minimizing
the false positive rate without degrading the detection rate.
In the following, we demonstrate the separation accuracy results with/without
the integration of GATUD into SDAD. Then, we demonstrate how this integra-
tion has a significant impact on the accuracy of the generation step of proximity
detection rules, which is the second phase following the separation process.
The Results of the Separation Process With/Without GATUD
As discussed in Chapter 5, the results that meet the following criteria are considered
as significant:  Detection rate ≥ 90%False positive rate ≤ 1.5% (6.5)
Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 show the separation accuracy results
with/without the integration of GATUD. Clearly, as shown in the result tables, the
larger the value of the cut-off threshold η, the higher the detection rate of inconsis-
tent observations. This is because the observations are sorted by their inconsistency
scores in ascending order and the consideration of the top large portion of the sorted
list increases the chance to obtain the actual inconsistent observations. However,
this will result in a large number of consistent observations existing in this portion,
and this definitely increases the false positive rate. On the another hand, it can
be seen that the use of GATUD can benefit from the larger value of the cut-off
threshold η in order to maximise the detection rate of inconsistent observations
and the obtained list of the assumed inconsistent observations is passed through
the decision-making model to rejudge whether each observation is inconsistent or
consistent. This, as can be seen in the result tables, nearly sustains the detection
rate, and meanwhile minimizes the false positive rate.
Table 6.2 shows that the significant accuracy results of separation of inconsis-
tent observations without the integration of GATUD are achieved when the cut-off
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threshold η is set with 3.5% and 4.0%. Moreover, it can be observed that the
setting of η with larger values such as 4.5% and 5.0% has not demonstrated any
significant results even though the detection rates of the inconsistent observations
were high. This is because, as demonstrated, the false positive rates were relatively
high. On the other hand, when GATUD was integrated, the high false positive
rates were significantly reduced and meanwhile the detection rates were sustained
at significantly acceptable levels. Similarly, the remaining results for each data set (
as shown in Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8) demonstrated that the integration
of GATUD significantly reduced the high false positive rates when larger values of
η were used, and meanwhile maintained the detection rates at a satisfactory and
significant level. However, the results for the data set MORD in Table 6.7 were
not significant whether GATUD was integrated or not. We would have expected
the integration of GATUD to produce significant results, if the cut-off threshold
η was set to a value that is greater than 0.05%. However, this value is assumed
as the maximum percentage of inconsistent observations in an unlabelled data set.
Therefore, this data set is considered to be an exceptional case.
Table 6.2: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on DUWWTP
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00% 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00%
1.00% 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63% 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63%
1.50% 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67% 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67%
2.00% 70.71% 0.02% 99.00% 82.50% 64.29% 0.02% 98.90% 77.92%
2.50% 79.29% 0.19% 92.50% 85.38% 71.43% 0.13% 94.34% 81.30%
3.00% 87.14% 0.39% 87.14% 87.14% 78.57% 0.13% 94.83% 85.94%
3.50% 92.86% 0.87% 76.47% 83.87% 92.86% 0.13% 95.59% 94.20%
4.00% 92.86% 1.30% 68.42% 78.79% 92.86% 0.28% 90.91% 91.87%
4.50% 94.29% 1.69% 62.86% 75.43% 92.86% 0.43% 86.67% 89.66%
5.00% 100.00% 2.17% 58.33% 73.68% 92.86% 0.54% 83.87% 88.14%
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending order,
are assumed as inconsistent
2 DR: Detection Rate
3 FPR: False Positive Rate
4 P : Precision
5 F −M :F-Measure
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Table 6.3: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on SimData1.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 40.78% 0.06% 88.51% 55.84% 40.78% 0.06% 88.51% 55.84%
1.00% 80.78% 0.13% 86.74% 83.65% 80.78% 0.13% 86.74% 83.65%
1.50% 98.04% 0.45% 70.42% 81.97% 98.04% 0.25% 80.91% 88.65%
2.00% 98.04% 0.95% 52.91% 68.73% 98.04% 0.41% 72.05% 83.06%
2.50% 98.04% 1.46% 42.19% 59.00% 98.04% 0.44% 70.87% 82.27%
3.00% 98.04% 1.97% 35.21% 51.81% 98.04% 0.46% 69.78% 81.53%
3.50% 98.04% 2.47% 30.21% 46.19% 98.04% 0.48% 68.82% 80.87%
4.00% 98.04% 2.97% 26.46% 41.67% 98.04% 0.50% 68.17% 80.42%
4.50% 98.04% 3.48% 23.47% 37.88% 98.04% 0.52% 67.48% 79.94%
5.00% 98.04% 3.99% 21.14% 34.78% 98.04% 0.52% 67.29% 79.81%
Table 6.4: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on SimData2.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 46.50% 0.01% 98.94% 63.27% 46.50% 0.01% 98.94% 63.27%
1.00% 81.50% 0.14% 85.79% 83.59% 81.50% 0.14% 85.79% 83.59%
1.50% 100.00% 0.45% 70.42% 82.64% 100.00% 0.16% 86.88% 92.98%
2.00% 100.00% 0.95% 52.91% 69.20% 100.00% 0.19% 84.82% 91.79%
2.50% 100.00% 1.46% 42.19% 59.35% 100.00% 0.23% 82.10% 90.17%
3.00% 100.00% 1.97% 35.21% 52.08% 100.00% 0.26% 80.71% 89.33%
3.50% 100.00% 2.47% 30.21% 46.40% 100.00% 0.27% 80.06% 88.93%
4.00% 100.00% 2.97% 26.46% 41.84% 100.00% 0.28% 79.37% 88.50%
4.50% 100.00% 3.48% 23.47% 38.02% 100.00% 0.29% 78.43% 87.91%
5.00% 100.00% 3.98% 21.14% 34.90% 100.00% 0.31% 77.40% 87.26%
Table 6.5: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on SIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20% 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20%
1.00% 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96% 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96%
1.50% 51.28% 0.00% 100.00% 67.80% 51.28% 0.00% 100.00% 67.80%
2.00% 68.38% 0.00% 100.00% 81.22% 68.38% 0.00% 100.00% 81.22%
2.50% 85.47% 0.00% 100.00% 92.17% 85.47% 0.00% 100.00% 92.17%
3.00% 100.00% 0.08% 97.50% 98.73% 100.00% 0.08% 97.50% 98.73%
3.50% 100.00% 0.59% 83.57% 91.05% 100.00% 0.52% 85.21% 92.02%
4.00% 100.00% 1.09% 73.58% 84.78% 100.00% 0.85% 78.10% 87.71%
4.50% 100.00% 1.60% 65.36% 79.05% 100.00% 0.97% 75.73% 86.19%
5.00% 100.00% 2.12% 58.79% 74.05% 100.00% 0.99% 75.24% 85.87%
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Table 6.6: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on SORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64% 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64%
1.00% 90.94% 0.35% 64.67% 75.58% 90.63% 0.35% 64.59% 75.42%
1.50% 93.75% 0.84% 44.12% 60.00% 90.63% 0.59% 52.06% 66.13%
2.00% 93.75% 1.77% 27.27% 42.25% 90.63% 0.70% 47.93% 62.70%
2.50% 93.75% 2.00% 25.00% 39.47% 90.63% 0.72% 47.15% 62.03%
3.00% 96.88% 2.33% 22.79% 36.90% 90.63% 0.72% 47.08% 61.97%
3.50% 96.88% 2.84% 19.50% 32.46% 90.63% 0.72% 47.08% 61.97%
4.00% 96.88% 3.35% 17.03% 28.97% 90.63% 0.72% 47.08% 61.97%
4.50% 96.88% 3.84% 15.20% 26.27% 90.63% 0.72% 47.08% 61.97%
5.00% 96.88% 4.35% 13.66% 23.94% 90.63% 0.72% 47.08% 61.97%
Table 6.7: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on MORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 36.21% 0.00% 100.00% 53.16% 36.21% 0.00% 100.00% 53.16%
1.00% 72.41% 0.00% 100.00% 84.00% 72.41% 0.00% 100.00% 84.00%
1.50% 86.03% 0.31% 79.21% 82.48% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
2.00% 86.21% 0.84% 58.82% 69.93% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
2.50% 86.55% 1.34% 47.36% 61.22% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
3.00% 87.41% 1.83% 39.92% 54.81% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
3.50% 87.93% 2.33% 34.46% 49.51% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
4.00% 87.93% 2.83% 30.18% 44.93% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
4.50% 88.45% 3.33% 27.00% 41.37% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
5.00% 89.31% 3.82% 24.55% 38.51% 75.86% 0.00% 100.00% 86.27%
Table 6.8: The separation accuracy of inconsistent observations with/without
GATUD on MIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η DR FPR P F-M DR FPR P F-M
0.50% 21.00% 0.00% 100.00% 34.71% 21.00% 0.00% 100.00% 34.71%
1.00% 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15% 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15%
1.50% 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30% 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30%
2.00% 85.00% 0.00% 100.00% 91.89% 85.00% 0.00% 100.00% 91.89%
2.50% 100.00% 0.15% 94.34% 97.09% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
3.00% 100.00% 0.65% 78.74% 88.11% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
3.50% 100.00% 1.16% 67.57% 80.65% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
4.00% 100.00% 1.67% 59.17% 74.35% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
4.50% 100.00% 2.18% 52.63% 68.97% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
5.00% 100.00% 2.71% 47.17% 64.10% 97.00% 0.00% 100.00% 98.48%
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The Results of Proximity Detection Rules With/Without GATUD
As mentioned previously, the generation process of proximity detection rules comes
after and relies on the separation process. Therefore, the robustness of these
proximity detection rules is influenced by the accuracy of the separation pro-
cess, and as earlier shown, the integration of GATUD demonstrated significant
results in the separation process even with large cut-off thresholds η. There-
fore, the detection accuracy results of the proximity detection rules, which are
extracted from the inconsistent and consistent observations that were separated
using such these large cut-off thresholds η, are expected to be significant. Ta-
bles 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 show the detection accuracy results.
Each table represents the results of the detection accuracy results for each in-
dividual data set, and also they are divided into two parts: the first part shows
the results of the proximity-detection rules that were extracted by separating in-
consistent from consistent observations where GATUD was not integrated in the
separation process. The second part shows the results obtained after the integration
of GATUD. The result tables show that the integration of GATUD into the sep-
aration process helps to generate robust proximity-detection rules even with large
cut-off thresholds η.
Overall, Table 6.16 highlights the acceptable thresholds η through which the
extracted proximity-detection rules demonstrated significant detection accuracy re-
sults, where GATUD was integrated into the separation process of inconsistent and
consistent observations. From this table, the determination of the near-optimal
value of a cut-off threshold η will not be problematic because the value of η can be
set to 0.05 which is assumed as the maximum percentage of inconsistent observa-
tions in an unlabelled data set. The resultant high positive rate that might result
from this large value can significantly be reduced by the integration of GATUD.
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Table 6.9: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD in the separation process
on DUWWTP.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.7506
62 2 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00% 62 2 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 25.00%
1.00% 59 5 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63% 59 5 35.71% 0.00% 100.00% 52.63%
1.50% 57 7 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67% 57 7 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% 66.67%
2.00% 54 10 70.71% 0.00% 100.00% 82.85% 55 9 64.29% 0.00% 100.00% 78.26%
2.50% 52 12 79.29% 0.00% 100.00% 88.45% 54 10 71.43% 0.00% 100.00% 83.33%
3.00% 51 14 87.14% 5.85% 80.26% 83.56% 53 11 78.57% 0.00% 100.00% 88.00%
3.50% 48 16 92.86% 0.78% 97.01% 94.89% 52 12 84.29% 0.00% 100.00% 91.47%
4.00% 46 18 92.86% 0.97% 96.30% 94.55% 52 12 84.29% 0.00% 100.00% 91.47%
4.50% 44 20 94.29% 9.75% 72.53% 81.99% 51 13 85.71% 0.19% 99.17% 91.95%
5.00% 41 23 100.00% 11.70% 70.00% 82.35% 49 15 89.29% 0.58% 97.66% 93.28%
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending order,
are assumed as inconsistent
2 w: The cluster width parameter
3 NC: The number of the produced normal clusters
4 AC: The number of the produced abnormal clusters
5 DR: Detection Rate
6 FPR: False Positive Rate
7 P : Precision
8 F −M :F-Measure
Table 6.10: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD in the separation process on
SimData1.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.1456
316 39 40.78% 0.06% 98.58% 57.70% 316 39 40.78% 0.06% 98.58% 57.70%
1.00% 286 68 80.78% 0.13% 98.33% 88.70% 286 68 80.78% 0.13% 98.33% 88.70%
1.50% 265 92 98.04% 0.46% 95.42% 96.71% 272 81 98.04% 0.28% 97.18% 97.61%
2.00% 252 104 98.04% 1.11% 89.69% 93.68% 269 82 98.04% 0.42% 95.79% 96.90%
2.50% 242 116 98.04% 1.73% 84.75% 90.91% 269 82 98.04% 0.44% 95.60% 96.81%
3.00% 238 131 98.04% 2.49% 79.43% 87.76% 268 85 98.04% 0.48% 95.24% 96.62%
3.50% 234 138 98.04% 3.08% 75.76% 85.47% 267 85 98.04% 0.56% 94.52% 96.25%
4.00% 225 144 98.04% 3.64% 72.52% 83.37% 267 85 98.04% 0.58% 94.34% 96.15%
4.50% 219 151 98.04% 4.24% 69.40% 81.27% 266 85 98.04% 0.59% 94.25% 96.11%
5.00% 211 157 98.04% 4.75% 66.93% 79.55% 267 85 98.04% 0.59% 94.25% 96.11%
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Table 6.11: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD in the separation process on
SimData2.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.1476
307 42 46.50% 0.01% 99.79% 63.44% 307 42 46.50% 0.01% 99.79% 63.44%
1.00% 279 71 70.00% 0.14% 97.90% 81.63% 279 71 70.00% 0.14% 97.90% 81.63%
1.50% 262 90 100.00% 0.51% 94.97% 97.42% 268 78 100.00% 0.17% 98.23% 99.11%
2.00% 255 102 100.00% 1.18% 89.05% 94.21% 268 78 100.00% 0.20% 97.94% 98.96%
2.50% 243 112 100.00% 1.72% 84.82% 91.79% 268 78 100.00% 0.26% 97.37% 98.67%
3.00% 239 120 100.00% 2.42% 79.87% 88.81% 268 78 100.00% 0.26% 97.37% 98.67%
3.50% 231 130 100.00% 3.05% 75.93% 86.32% 268 78 100.00% 0.26% 97.37% 98.67%
4.00% 228 139 100.00% 3.63% 72.57% 84.10% 268 78 100.00% 0.28% 97.18% 98.57%
4.50% 222 146 100.00% 4.19% 69.64% 82.10% 268 78 100.00% 0.31% 96.90% 98.43%
5.00% 216 147 100.00% 4.71% 67.11% 80.32% 268 78 100.00% 0.37% 96.34% 98.14%
Table 6.12: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD in the separation process on
SIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.0124
63 17 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20% 63 17 17.09% 0.00% 100.00% 29.20%
1.00% 45 35 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96% 45 35 34.19% 0.00% 100.00% 50.96%
1.50% 36 44 51.97% 0.00% 100.00% 68.39% 36 44 51.97% 0.00% 100.00% 68.39%
2.00% 31 49 67.61% 0.00% 100.00% 80.67% 31 49 67.61% 0.00% 100.00% 80.67%
2.50% 24 57 72.65% 0.00% 100.00% 84.16% 24 57 70.09% 0.00% 100.00% 82.41%
3.00% 17 63 100.00% 0.42% 98.48% 99.24% 17 63 100.00% 0.42% 98.48% 99.24%
3.50% 15 64 100.00% 0.77% 97.26% 98.61% 16 63 100.00% 0.65% 97.66% 98.82%
4.00% 15 64 100.00% 1.58% 94.51% 97.18% 16 63 100.00% 0.84% 97.01% 98.48%
4.50% 15 64 100.00% 6.98% 79.59% 88.64% 16 63 100.00% 0.93% 96.69% 98.32%
5.00% 15 65 100.00% 8.14% 76.97% 86.99% 16 64 100.00% 0.93% 96.69% 98.32%
Table 6.13: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD in the separation process on
SORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.0152
73 20 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64% 73 20 71.88% 0.00% 100.00% 83.64%
1.00% 67 27 90.94% 0.28% 95.41% 93.12% 67 27 90.63% 0.28% 95.39% 92.95%
1.50% 64 32 93.75% 0.90% 86.96% 90.23% 67 28 90.63% 0.60% 90.63% 90.63%
2.00% 62 33 93.75% 1.32% 81.97% 87.46% 67 28 90.63% 0.72% 88.96% 89.78%
2.50% 61 35 93.75% 2.02% 74.81% 83.22% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
3.00% 57 37 96.88% 2.38% 72.26% 82.78% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
3.50% 55 41 96.88% 3.03% 67.10% 79.28% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
4.00% 55 42 96.88% 3.83% 61.75% 75.43% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
4.50% 54 41 96.88% 4.19% 59.62% 73.81% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
5.00% 54 42 96.88% 4.59% 57.41% 72.09% 67 28 90.63% 0.74% 88.69% 89.64%
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Table 6.14: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD on in the separation process
MORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.0093
74 14 36.21% 0.00% 100.00% 53.16% 74 14 36.21% 0.00% 100.00% 53.16%
1.00% 55 34 72.59% 0.00% 100.00% 84.12% 55 34 72.59% 0.00% 100.00% 84.12%
1.50% 53 38 77.59% 0.56% 94.54% 85.23% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
2.00% 53 39 86.21% 1.10% 90.74% 88.42% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
2.50% 52 39 86.55% 1.68% 86.55% 86.55% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
3.00% 50 40 87.41% 2.20% 83.25% 85.28% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
3.50% 49 41 87.93% 2.72% 80.19% 83.88% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
4.00% 48 42 87.93% 3.00% 78.58% 82.99% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
4.50% 48 43 88.45% 3.39% 76.57% 82.08% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
5.00% 46 44 89.31% 3.99% 73.68% 80.75% 55 34 77.41% 0.00% 100.00% 87.27%
Table 6.15: The detection accuracy of the proximity-detection rules that have
been extracted with/without the integration of GATUD on in the separation process
MIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
η w NC AC DR FPR P F-M NC AC DR FPR P F-M
0.50%
0.0135
62 13 20.10% 0.00% 100.00% 33.47% 62 13 20.10% 0.00% 100.00% 33.47%
1.00% 44 31 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15% 44 31 42.00% 0.00% 100.00% 59.15%
1.50% 37 38 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30% 37 38 63.00% 0.00% 100.00% 77.30%
2.00% 26 49 70.00% 0.00% 100.00% 82.35% 26 49 70.00% 0.00% 100.00% 82.35%
2.50% 20 55 100.00% 0.20% 99.11% 99.55% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
3.00% 18 57 100.00% 0.87% 96.15% 98.04% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
3.50% 18 58 100.00% 1.29% 94.43% 97.13% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
4.00% 18 59 100.00% 6.54% 76.92% 86.96% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
4.50% 15 61 100.00% 7.63% 74.07% 85.11% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
5.00% 16 65 100.00% 8.28% 72.46% 84.03% 22 54 96.90% 0.00% 100.00% 98.43%
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Table 6.16: The acceptable thresholds η that produce significant accuracy results
of the separation of inconsistent observations on each data set when GATUD was
intergraded
Data sets
η AgreeNO
DUWWTP SimData1 SimData2 MORD MIRD SORD SIRD
0.50% 0
1.00%
√
1
1.50%
√ √ √
3
2.00%
√ √ √
3
2.50%
√ √ √ √
4
3.00%
√ √ √ √ √
5
3.50%
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
4.00%
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
4.50%
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
5.00%
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
1 η: Top percentage of observations, that are sorted by inconsistency scores in ascending order,
are assumed as inconsistent
2 AgreeNO: The number of data sets that agree on each separation threshold η, where
the agreement is judged by the significant detection results
6.5.2 Integrating GATUD into Clustering-Based Technique
Here we show how GATUD can be integrated not only with the scoring-based
intrusion detection technique, but also with the clustering-based technique. The
k-means algorithm, which is considered as one of the most useful and promis-
ing techniques for building an unsupervised clustering-based intrusion detection
model [Jianliang et al., 2009; Mu¨nz et al., 2007], is chosen to demonstrate the in-
tegration effectiveness of GATUD with an unsupervised clustering-based intrusion
detection technique. This is because this algorithm already has been adapted in
Chapter 5 to build the unsupervised anomaly detection model to detect inconsistent
observations, and the results were compared with SDAD. Therefore, it is interesting
to demonstrate detection accuracy results with/without the integration of GATUD.
For more details about how this algorithm can be adapted to build an unsupervised
anomaly detection model, see Chapter 5.
In the adaptation of k-means for building an unsupervised anomaly detection
model, anomalies are assumed to be grouped in clusters that contain percentage θ
of the data. Let C = C1, C2, . . . Cn be the set of clusters that have been created.
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Then, the anomalous clusters are defined as follows:
C´ = {C´1, C´2, . . . C´b} =
n∑
i=1
|Ci| ≤ θ (6.6)
while, the remaining clusters C − C´ are labelled as normal. In this evaluation, we
assume the real anomalous cluster is the cluster where the majority of its members
are actual inconsistent observations. Say the number of inconsistent observations
≥ |C´i|/2. Therefore, the labelling accuracy of the assumed percentage θ of the data
in anomalous clusters is measured by the Labelling Error Rate (LER) for clusters:
LER =
# of clusters incorrectly labelled
# of All identified clusters
(6.7)
When integrating GATUD to label the clusters, the members of each individual
cluster pass through the decision-making model to be labelled as either normal or
abnormal. Then the cluster is labelled according to the label of the majority of its
members. The labelling of clusters by GATUD is given as follows:
L(Ci) =
|Ci|∑
j=1
Class(xj) (6.8)
where L(Ci) is the number of inconsistent observations, which are judged by the
decision-making model, in the cluster Ci. Then the anomalous clusters are defined
as follows:
C´ = {C´1, C´2, . . . C´b} =
n∑
i=1
L(Ci) ≥ ε× |Ci| (6.9)
where ε is the percentage of the inconsistent observations in a cluster Ci to be
labelled as inconsistent. In this evaluation, it is set to 0.5.
We evaluate the integration of GATUD as an add-in component with k-means,
where this component is only used to label the produced clusters as either normal
or abnormal. The k-means requires two user-specified parameters k and θ to build
the unsupervised anomaly detection model from unlabelled data. Where k the
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number of clusters, and θ is the percentage of the data in a cluster to be assumed
as malicious. However, the parameter θ is not required when GATUD is integrated.
In this evaluation, we demonstrate the detection accuracy of k-means as an inde-
pendent/dependent algorithm. In the independent use, k-means is used to cluster
the training data set and labels each cluster using an assumption of the percentage
of the data in a cluster to be assumed as malicious. While in the dependent use,
GATUD is used as a labelling technique for the produced clusters by k-means. The
parameters k and θ are set to the same values that have been used in Chapter 5.
This is because the same data sets are used.
Tables 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22 and 6.23 show the detection accuracy re-
sults of the detection model that was built by the clustering k-means algorithm, and
as shown, these results represent the independent and dependent use of k-means,
where, in the latter, GATUD was integrated to label the clusters. In this evaluation,
we show only the results of F-measure as they are the interesting results to compare.
Clearly, the detection accuracy results of k-means in detecting inconsistent obser-
vations are very poor for all data sets when GATUD was not integrated. On the
other hand, significant results for some data sets are obtained when GATUD is in-
tegrated to label the produced clusters. It is obvious from the results that GATUD
can be a promising technique to improve the accuracy of an unsupervised anomaly
detection approaches, not only with our SDAD approach proposed in Chapter 5
but also it can be integrated with unsupervised clustering-based anomaly detection
models.
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Table 6.17: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on DUWWTP.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 12.40% 69.65% 29.30% 59.98% 43.73% 50.50% 53.80% 44.22% 60.92% 39.86% 6.00% 79.37%
60 20.17% 62.36% 39.08% 53.36% 53.11% 44.37% 61.92% 39.03% 67.63% 35.62% 7.17% 74.14%
70 23.57% 62.95% 46.43% 48.73% 59.76% 40.56% 67.39% 36.05% 72.20% 33.17% 6.71% 79.36%
80 33.75% 57.08% 54.63% 44.19% 66.25% 37.23% 72.75% 33.28% 76.73% 30.91% 5.88% 79.42%
90 40.44% 58.62% 62.17% 42.73% 71.96% 35.87% 77.17% 32.26% 80.27% 30.10% 7.11% 80.28%
100 47.60% 51.52% 67.10% 38.56% 75.63% 33.01% 80.08% 30.13% 82.74% 28.39% 6.40% 72.13%
1 DR: Labelling Error-Rate
2 F-M: F-Measure
3 θ: The percentage of the data in a cluster to be assumed as malicious
4 K: The number of clusters
Table 6.18: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on SimData1.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 10.40% 50.56% 33.40% 30.82% 50.00% 23.74% 61.10% 19.79% 68.48% 17.67% 0.60% 72.59%
60 18.50% 37.04% 42.67% 24.17% 58.83% 19.06% 68.46% 15.51% 74.37% 14.23% 0.00% 68.50%
70 28.86% 26.97% 55.29% 18.66% 68.81% 15.02% 76.00% 13.32% 80.51% 12.44% 0.29% 64.13%
80 40.88% 30.68% 64.69% 20.10% 75.58% 16.30% 81.19% 14.51% 84.68% 13.39% 0.13% 98.11%
90 41.67% 24.61% 67.56% 17.29% 77.93% 14.50% 83.14% 12.69% 86.20% 11.94% 0.00% 86.28%
100 53.90% 21.15% 75.05% 15.34% 82.90% 13.22% 86.88% 11.96% 89.28% 11.35% 0.40% 86.77%
Table 6.19: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on SimData2.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 10.80% 74.79% 31.70% 48.40% 48.60% 36.25% 59.95% 29.58% 67.24% 25.49% 0.60% 99.71%
60 21.00% 52.54% 44.58% 33.94% 59.89% 26.06% 69.17% 21.77% 74.80% 19.17% 0.33% 99.61%
70 25.86% 43.87% 52.07% 28.49% 66.67% 22.10% 74.29% 18.80% 78.89% 16.80% 0.14% 99.80%
80 35.88% 33.18% 61.56% 22.04% 73.17% 17.76% 79.25% 15.55% 82.98% 14.19% 0.13% 99.80%
90 45.56% 25.24% 68.28% 17.73% 78.00% 14.83% 82.97% 13.33% 86.04% 12.42% 0.56% 99.22%
100 52.20% 22.03% 73.40% 15.79% 81.37% 13.51% 85.50% 12.33% 88.04% 11.62% 0.30% 99.41%
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Table 6.20: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on SIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 13.20% 80.09% 32.30% 62.74% 45.87% 52.44% 55.35% 45.76% 61.68% 41.40% 2.80% 94.09%
60 22.17% 71.64% 43.00% 53.86% 55.28% 45.25% 63.75% 39.72% 68.83% 36.34% 3.17% 93.82%
70 27.57% 64.89% 49.36% 48.09% 60.95% 40.33% 68.21% 35.97% 72.86% 33.23% 2.29% 94.77%
80 37.50% 56.39% 56.06% 43.16% 67.04% 36.51% 72.88% 32.95% 76.70% 30.72% 2.38% 94.43%
90 45.33% 49.58% 63.17% 38.59% 71.41% 33.45% 76.33% 30.51% 79.56% 28.77% 2.33% 94.18%
100 52.00% 42.35% 68.10% 34.20% 75.47% 30.16% 79.48% 28.01% 81.84% 26.71% 2.10% 94.44%
Table 6.21: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on SORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 18.00% 42.53% 36.40% 28.45% 50.27% 21.83% 60.60% 18.01% 67.52% 15.64% 2.00% 78.90%
60 22.67% 37.43% 44.50% 24.32% 58.83% 18.62% 68.04% 15.49% 73.50% 13.62% 1.67% 80.01%
70 33.00% 26.69% 54.86% 17.91% 66.81% 14.15% 73.75% 12.16% 78.06% 10.93% 2.29% 79.88%
80 43.00% 20.41% 63.69% 14.05% 73.58% 11.52% 79.16% 10.17% 82.53% 9.34% 1.50% 81.96%
90 48.67% 17.01% 68.61% 12.15% 77.63% 10.14% 82.19% 9.11% 85.04% 8.49% 1.44% 81.07%
100 58.40% 14.07% 74.20% 10.54% 81.03% 9.07% 84.75% 8.31% 87.04% 7.84% 1.50% 83.16%
Table 6.22: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on MORD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 8.20% 72.61% 30.80% 48.03% 47.07% 36.94% 57.00% 31.08% 64.12% 27.23% 0.20% 91.53%
60 15.17% 56.72% 40.83% 37.64% 56.28% 29.59% 65.29% 25.16% 71.03% 22.42% 0.30% 90.55%
70 24.14% 44.26% 48.93% 30.09% 62.48% 24.24% 70.57% 20.99% 75.37% 19.04% 0.20% 91.67%
80 33.13% 37.11% 57.19% 25.44% 68.79% 20.90% 75.22% 18.52% 79.13% 17.05% 0.10% 92.84%
90 42.11% 29.29% 64.39% 21.18% 74.22% 17.97% 79.39% 16.27% 82.58% 15.26% 0.50% 89.82%
100 49.50% 24.53% 69.45% 18.61% 77.73% 16.16% 81.83% 14.91% 84.46% 14.15% 0.30% 91.84%
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Table 6.23: The detection accuracy of k-means clustering algorithm with/without
GATUD on MIRD.
Without GATUD With GATUD
θ = 0.01 θ = 0.02 θ = 0.03 θ = 0.04 θ = 0.05
K LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M LER F-M
50 9.80% 84.02% 28.90% 61.31% 42.27% 49.73% 52.35% 42.47% 59.60% 37.69% 0.25% 99.31%
60 14.50% 75.38% 36.67% 53.65% 51.17% 43.10% 60.71% 36.99% 66.67% 33.19% 0.25% 99.41%
70 23.57% 63.42% 47.71% 44.59% 61.00% 36.16% 68.61% 31.70% 73.17% 28.97% 0.25% 99.51%
80 33.13% 53.07% 56.13% 38.25% 67.50% 31.78% 73.72% 28.35% 77.50% 26.25% 0.25% 99.70%
90 40.33% 45.60% 61.61% 33.55% 71.67% 28.50% 77.00% 25.84% 80.18% 24.25% 0.25% 99.11%
100 51.90% 37.75% 70.35% 28.72% 77.97% 25.19% 81.75% 23.38% 84.10% 22.28% 0.25% 99.70%
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed an innovative approach, called Global Anomaly Threshold
to Unsupervised Detection (GATUD), which is used as an add-on component to
improve the accuracy of unsupervised intrusion detection techniques. This has
been done by initially learning two labelled small data sets from the unlabelled
data, where each data set represents either normal or abnormal behaviour. Then,
a set of supervised classifiers are trained with question data sets to produce an
ensemble-based decision-making model that can be integrated into both unsuper-
vised anomaly scoring and clustering-based intrusion detection approaches, where
in the former, GATUD is used to mitigate the sensitivity of anomaly threshold,
while in the latter, it is used to efficiently label the produced clusters as either
normal or abnormal. Experiments show that the integration of GATUD into our
SDAD approach proposed in Chapter 5, to mitigate the sensitivity of the anomaly
threshold, has demonstrated significant results. Moreover, GATUD demonstrated
significant and promising results when it was integrated into a clustering-based
intrusion detection approach as a labelling technique for the produced clusters.
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Conclusion
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have become a promising security method for
anomaly detection in traditional IT. The increased importance of this method has
opened up an interesting research area in security, and its use is not confined to
traditional IT, but has been adapted to detect unexpected behaviours in SCADA
systems. However, the different nature and characteristics of SCADA systems have
motivated security researchers to develop SCADA-specific IDSs. Information source
(e.g. network-based, application-based) through which anomalous behaviours can
be detected and modelling methods that are used to build the detection models
using the available information source, are the two salient parts that must be taken
into account in the development of IDSs.
A number of IDSs have been specifically developed to meet the requirements
of SCADA systems. However, they vary with respect to the modelling methods
used to build the detection model, and in addition to the selected information
source. Significant recent research has revealed that a SCADA data-driven IDS
has the potential to revolutionize the secure monitoring of our daily infrastructures
and industrial processes. The building of detection models using SCADA data can
be performed using two frequently-used strategies: manual definition or machine
learning. The former is time-consuming and prohibitively expensive as it requires
experts, while the latter requires the machine to automatically build a detection
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model based on a set of training data. However, the detection accuracy of any
created detection model relies totally on the goodness of that model. By “good-
ness” we mean the ability of the detection model to distinguish between normal
and abnormal behaviour. This can be achieved by training the anomaly detection
techniques with a labelled training data set, where each observation is denoted as
either normal or anomalous. This type of learning is called supervised mode.
However, labelled data should be accurately labelled and comprehensively repre-
sent all types of behaviours, which makes it prohibitively expensive because this
requires domain experts to label hundreds of thousands of data observations. In
addition, it is challenging to obtain abnormal observations that comprehensively
represent anomalous behaviours.
To address the previously discussed issues in the supervised mode, semi-supervised
mode is proposed where the anomaly detection technique is trained with just a one-
class problem of either normal or abnormal data. Obtaining a normal training data
set can be done by running a target system under normal conditions and the col-
lected data is assumed as normal. However, it is difficult to obtain purely normal
data that comprehensively represent normal behaviours. On the another hand, it
is challenging to obtain a training data set that covers all possible abnormal be-
haviour that could occur in the future. Therefore, unsupervised mode, where
the labelled data is not available, has the potential to address the aforementioned
issues of the previous modes, namely supervised and semi-supervised modes. How-
ever, low accuracy and efficiency of the unsupervised mode have made it a poor
alternative. In this thesis, we were motivated in particular to develop a robust, un-
supervised SCADA-specific IDS that is based on SCADA data. A set of solutions
has been proposed to achieve this aim.
The proposed unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS and framework for SCADA
security testbed can facilitate the nearly-optimal design of SCADA systems in which
the intrusion behaviours, that deviate from an expected pattern (the predened nor-
mal behaviours), can be easily monitored. For instance, a pre-determined threshold
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for a single parameter is the most commonly-used approach to monitor a system’s
behaviours, where any value exceeding this threshold is considered as anomalous.
However, the value of a single process parameter may not be abnormal, but, in com-
bination with other process parameters, may produce abnormal behaviours, which
very rarely occurs. Therefore, the proposed unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS
can be used to find out the neatly-optimal combination of parameters that can
nearly define the boundaries of hidden normal behaviours of a targeted system.
Moreover, the proposed framework for the SCADA security testbed can be used to
design the proposed SCADA system, in addition to simulating security measures
and testing attack scenarios prior to implementing the proposed system in the real
world.
7.1 Overall Contributions
Four research questions have been addressed in this thesis, namely:
A) How to develop a SCADA testbed which is a realistic alternative for real
SCADA systems so that it can be used for efficient SCADA security eval-
uation and testing purposes?
B) How to efficiently find the k-NN in Large and High Dimensional Data?
C) How to learn, from unlabelled SCADA data, clustering-based proximity rules
for SCADA anomaly detection?
D) How to find a global and efficient anomaly threshold to unsupervised detection?
The first research question focuses on the development of a framework for a
SCADA security testbed that is intended to be an evaluation and testing envi-
ronment for SCADA security in general, and in particular for our proposed unsu-
pervised IDS. The following three research questions focus on the development of
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techniques that are used together to build a robust unsupervised SCADA data-
driven IDS. In the following, the overall thesis contributions are summarized.
7.1.1 A framework for SCADA security testbed
The establishment of a SCADA research laboratory is very important in identi-
fying common attacks and evaluating security solutions tailored to SCADA sys-
tems. However, it is impractical to evaluate SCADA security solutions on actual
live systems. Thus, a framework for a SCADA security testbed based on virtu-
alization technology has been proposed. In this framework, the two main parts,
namely main SCADA system components and controlled environment have been
modelled in order to realistically mimic an actual SCADA system. In the former
part, all the essential SCADA components such as MUT, PLC, ModBus protocol,
etc. have been built on top of the CORE emulator that has been used as a com-
munication infrastructure for SCADA components. The integration of the essential
SCADA components into a CORE emulator introduces a friendly interface to create
a SCADA system that is configurable for any application to control and supervise.
While, in the latter part, the server, which acts as a surrogate for water distribution
systems, has been introduced to simulate water movement and quality behaviour
within pressurized pipe networks using the well-known modelling dynamic link li-
brary (DLL) of EPANET. In addition, the server can simulate any topology of
water network systems and can be manipulated by a custom TCP-based protocol.
A case study is presented to demonstrate how the testbed can easily be used and
configured to monitor and control any automatised processes. Moveover, DDoS
and integrity attacks have been described to illustrate how malicious attacks can
be launched on supervised processes.
7.1.2 An efficient search for k-NN in large and high dimensional data
We undertook this study to develop a SCADA data-driven IDS that operates in
unsupervised mode where labels are not available. It is a challenging process to
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build detection models from unlabelled data. This is because an unlabelled data
set cannot be guaranteed to represent one behaviour as either normal or abnormal.
The separation between normal and abnormal data is the salient part in the training
phase of our proposed system. The k-Nearest Neighbour-based(k-NN) approach is
found in the literature to be one of the most interesting and best approaches for
mining anomalies. However, a large computational cost is incurred when finding
the k-NN for any query object because all objects in a data set must be checked.
Therefore, we have proposed an efficient k-nearest-neighbour based approach, called
kNNVWC, that is based on a novel various-widths clustering algorithm and triangle
inequality. This approach makes possible the partitioning of a data set using various
widths whereby each width suits a particular distribution. The novel various-widths
clustering technique for partitioning a data set has introduced two features: (i) the
balance between the number of produced clusters and their respective sizes has
maximized the efficiency of using triangle inequality to prune unlikely clusters; and
(ii) clustering with a global width first produces relatively large clusters, and each
cluster is independently partitioned without considering other clusters, thereby
reducing the clustering time.
In the experiments, twelve data sets which vary in domains, size and dimen-
sionality, have been used. The experimental results have shown that the proposed
kNNVWC approach outperforms four algorithms in both construction and search
times. Moveover, kNNVWC has shown promising results with high-dimensional
data in searching k-NN for a query object.
7.1.3 Clustering-based proximity rules for SCADA anomaly detection
The separation between normal and abnormal behaviour using the efficient pro-
posed kNNVWC approach, needs a further process in order to build an efficient
SCADA data-driven detection model. This is because it is impractical to use all
the training data in the anomaly detection phase, as a large memory capacity
is needed to store all scored observations, and it is computationally infeasible to
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calculate the similarity between these observations and each current new obser-
vation. Consequently, we have introduced a novel SCADA Data-driven Anomaly
Detection approach, called SDAD, based on a clustering-based technique to extract
proximity-based detection rules. This has been performed by initially separating
the inconsistent observations from consistent ones, and then the proximity detec-
tion rules for each behaviour, whether consistent or inconsistent, are automatically
extracted from the observations that belong to that behaviour. The extracted rules
are used to monitor and warn of inconsistent observations that are produced by the
target SCADA data points for a given SCADA system. The extracted proximity-
based detection rules have demonstrated promising results for detecting anomalies
in SCADA data. Moreover, we also tested the reliability of this approach with the
existing clustering-based intrusion detection algorithm.
7.1.4 Towards global anomaly threshold to unsupervised detection
An unsupervised intrusion detection technique is an appropriate method for detect-
ing anomalies in unlabelled data. This is because the labelling of the huge amount
of data produced by SCADA systems is a costly and time-consuming process. How-
ever, unsupervised learning algorithms are based on some assumptions by which
anomalies are detected, where these assumptions are controlled by several param-
eter choices. Thus, Global Anomaly Threshold to Unsupervised Detection called
GATUD has been proposed. This approach is proposed as an add-on component
to improve the accuracy of unsupervised intrusion detection techniques. This has
been performed by initially learning two labelled small data sets from the unla-
belled data, where each data set represents either normal or abnormal behaviour.
Then, a set of supervised classifiers are trained with these two data sets to build
an ensemble-based decision-making model that can be integrated into both unsu-
pervised anomaly scoring and clustering-based intrusion detection approaches. In
the former, GATUD is used to find a global and efficient anomaly threshold, while
in the latter it is used to efficiently label produced clusters as either normal or ab-
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normal. Experiments have shown that the integration of GATUD into our SDAD
approach proposed in Chapter 5 has demonstrated significant results. Moreover,
GATUD demonstrated significant and promising results when it was integrated
into a clustering-based intrusion detection approach as a labelling technique for the
produced clusters.
7.2 Future Work
This thesis has proposed a set of innovative solutions that have been used together
to make a robust unsupervised SCADA data-driven IDS. In addition, a framework
for a realistic SCADA testbed has been introduced. Nevertheless, important future
work still needs to be done to refine each approach.
• In Chapter 3, a framework for a SCADA security testbed based on virtual-
ization technology has been proposed. In this framework, both main SCADA
system components and controlled environment have been considered so that
a user can fully simulate a full SCADA system. However, this framework
is still limited to Modbus/TCP-based components. That is, all the sim-
ulated SCADA components such as PLC, MTU server, HMI Server, etc.
are Modbus/TCP-based. Therefore, it is valuable to integrate some notable
SCADA protocols such as Zigbee and DNP3. A server which is used as a sur-
rogate for water distribution systems has been introduced in this framework,
although it would be ideal to integrate other controlled environments such
as PowerWorld and wind turbine simulators. This integration can be easily
performed by extending the generic gateway provided in this framework.
• In Chapter 4, an approach to efficiently searching for k-NN in large and high
dimensional data has been proposed. This approach has demonstrated sig-
nificant results compared to well-known algorithms and has made it possible
to efficiently give an anomaly score for each observation based on its neigh-
bourhood density even with large and high-dimensional data. However, the
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efficiency of this approach depends on the efficiency of the novel various-
widths clustering algorithm that partitions a data set into a number of clus-
ters using various-widths. The number and size of the produced clusters are
controlled by the partitioning and merging processes in this algorithm. The
creation of a small number of clusters can result in large clusters that incur a
high computational cost when finding k-NN for an observation. On the other
hand, a large number of produced clusters can result in a large number of
distance computations between an observation and the centroids of the pro-
duced clusters in order to prune unlikely clusters. Thus, the optimization of
the optimal balance of the number of produced clusters and their respective
sizes is significantly important and should be considered in future work.
• In Chapter 5, we proposed a technique to extract, from unlabelled SCADA
data, proximity detection rules based on clustering technique for SCADA
anomaly detection. These proximity detection rules can be extracted from
large and high-dimensional SCADA data, where the k-nearest neighbour app-
roach, that was proposed in Chapter 3, is used to efficiently give an anomaly
score for each observation based on its neighbourhood density. Then, the
normal proximity detection rules are extracted from observations that are
strongly expected to represent the normal behaviour. From the abnormal
observations, we extracted abnormal proximity detection rules. Although the
results of the extracted proximity detection rules are promising, there is a
need to dynamically update these rules, as the normal behaviours of a given
system may evolve over time.
• Although the SDAD approach proposed in Chapter 5 has the ability to ex-
tract, from unlabelled data, proximity detection rules based on clustering-
based, it suffers from low detection accuracy. This is because the detection
of anomalies in this mode (unsupervised) is based on assumptions to find
the near-optimal anomaly threshold. Therefore, the best detection accuracy
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is achieved when a near-optimal choice of the anomaly threshold is met. In
Chapter 6, we proposed an approach that can be used as an add-on compo-
nent to find a global and efficient anomaly threshold. Two major steps are in-
volved: learning of a most-representative data set from unlabelled data, which
represents both normal and abnormal behaviours, and building an ensemble-
based decision-making model. Although this approach has shown promising
results, there is still scope for future work: (i) minimizing the size of the most-
representative data set as much as possible without losing its representative
characteristics for the learning data, and (ii) evaluating this approach with
further intrusion-detection techniques for various application domains.
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Selected colorimetry definitions
Chromaticity: colour information, with the brightness information removed.
Gamma correction: adjusting linear values to compensate for the non-linearity
of the human eye, CRT monitors, and other input and display devices.
Intensity: a measure of the actual light power.
Lightness (L*): perceived intensity of a reflecting object; the perceptual response
to luminance.
Luma (Y): an approximation of CIE luminance, used in video engineering. It is
calculated from a weighted sum of gamma-corrected R, G, and B values.
Luminance: radiant power weighted according to the brightness sensitivity of hu-
man vision.
189 (December 2, 2014)
AppendixB
Testbed specifications
The experiments reported in this work were implemented through a combination
of C/C++ code—compiled using the GNU C++ compiler—and bash or PHP wrapper
scripts. The main components of the evaluation testbed are routines to:
• extract the ground truth from image annotations for use in evaluation of
query effectiveness;
• extract feature data from the collection images;
• pose single-example queries using the specified feature, feature representation,
and distance measure, and sort the collection images by similarity to the query
example;
• combine the lists produced by individual examples in a multiple-example
query according to the selected combining function;
• evaluate the results using the ground truth, and generate the precision and
recall data;
• convert the precision and recall data to eleven-point interpolated values or
R-precision;
• average the results over all queries; and
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• generate plots of the precision and recall behaviour.
The timing experiments were carried out on a personal computer with the following
specifications:
Processor: AMD Athlon XP1600+
RAM: 256MB (DDR)
Hard disk drive: Seagate ST360021A ATA (60GB, 2MB Cache, 7200RPM)
Operating system: Mandrake GNU/Linux 8.1 (kernel: 2.4.8-26mdk)
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